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This dissertation combines cultural theory and gender theory with literary 
criticism to evaluate the treatment of lesbians during the Holocaust and in narratives 
about the Holocaust. Responding to the kissing-scene controversy of the Berlin memorial 
for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust I claim that lesbian women’s experience of 
suffering is downplayed and disappears under the umbrella term ‘homosexuals.’ 
Employing a critical historical conceptualization of “lesbian love,” I consider examples 
from Claudia Schoppmann’s Days of Masquerade and Verbotene Verhältnisse as well as 
the personal estate of political activist Hilde Radusch to trace the personal view lesbians 
have of themselves. Shifting focus onto lesbian suffering in Erica Fischer’s Aimée & 
Jaguar and Alexandra von Grote’s Novembermond, I specifically argue that narratives 
with lesbian love stories set during the Holocaust only work in the context of one partner 
being Jewish. Religious persecution and discrimination based on sexual identity are 
conflated to overshadow each other: a reading as either Jewish or lesbian suffering is 
rejected in favor of the novelty of a lesbian love story. Employing critical 
conceptualizations of “identity” and “memory” I further develop the idea of what the 
representation or misrepresentation of lesbian persecution during the Holocaust means for 






Table of Contents 
Dedication .................................................................................................... iii	  
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................ iv	  
Abstract ........................................................................................................ vi	  
List of Figures .............................................................................................. ix	  
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................... x	  
Introduction .................................................................................................. 1	  
Chapter 1 – Terminology ............................................................................. 9	  
1.1 Discrimination versus Persecution .......................................... 9	  
1.2 Lesbian, Tribade, or Female Friend? ................................... 22	  
1.3 Nazis' Sexual Policy and their Perception of Women ......... 39	  
1.4 Lesbian Victims ...................................................................... 45	  
Chapter 2 – Memory, Identity, Trauma and History ............................. 53	  
2.1 Memory and History .............................................................. 55	  
2.2 Memory and Trauma ............................................................. 59	  
2.3 Memory and Identity ............................................................. 66	  
 
 viii 
Chapter 3 – Lesbian Persecution in Historical Representations ........... 76	  
3.1 Hilde Radusch ......................................................................... 78	  
3.2 Aimée & Jaguar ...................................................................... 85	  
3.3 Days of Masquerade ............................................................... 95	  
Chapter 4 – Lesbian Persecution in Fictional Representations ........... 100	  
4.1 Verbotene Verhältnisse ........................................................ 101	  
4.2 Aimée & Jaguar: ................................................................... 114	  
4.3 Novembermond ..................................................................... 128	  
Chapter 5 – Memorials ............................................................................ 139	  
5.1 Cologne Pink Triangle Memorial ........................................ 140	  
5.2 Frankfurt’s Angel ................................................................. 147	  
5.3 Berlin’s ‘Homomonument’ .................................................. 151	  
Chapter 6 – Conclusion ............................................................................ 160	  




List of Figures 
Figure 1.1. The ‘pure Aryan’ Family, 1939….………………………………………17 
Figure 1.2. The Aryan Family.……………………………………………………….18 
Figure 2.1. Willy Brandt……………………..……………………………………….62 
Figure 3.1. Hilde Radusch Memorial………..……………………………………….78 
Figure 3.2. H. Radusch “Words”…………….……………………………………….85 
Figure 4.1. Férial & November……………...……………………………………...137 
Figure 5.1. Cologne Pink Triangle…………..……………………………………...142 
Figure 5.2. Frankfurter Angel..……………………………………………………...151 




List of Abbreviations 
Gestapo…………………………………………………………………Secret State Police 
HJ.………..……………………………………………………………………Hitler Youth 
KPD.…….………………………………………………………German Communist Party 
NS………..………………………………………………………………National Socialist 
NSDAP…………………………………………National Socialist German Workers Party 







Thoughts about the representation of homosexual victims of the Nazi regime 
through memorials were the starting point of the initial project from which this 
dissertation derived. More specifically, this project was sparked by the debates about a 
kiss and the words that should be engraved on the Memorial to Homosexuals Persecuted 
under Nazism in Berlin, Germany. The criteria outlined by the German Bundestag 
showed a three-fold goal that the monument was supposed to achieve. First, it was 
directed at the past to memorialize homosexual victims of the Nazi era. Simultaneously, 
however, it was also to be seen as a symbol of support and acceptance of homosexuality 
in the present by condemning any intolerance, hostility or marginalization against them. 
Lastly, the monument is to facilitate a sense of pride in homosexuals and the diversity of 
their history.1 Based on this Call for proposals, the winning submission was presented to 
the public on the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the 
Holocaust in January 2006. It envisioned a large, black cube with a peephole through 
which a screen could be viewed that showed an infinite loop of two men kissing each 
other. The jury mentioned in its explanation of the winning project: “The very 
sophisticated and confident sculpture very openly takes up the theme of the Holocaust 
monument by Richard Eisenman” and by showing two men kissing the artists manage 
“without verbal or written explanation […] to address the topic of homosexuality 
                                                
1 Full text at http://www.gedenkort.de/files/GedO_Auslobung_dt_engl.pdf . 
 
 2 
straightforwardly yet subtly” (Initiative der Homosexuellen NS-Opfer Gedenken).2 The 
design itself and the rationale of the jury set in motion a process of heated debates 
regarding the successful implementation of the proposal’s goals as well as a problematic 
comparison and contrasting between Jewish and homosexual victims of the Holocaust. 
Probably the harshest critique, however, was directed at the discrepancy of a monument 
for gay and lesbian homosexual victims of the Holocaust that completely erased the 
existence of lesbians. 
The complete debate is well documented online, so I will not recount the broad 
set of difficulties that arose between the first idea for a memorial in 2003 and the 
unveiling of the final product in 2008.3 The central point of the controversy, however, 
stands in direct relation to the explanation of the jury for choosing the project, which 
mentions the kiss of two men as representing homosexual victims subtly yet confidently. 
It is worth mentioning here that the term ‘homosexual’ by definition includes men and 
women. A German dictionary entry defines homosexuality as behavior and emotions of 
men or women towards their own gender.4  The reasoning of the jury is therefore hard to 
comprehend when the initial proposal called for a symbol of persecution that would 
facilitate a sense of pride in all homosexuals.  In essence, while organizations serving 
homosexual men argued that only they were persecuted and the memorial represented 
                                                
2 “[Die] sehr klar durchdachte und selbstbewußt auftretende Skulptur nimmt ganz 
offensichtlich Bezug auf die Stelen des Holocaust Denkmals von Richard Eisenman”. 
“[o]hne verbale Hilfestellungen oder schriftliche Erklärungen […] das Thema der 
Homosexualität direkt und doch subtil [vorzustellen]”. 
3 Detailed information and further links can be found in “Das Denkmal für die 
Homosexuellen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus in der Diskussion.” Gedenkort für die im 
Nationalsozialismus Verfolgten Homosexuellen. LSVD, 2006. Web. 22 Dec. 2014.    
4 cf. Der Duden: “Homosexualiät”. 
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this accurately, lesbian organizations insisted that homosexual women had been 
persecuted as well and weren’t included in the memorial. As a direct consequence of the 
heated debate about the memorial in Berlin, a workshop was organized at the 
concentration camp in Ravensbrück in 2010, addressing problems of memorialization and 
remembrance. The biggest concentration camp almost exclusively used to incarcerate 
women and children, Ravensbrück is of significance especially because most of the 
women sent there were categorized as ‘asocial,’ the classification assigned to many 
lesbian women. This workshop as well as the resulting book Homophobie und Devianz is 
evidence of the continuing struggle for recognition of lesbian persecution and 
deconstruction of the category ‘homosexual,’ The main question central for promoting 
the undertaking of this study came as a result of the erasure of lesbian existence from the 
memorial for homosexual victims. In choosing this particular memorial, did the jury 
forget or deny lesbian victims?  
The debate around lesbian representation in the Berlin memorial throws up a 
larger question about the status of lesbian holocaust victims. This dissertation will 
explore the status, focusing on how lesbians have been included in and excluded from the 
narrative of the Holocaust; how inclusion and exclusion has played out in representations 
of the Holocaust, and what that treatment has meant for lesbian identity in Germany. I 
approach these questions not from a historian’s point of view but from the position of a 
comparative literature scholar researching the discursive representation of a phenomenon. 
While I do take the historicity of the problem into consideration I concentrate on the 
literary representation. Against the backdrop of Holocaust studies, however, I suggest a 
conceptual change of definition. Instead of defining lesbian women as ‘lesbian victims of 
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the Holocaust’ I propose it will be more beneficial for addressing the (in)visibility of 
lesbian women to think of them as ‘the lesbian women among the victims of National 
Socialism.’ This opens up the categories used by the Nazis, offering a possibility to 
analyze aspects such as sexual orientation that permeate these boundaries. 
This dissertation thus focuses on the representation of lesbian love in the narrative 
of the Holocaust. What aspects of lesbian identity are represented, how, and to what end? 
Based on arguments juxtaposing lesbian discrimination versus lesbian persecution I have 
analyzed the material in terms of how these two concepts are embodied. The fundamental 
change of including psychological tormenting in the contemporary definition of 
persecution as outlined by the United Nations, is a major factor in my analysis. My 
intention was not to settle the argument but rather to show how lesbian love during the 
Holocaust is (mis-)remembered and what implications can be derived from it. The 
mechanisms of Nazi persecution directed at lesbians were mainly grounded in 
psychological terror and torment. Fear of attracting attention by falling outside the 
prescribed norm silenced lesbian women and drove them into invisibility. My central 
thesis is that lesbian women’s experience of this persecution is downplayed and 
disappears under the umbrella term ‘homosexuals’ with tangible consequences in the lack 
of collective identity that are still palpable in the 21st century. The repercussions of 
silencing through psychological pressures as exerted on lesbians by National Socialists 
lasted long into the 1970s, leaving a gap of apparent nonexistence.  
To be able to write about a topic that is separated from the 21st century by seventy 
years one must clarify differences in the understanding of terminology and ideas between 
‘then’ and ‘now.’  
 
 5 
As Ferdinand de Saussure explained in Course in General Linguistics, human 
beings strive to create meaning through interpretation of ‘signs.’ De Saussure’s concept 
relies on the signifier, which is the form that the sign takes. For the purpose of this 
dissertation the signifier(s) could be the terms ‘lesbian’ or ‘persecution.’ The signified is 
the concept that is represented by the sign. For the signifier ‘lesbian’ the signified would 
be the concept of women loving women. Only when there is an association between the 
‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’ is meaning created and a ‘sign’ developed that has universal 
meaning for the members of one specific group who interpret the signified similarly (cf. 
Saussure 67). If the concept – the signified – changes, the sign necessarily changes as 
well. In some cases the sign, signified, and signifier have changed since the 1930s. What 
the sign ‘lesbian’ means in the 21st century is not the same as the understanding during 
the Third Reich, creating a problem for identifying the subject one wants to analyze. 
Being mindful of linguistic changes and limitations will also possibly help understand 
rationalizations in the debates about lesbian victims of and persecution of lesbian women 
under National Socialism. It is therefore essential to examine what is meant when writing 
about ‘women loving women.’ Scholars in Women’s and Gender studies have challenged 
and changed the meaning of what it means to be female, what it means to be ‘a woman.’ 
In addition, delineation between the understanding of romantic love versus sexual 
intercourse or brotherly love/friendship (philia) needs to be explored at least partially.  
I have dedicated my first chapter to establishing (1) the definition and meaning of 
discrimination versus persecution as it was understood during the Nazi era and as it is 
understood today, (2) distinguishing between terms used by women-loving-women 
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during the Nazi era to describe themselves and those used in the 21st century,5 (3) to 
investigating the triad of heterosexuality – homosexuality – bisexuality and (4) to 
explicating the sexual policies of the National Socialists and their perception of women.6  
In the second chapter I move on to write about memory and identity as they 
pertain to a collective, and especially the way memory is influenced by trauma. I strive to 
answer the following questions in this chapter: What can be remembered and how is 
trauma significant in the process of remembering? What influence does the way of 
remembering have on the formation of a collective identity for the following generation? 
Is there a specific female way of remembering trauma and dealing with it? If so, what 
implications does that have for the way lesbian victims of the Holocaust are (not) 
remembered? 
The third chapter is an analysis of the historical parts of the material I have 
gathered. I begin with the personal estate of German political activist and lesbian Hilde 
Radusch, who was persecuted by the Nazis, and move on to evaluate the hybrid text 
Verbotene Verhältnisse by Claudia Schoppmann, in which she uses authentic court files 
                                                
5 In an fortunate turn of events, as I was about to turn in the manuscript new material 
came to light that I would have liked to include in the study. The transcript of a 2011 
radio talk show, interviews several women-loving women who lived in Nazi Germany 
during the 1930s. References to the use of the term ‘lesbian’ and treatment of lesbians by 
women in their 90s who even now want to remain anonymous, would have 
supported/broadened my thesis and shown how survivors think/thought about their 
gender identity and the repercussions of living invisible lives. I have opted to insert 
footnotes in relevant places to highlight that this material is available and significant for 
further study. 
6 One reason for this necessity is the pro and contra arguments used by historians to 
justify their position regarding the in-/exclusion of lesbians from the Holocaust narrative. 
Another one derives from my analysis of the material for which I have to build a 
framework of reference and classification. 
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to reconstruct legal cases against women accused of being lesbians in Austria between 
1933-1945. In this chapter I limit my inquiry to the historical portion of Schoppmann’s 
text, in the following chapter I then analyze its fictional elements. Furthermore, I evaluate 
the documentary novel Aimée & Jaguar by Erica Fischer. My emphasis in this chapter is 
the way lesbian women described themselves and their persecution during the Nazi era in 
order to have a basis for the next chapter, which deals with the fictionalized 
representation of their lives and persecution.  
As mentioned above, my fourth chapter deals with the fictional accounts of 
Claudia Schoppmann’s Verbotene Verhältnisse and moves on to the movie Aimée & 
Jaguar that is based on Erica Fischer’s book analyzed in the previous chapter. The last, 
and purely fictional, movie in this chapter is Alexandra von Grote’s Novembermond. 
Especially interesting for this chapter is the question of what happens with the love story 
between the two women. Who are they, how are they portrayed and what does their 
portrayal do for the interpretation of the characters as lesbians?  
In the fifth chapter I analyze the commemoration of lesbian persecution after 
1945, specifically starting with the dedication of the first official memorials for 
homosexual victims of the Holocaust. I have chosen the memorials in Frankfurt, 
dedicated in 1994, Cologne (dedicated 1995) and Berlin (2008) to trace changes and 
similarities in the representation as well as difficulties that arose during the process of 
erecting the memorials. An analysis of location, design and inscription were my guide to 




The sixth and final chapter is my conclusion, summarizing my findings and 
answering the question of how lesbian love is represented in the gender(ed) narrative of 
the Holocaust. I argue that lesbian identity disappears behind other categories, such as 
Jewishness or political affiliation, making lesbian persecution invisible and thus 
impossible to represent. Trying to shift the direction of the discourse, I propose a change 
in meaning to view lesbian victims of the Holocaust as a subgroup within a larger group: 






Chapter 1 – Terminology 
In this chapter I analyze different definitions and concepts in the 1930s and the 
21st century in order to clarify what I am examining in this study. The changes in 
meanings of discrimination and persecution are imperative for understanding 
contemporary debates about inclusion/exclusion of lesbians in remembering the 
Holocaust. Equally essential is the following discussion of what as and is understood as 
lesbian, lesbian behavior or lesbian sexual orientation. Building on that I then lay out 
what National Socialists sexual policies reveal about the Nazi perception and treatment of 
women in general, since large portions of measures against lesbians are rooted in it. In 
my last step I bring all of the previous sections together and talk about lesbian victims of 
the Holocaust.  
1.1 Discrimination versus Persecution 
In the discourse for or against an inclusion of lesbians – or, more specifically, an 
explicit inclusion of the word ‘lesbians’ instead of the collective ‘homosexuals’ – as 
recognized victims of the Holocaust, two other terms need to be discussed to understand 
the viewpoints of the quarreling parties. The differentiation between the terms 
‘Discrimination’ (Diskriminierung) and ‘Persecution’ (Verfolgung) is vital to an 
understanding of the different perceptions and, moreover, the consequences for 
commemoration of Holocaust victims. Following are examples from various letters, 
statements and articles dealing with the ‘HomoMonument’ in Berlin and persecution of 
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lesbian women during the Holocaust in general. An open letter by VEHN (Verein zur 
Erforschung der Geschichte der Homosexuellen in Niedersachsen e.V.1) to the German 
Minister of State from 2010 regarding the call for submissions of same-sex kissing scenes 
for the memorial to homosexual victims of the Holocaust reads 
It cannot be historically verified that lesbian women were subject of 
individual persecution during National Socialism based on their sexual 
orientation. […] Of a different quality was the individual persecution and 
deportation to concentration camps that millions of people had to endure.23   
Ilse Kokula states that “In the patriarchal society of the National Socialists lesbian 
women were not persecuted with the same severity and systematic as gay men. […] 
Contempt and denigration, however, struck homosexual women and men alike” 
(Senatsverwaltung fuer Bildung, Jugend und Sport 5). In an article about ways of 
remembering lesbian women during National Socialism Sabine Schrader writes  
Lesbian women are subjected to a two-fold discrimination in a patriarchal 
system, first in their exclusion from official life because of their gender 
and then fore rejecting the natural role of women, to be fertile, and to 
reproduce. […] The only thing we can be sure of is that there was no 
systematic persecution.4 (Schrader 33–34)  
                                                
1 VEHN is an organization dedicated to researching the history of homosexuals in Lower 
Saxony.  
2 Unless otherwise noted all translations were done by me. The original German quotes 
are included in the footnotes. 
3 “Es ist historisch nicht zu belegen, dass lesbische Frauen im Nationalsozialismus 
individueller Verfolgung aufgrund ihrer sexuellen Orientierung ausgesetzt gewesen seien. 
[…] Eine ganz andere Qualität hatte die individuelle Verfolgung und Verschleppung in 
Konzentrationslager, der Millionen Menschen ausgesetzt waren”.  
4 “Lesbische Frauen unterliegen in einem patriarchalen System einer zweifachen 
Diskriminierung, zum einen in ihrem Ausschluss aus dem öffentlichen Leben qua 
Geschlecht, zum anderen in ihrem Verstoß gegen die natürliche Bestimmung der Frau, 
ihrer Fruchtbarkeit und Reproduktion. […] Sicher ist nur, daβ es keine systematische 
Verfolgung gab”.  
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Likewise, German historian Claudia Schoppmann notes that the “situation of lesbian 
women in the ‘Third Reich’ can only partly be described in terms of clear-cut criteria of 
persecution” (Grau and Schoppmann 8).5  
What becomes clear as one delves deeper into the topic is a differentiation 
between lesbian and gay victims. ‘Discrimination’ appears to be the favored term for the 
description of treatment of lesbian women while ‘persecution’ is used in conjunction with 
gay men.  A short comparison between definitions of both terms in selected dictionaries 
yields the conclusion that there is a hierarchy of suffering between persecution and 
discrimination. The main difference between the entries should be understood as the 
intent to kill someone (persecution) as opposed to harassing someone without any lethal 
methods (discrimination).6 In contrast to definitions given in dictionaries, the United 
                                                
5 Only one article by in the TAZ from1992 utilized the term ‘Verfolgung’ a few dozen 
times (Mittag).  
6 Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “discrimination” as “the practice of unfairly 
treating a person or group of people differently from other people or groups of people”. 
In the body of the main entry this is broken down further into the “act, practice, or an 
instance of discriminating categorically rather than individually” and a “prejudiced or 
prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment”. The latter is accompanied by the reference to 
racial discrimination. The entry for “persecution” in the same dictionary reads as follows: 
“the act or practice of persecuting especially those who differ in origin, religion, or social 
outlook; the condition of being persecuted, harassed, or annoyed”. A further survey to 
how the verb is defined reveals the information that to persecute someone means to “to 
treat (someone) cruelly or unfairly especially because of race or religious or political 
beliefs” and by a lesser extent to “constantly annoy or bother (someone)”. The Oxford 
English Dictionary gives more detailed entries. Discrimination is here delineated as the 
“making of distinctions prejudicial to people of a different race or colour from oneself; 
racial discrimination” and to persecute means “to pursue, follow with hostility or 
malignity […] to pursue, chase, hunt, drive (with missiles, or with attempts to catch, kill 
or injure) […] to pursue with malignancy or enmity and injurious action; esp. to oppress 
with pains and penalties for the holding of a belief or opinion held to be injurious or 
heretical”. Persecution itself is defined as “infliction of death, torture, or penalties for 
adherence to a religious belief or an opinion as such, with a view to the repression or 
extirpation of it” (Simpson and Weiner).  
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Nation’s understanding of persecution and discrimination is interesting to look at because 
it applies to refugees and grew out of the atrocities of the Nazis in 1951. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees published an updated document in 1992 that 
sheds light on the divergent perception of the two terms: 
51. There is no universally accepted definition of “persecution”, and 
various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little 
success. From Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, it may be inferred that a 
threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. 
Other serious violations of human rights – for the same reasons – would 
also constitute persecution. […] 
54. Differences in the treatment of various groups do indeed exist to a 
greater or lesser extent in many societies. Persons who receive less 
favourable treatment as a result of such differences are not necessarily 
victims of persecution. It is only in certain circumstances that 
discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of 
discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature 
for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn his 
livelihood, his right to practice his religion, or his access to normally 
available educational facilities. (Moussalli, emphasis added) 
It should be self-evident that one cannot deny the separate nature of what it means to be 
discriminated against as opposed to being persecuted. A threat to life and freedom is 
essential to the meaning of persecution; discrimination, on the other hand, is understood 
as the less favorable treatment of an individual or group. When we apply this 
understanding of the two terms to how the Nazis treated homosexual women and men 
two things become clear. The first is that with §175 male homosexuals were singled out 
and targeted officially as enemies of the Reich.7 They were discriminated against as well 
                                                
7 The complete text of §175 after the Nazis reformed it in 1935 reads: “A male who 
commits a sex offense with another male or allows himself to be used by another male for 
a sex offense shall be punished with imprisonment. Where a party was not yet twenty-one 
years of age at the time of the act, the court may in especially minor cases refrain from 
punishment” (Halsall). The addendum §175a lists punishments and the various ways in 
which this sexual offense could take place: “Penal servitude up to 10 years or, where 
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as persecuted and – maybe most importantly – incarcerated in concentration camps. The 
law put into place demanded “penal servitude up to 10 years or, where there are 
mitigating circumstances, imprisonment of not less than three months” (Halsall) for any 
homosexual act committed by men. Secondly, if one looks at the wording of §175, 
women were notably excluded from it. Although there had been efforts by various 
persons to create a similar law for lesbian women, these efforts never made it into the 
legal code. It can be speculated that based on the view the German leadership had on 
differences between the sexes that they singled out male homosexuals as the destroyer of 
German blood whereas women were not seen as valuable enough to warrant mention. 
Furthermore, homosexuality was feared to spread like a disease if contact between 
homosexuals and heterosexuals was allowed. This fear accounts for the separate 
cellblocks and camp blocks that have been reported by male homosexual prisoners. If one 
takes the theory of homosexuality as a disease one step further the fear of the Nazi 
leadership was a loss of ‘good’ German blood by young men being recruited by gays and 
infected with homosexuality. Lesbian love, on the other hand, was not only less visible – 
affectionate acts between women were considered part of the feminine nature – but also 
to some extent viewed as less dangerous. This did not, however, constitute more 
acceptance on the part of the Nazis. Lesbian women still subverted the heteronormative 
                                                                                                                                            
there are mitigating circumstances, imprisonment of not less than three months shall 
apply to: (1) a male who, with violence or the threat of violence to body and soul or life, 
compels another male to commit a sex offense with him or to allow himself to be abused 
for a sex offense; (2) a male who, by abusing a relationship of dependence based upon 
service, employment or subordination, induces another male to commit a sex offense with 
him or to allow himself to be abused for a sex offense; (3) a male over 21 years of age 
who seduces a male person under twenty-one years to commit a sex offense with him or 
to allow himself to be abused for a sex offense; (4) a male who publicly commits a sex 
offense with males or allows himself to be abused by males for a sex offense or offers 
himself for the same” (Halsall).  
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gender stereotype but, unlike gay men, their sexuality never became an issue of 
importance. They were persecuted and discriminated against but differently and with 
different outcomes.  
Nazi policies and their perception of women make it clear that women were only 
the vessel for the German seed with the man providing the essential ‘German blood’ and 
value. As Gabriele Mittag reports in a newspaper article:  
Female homosexuality was effectively ‘unthinkable’ for the Nazis or only 
conceivable as ‘pseudo homosexuality’, as the result of ‘seduction’ and 
not a catastrophe regarding demographic development since women were 
still ‘usable’ […] meaning that they were always ready for sexual 
intercourse.8 (Mittag) 
One cannot forget, however, that in Austria a law similar to §175 existed for lesbian 
women between 1852 and 1971. Paragraph 129Ib applied to women as well as men: 
“Punishable as criminal acts are also the following acts of sodomy: 1. Sodomy against 
nature, which is […] b) with persons of the same sex” (DöW).9 Since the law does not 
specify the biological sex of the person committing the offense, the National Socialists 
kept the law in place after the annexation of Austria and applied it to both men and 
women. Historian Claudia Schoppmann, who used archival records of court documents 
from 1938-1945 that had survived the war and had not been destroyed afterwards to piece 
together stories of persecution against lesbian women, expresses in her book Verbotene 
Verhältnisse that between 1938 and 1943 66 women had been prosecuted in Vienna 
                                                
8 “Weibliche Homosexualität war für die Nazis im Grund ‘undenkbar’ oder nur als 
‘Pseudohomosexualität’ vorstellbar, als Ergebnis einer ‘Verführung’ und 
bevölkerungspolitisch keine Katastrophe, da die Frau ‘nach wie vor nutzbar’, […] d.h. 
immer ‘geschlechtsbereit’ sei”. 
9 “Als Verbrechen werden auch nachstehende Arten der Unzucht bestraft: 1. Unzucht 
wider die Natur, das ist [...] b) mit Personen desselben Geschlechtes”. 
 
 15 
based on §129Ib. While this number is much lower than those of men prosecuted based 
on either §175 or §129Ib, it nevertheless goes to show that a systematic discrimination 
and persecution of lesbian women did take place. Why only very little research has been 
and is being done on the topic – with the exception of lesbian and homosexual 
organizations – may be explained by reasoning that “the topic is still one considered 
‘dubious’ if not abominable’” (Mittag).10 With LGBT history having become a serious 
subject with active research in the past twenty years, however, Mittag’s explanation is not 
adequate anymore. I leave the specifics of analyzing the mechanisms behind this 
phenomenon to other scholars, noting here only that there is a discrepancy. 
From a purely pragmatic standpoint the persecution of male homosexuals was a 
necessity for the Nazis. Focused on population growth, every male homosexual counted 
as the loss of a potential genitor; leaving homosexuals free to do as they wished would 
lead to seduction of susceptible German youth (cf. Grau 31). With the rigorous separation 
of men and women into their respective organizations, the prejudice of gays seducing the 
youth may have been valid for youngsters in the Hitler Jugend (HJ), where male-male 
bonding was encouraged and pubescent hormonal outbursts could lead to 
experimentation, but is unjustified for adults. One rationale that drove the National 
Socialists to the extreme measure of trying to eradicate homosexuals is deeply embedded 
in the ideology of Nationalism. The ideology of modern nationalism is tied to the idea of 
respectability, meaning ‘decent’ or ‘correct’ manners, morals, and most of all sexuality. 
George L. Mosse, in analyzing the relationship between nationalism, respectability, and 
sexuality, writes in Nationalism & Sexuality: 
                                                
10 “der Gegenstand immer noch als ‘unseriös’, wenn nicht sogar ‘anrüchig’ gilt”. 
 
 16 
 Analyzing the relationship between nationalism and respectability 
involves tracing the development of some of the most important norms 
that have informed our society: ideals of manliness […], and their effect 
on the place of women; and insiders who accepted the norms, as compared 
to the outsides, those considered abnormal or diseased. (Mosse 1) 
The patriarchal hierarchy of the National Socialists saw women first and foremost as 
mothers and wives. They served as the helper for men while men actively engaged in 
moving the nation into the future. In the disorder of the beginning of the 20th century this 
future was envisioned with stability and respectability in mind. The division of labor 
between the sexes ensured a certain set of rigid standards, which mimicked stability by 
guaranteeing a stable and settled family life. It can be argued that abnormal or deviant 
sexuality jeopardized the stability of the male-female nuclear family, thus making it a 
threat to society. Respectability was the nationalists’ way of maintaining a division of 
labor and therefore a future for the German Volk. Respectability, ‘correct’ and ‘decent’ 
manners and morals, were concerned with popular attitudes towards sexuality and sexual 
behavior. “Respectability came to rule behavior patterns […], and was based on a 
consistent attitude toward the human body, its sensuous qualities and its sexual 
functions” (Mosse 5). ‘Decent’ and ‘correct’ behavior patterns, then, arose from the most 
important ideals of Pietism and Evangelicalism: Modesty, sexual purity, virtue, among 
others (cf. Shantz 310ff.). A determination to restrain sexual passion and behavior arose 
from these values, marking sexuality as a procreation necessity. With that, differentiation 
between deviant and normal sexuality could be based not on ‘correct’ behavior but its 
result for the Volk. One doctor said about homosexuals “the secrecy that accompanie[s] 
deviant sexuality resemble[s] a conspiracy sowing hatred against the state; men and 
women who practice such vices lack either moral sense or civic responsibility” (Mosse 
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29). The aforementioned threat to the stability of society can consequently be understood 
as a driving force behind the Nazi persecution of homosexuals.  
The other very important idea stemming from the ideology of nationalism is the 
ideal of manliness mentioned before. It, too, was central to the self-definition of the 
National Socialist state, with images of the Nordic, blonde Aryans perpetually published 
in NSDAP propaganda material. Figure 1.1 shows a calendar cover from 1938 published 
by the arms policy department of the NSDAP. The Aryan ideal of manliness is depicted 
alongside a woman and child. Blonde, muscular, tanned and towering over the female the 
man’s image evokes a sense of him as a protector and defender of the family. He 
symbolizes the strength of body and mind while the blonde female, garbed in white and 
Figure 1.1: The ‘pure Aryan’ Family, 1938  
"Propaganda Artifacts Gallery." United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Ed. 




cradling an infant, embodies purity and virtue. She sits in between his legs, giving her an 
aura of modesty and subservience. Another image (Figure 1.2) found in the publications 
by official National Socialist sources is a depiction of the ideal Aryan family. Again, all 
members of the family have blonde hair and are impeccably dressed. The father acts as 
the protector by placing his hands on the shoulders of his sons. He is the center of the 
image and towers over the rest of his family. All three male members of the family are 
drawn looking directly at the audience while the mother holds an infant and her daughter 
stands with her back towards the onlooker. Neither of them makes eye contact, instead 
looking demurely towards the infant. The clear masculine-feminine role distinctions and 
the division of labor seen in this image illustrate the Nazi idea of an ideal Aryan family. 
With four children, the woman has reached the minimum number of children to receive a 
Mother’s Cross. The manliness that National Socialists endeavored to reach was 
Figure 1.2: The Aryan Family. Representation in a poster for the Winterhilfswerk. 
Stegemann, Wolf. “Das Winterhilfswerk – Spenden für den Staat, die Armen und für die 
Frierenden Soldaten im Osten.” Dorsten unterm Hakenkreuz. Wolf Stegemann, 28 May 
2012. Web. 20 Dec. 2014. 
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“invoked to safeguard the existing order against the perils of modernity, which threatened 
the clear distinction between what was considered normal and abnormality”. 
Furthermore, as is evident in the images, “manliness symbolized the nation’s spiritual and 
material vitality. It called for strength of body and mind, but not brute force – the 
individual’s energies had to be kept under control” (Mosse 23). Modeled after the Greek 
idea of male beauty, the Aryan man was supposed to show proper physical proportions 
and exude an air of transcendent beauty. Masculinity meant offering stability in the 
home, creating order, keeping the body fit and healthy. The Nazi’s efforts in the Hitler 
Youth to form young boys in this image are evidence for the control and oppression that 
that the regime exhibited. Homosexuals, then, undermined the efforts of nationalism to 
keep order and balance by what was perceived as sexual laxity and through deterioration 
of the masculine ideal. They were seen as nervous and unstable individuals, prone to 
masturbation and with distorted physiognomy that showed degeneracy of mental 
capacities (cf. 31). Fear of being seduced to the degenerate lifestyle and feeling 
threatened by emasculation hence also fueled the agenda of the Nazis.   
Nevertheless, one cannot assume that the National Socialists frowned upon all sex 
equally. As Dagmar Herzog remarks in her book Sex after Fascism “that all the 
manifestly brutal aspects of Nazi sexual policies were not embedded in a broader 
antisexual attitude, but, rather, coexisted with injunctions and encouragements to the 
majority of Germans to seek and experience sexual pleasure” (Herzog 11). Repressive 
acts were first and foremost directed at those who evoked anxiety and fear, be that on the 
level of sexuality or race. The same rhetoric that was used to demonize abnormal 
sexualities was also employed to villainize the Jews whose ‘degeneracy’ was understood 
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as a natural trait of Jewish men. The idea that “Jewish men differ from non-Jewish men 
by being delicate, meek, or effeminate in body and character runs deep in European 
history” (Lerner et al. 2-4). Elemental in this approach and explanatory for the existential 
Nazi angst of homosexuals is the duality that is inherent in both Jewish males and 
homosexuals. People with the religious identity “Jewish” also had a national identity, 
“German”. Likewise, homosexuals had their sexual identity deviant from the 
heterosexual norm but nonetheless identified as German nationals. Thus their expression 
of masculinity was just as German as the ideal masculinity propagated by the National 
Socialists. The following quote from an NSDAP functionary illustrates how fluidly the 
transition from one victim group to another can be made as well as how fearful the Nazi 
ideology was of emasculation:  
 ‘Suprema lex salus populi!’ Service before Self! It is not necessary that 
you and I live, but it is necessary that the German people lives. And it can 
live only if it has the will to struggle – for to live is to struggle. And it can 
struggle only if it remains virile [mannbar]. But it is virile only if it 
exercises discipline, particularly in sexual matters. Free love is 
undisciplined and unbridled. That is why we reject it, as we reject 
everything that is of harm to the people. Anyone who aims at male-male 
or female-female sex is our enemy. We reject everything that emasculates 
our people and puts it at the mercy of its enemies […].The stronger are 
right. And the stronger will always assert themselves against the weaker. 
Today we are the weaker ones. Let us make sure that we again become the 
stronger! We can do that only if we exercise discipline [Zucht]. We 
therefore reject any sexual deviation [Unzucht], particularly between man 
and man, because it robs us of the last possibility of freeing our people 
from the slave-chains in which it is now forced to toil.11 (Grau and 
Schoppmann 25) 
                                                
11 “’Suprema lex salus populi!’Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz! Nicht nötig ist es, daß Du und 
ich leben, abers nötig ist es, daß das deutsche Volk lebt. Und leben kann es nur, wenn es 
kämpfen will, denn leben heißt kämpfen. Und kämpfen kann es nur, wenn es sich 
mannbar hält. Mannbar ist es aber nur, wenn es Zucht übt, vor allem in der Liebe. 
Unüchtig ist: Freie Liebe und zügellos. Darum lehnen wir sie ab, wie wir alles ablehnen, 
was zum Schaden des Volkes ist. Wer gar an Mann-männliche und Weib-weibliche Liebe 
 
 21 
The declaration was given in 1928 during the election of the Reichstag, and does not 
obfuscate whom the Nazis viewed as their enemies. Emasculation wasn’t only perceived 
as a threat from homosexual men but from Jews as well.  
Jewishness and masculinity have been debated in Europe since the 13th century. 
This idea manifested itself in most instances when Jewish emancipation was an issue and 
Jewish men were viewed as not masculine enough to take part in military operations. 
With growing anti-Semitism, however, such stereotypes changed from issues of 
masculinity to non-normative gender expressions in Jewish men. Reasons for the 
apparent lack of masculinity were plentiful, but tended to focus on the religious 
studiousness of the Jewish male and the dominant Jewish woman (cf. 2ff.). For Freud, on 
the other hand, the effeminate nature of the Jewish male stemmed from his circumcision, 
which essentially left him “no longer fully a male” (Gilman, The Jew’s Body 156). The 
image of the emasculated Jew who inverted the order of the hyper masculine German 
gender ideal therefore became synonymous with all that needed to be annihilated.  
   
                                                                                                                                            
denkt, ist unser Feind. Alles, was unser Volk entmannt, zum Spielball seiner Feinde 
macht, lehnen wir ab […]. Der Stärkere hat Recht. Und der Stärkere wird immer sich 
gegen den Schwächeren durchsetzen. Heute sind wir die Schwächeren. Sehen wir zu, daß 
wir wieder die Stärkeren werden! Das können wir aber nur, wenn wir Zucht üben. Wir 
verwerfen darum jede Unzucht, vor allem die Mann-männliche Liebe, weil sie uns der 
letzten Möglichkeit beraubt, jemals unser Volk von den Sklavenketten zu befreien, unter 




1.2 Lesbian, Tribade, or Female Friend? 
In 1559 Italian anatomist Renaldo Columbo published De re Anatomica in which 
he first described the organ and its function. His prosaic description makes the clitoris a  
certain small part, which is elevated on the apex vaginae above the 
foramen from which urine exits. And this dearest reader is that, it is the 
principal seat of women’s enjoyment in intercourse; so that if you not only 
rub it with your penis, but even touch it with your little finger, the pleasure 
causes their seed to flow forth in all directions, swifter than the wind, even 
if they don’t want it to. (Stringer and Becker 131–132) 
The idea of the clitoris as an organ that gives pleasure clashed with the belief of that time, 
which saw women as being inverted men whose genitalia was merely hidden inside (cf. 
Laqueur 26ff.). If women now also had the clitoris as an external pleasure point this 
represented a second penis in the female body, a concept, which raised male concerns. If, 
as Valerie Traub notes in Psychomorphology of the Clitoris, the  
vagina was seen as an inverted penis, the clitoris had to be an external one. 
Immediately the clitoris was linked to nonreproductive sex, and anxieties 
arose about women with clitorides capable of penetration; because of these 
anxieties, the clitoris, its size and function, was immediately linked to 
same-sex desire. (Traub) 
The idea that the clitoris makes a woman capable of penetration inevitably evokes the 
notion of women penetrating same-sex or opposite-sex partners, thus ascribing 
masculinity to her. She is then viewed not as a ‘complete total’ woman but instead, based 
on her inverted genitalia; she becomes a masculinized woman, an inferior pseudo-male 
body. Nevertheless, tribadism is a sexual act; it does not automatically constitute a sexual 
identity and, unlike homosexuality, tribadism is only applicable for women.  
The term lesbian, like tribade, is reserved for women only. Originating from the 
Greek ‘lesbios’ (“of lesbos”) it refers to the Greek island Lesbos in the Aegean Sea (cf. 
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“Online Etymology Dictionary”). Home to the poet Sappho who wrote erotic poetry 
about women (and men!), Lesbos has since become closely connected with the notion of 
lesbianism. Valerie Traub, however, has brought up the point that “Lesbos was originally 
associated with fellatio and Sappho with prostitution rather than ‘lesbian’ desire; it was 
only after the second century A.D. that ‘Lesbos’ was associated with Sappho’s expression 
of desire for women” (Traub 104). Unlike tribadism, however, lesbianism is not limited 
to a bodily attribute or certain sexual acts. A Freudian understanding of the lesbian body, 
for instance, is one that has already been castrated and tries to overcome the loss of the 
penis through masculine dress and behavior. She is a lesbian not because of who she 
desires but by virtue of acting masculine to mask the lack of the phallus (cf. Price and 
Shildrick 116). Attempting to discuss female homosexuality ultimately leads to the 
prerequisite of including at least a short historical contextualization of the general term 
homosexuality. Coined in 1869 by the Hungarian journalist Karl-Maria Kertbeny, the 
term ‘homosexual’ became popular through its use in the 1892 translation of Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis. In it, the Austro-German psychiatrist von Krafft-
Ebing published a “compendium of more than two hundred case histories of individuals 
who illustrated ‘the various psychopathological manifestations of sexual life’” 
(Mondimore 35). The popularity of the Psychopathia Sexualis arguably is responsible for 
linking the discourse of homosexuality almost inseparably with the idea of mental illness. 
The concept of homosexuality – or any sexual identity for that matter – encompasses 
three distinct ideas, namely behavior, condition and social role. Yet, for the most part, 
society conflates the three ideas and assumes that they all together make up the 
personality of the homosexual. To quote Erwin J. Haeberle, Director of the Archive for 
 
 24 
Sexology at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin: “Homosexuals do what they do because 
they are what they are, and so they can always be recognized by their typical lifestyle” 
(Haeberle and Gindorf 15). Thus, the idea of what it means to be homosexual was infused 
with a second layer of meaning that completely obscured the aspect of erotic attraction of 
one human being to another, focusing instead on behavior and a ‘typical lifestyle’ (social 
role). Diverging from the normative heterosexual attraction and entrenched in the 
narrative of mental illness, homosexuality is then perceived as an undesirable practice 
threatening the heteronormative social stability. The concept of ‘contrary sexual feelings’ 
(Konträres Sexualempfinden) presented by German psychiatrist Carl Westphal gave way 
to the idea of ‘inversion’, both of which express the undesirability of the non-normative 
homosexual:  
The patient suffering from this deplorable condition was an ‘invert.’ […] 
A reversal or transposition of masculine into feminine erotic feelings in 
the case of men and of feminine into masculine erotic feelings in the case 
of women. The word contrary signaled that such a reversal went against 
nature and health, in short, that it was wrong, and that, ideally, there 
should be only complete ‘total men’ and complete ‘total women’ in whom 
everything ‘fit together.’ As one can see, Uranians, homosexuals, 
contrasexuals, or inverts disturbed a sense of psychiatric order. Female 
souls or feelings in male bodies (or vice versa) simply were not to be 
accepted as normal. (20) 
What this quote illustrates quite well is that on one hand, the idea of a normal and an 
abnormal sexuality, and on the other hand, the belief of how this is expressed. The 
transposition of feelings of the other sex paves the way for the belief that the homosexual 
man will inevitably be effeminate, the homosexual woman masculine. Seeing as neither 
is a ‘complete total’ man or woman if feelings of the other sex are present, it stands to 
reason that they are lacking ‘real’ masculinity or femininity. In a logical fallacy, the 
gender role of homosexuals is presumed to be defective because they are homosexual. 
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The aforementioned conflation of behavior, condition, and social role into the concept of 
‘the homosexual’ makes it impossible to distinguish between the three ideas and come to 
the logical conclusion that the triad can be – must be – separated into its distinct parts.12 
The National Socialist fear of (male) homosexuals is rooted in this conflation of ideas, 
which a priori ascribes the homosexual men with emasculating traits and bases the 
identification of homosexuals on behavior and social role rather than the condition of 
being erotically attracted to members of the same sex. Such conflation and twisting of 
expectations about behavior and visibility of gender roles to fit established linguistic 
signs is problematic, however, as it affects what is represented and understood as 
belonging to this sign. 
Writing about women who would nowadays for the most part use the word 
‘lesbian’ to describe themselves and their sexual identity necessitates a definition or 
explanation about what is meant within the context of this dissertation when I use terms 
such as ‘homosexual women’, ‘lesbian women’ or simply ‘tribade(s).’ Moreover, it 
already reveals a significant problem that I encountered during my research: How to 
identify the research subject I was looking for. The origin and implications of the term 
homosexual have already been discussed; I will now focus on some of the terms used 
exclusively for female homosexuals during the Third Reich. At that time, vocabulary for 
women who loved women was inevitability less obvious so as not to draw attention to 
themselves. Personal ads in the women’s magazine Die Freundin use the inculpable 
                                                
12 Only in separating the concept of homosexuality into its three distinct ideas can one 
make sense of the behavior of people isolated from the opposite sex. Homosexual activity 
between young adolescents, prisoners or boarding school students, to give some 
examples, is not automatically an expression of homosexual feelings. It can simply be a 
behavior without any influence on condition or social role. 
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words ‘Freundin’ or ‘Bekannte’13 although a romantic interest can be inferred from the 
ads. Sabine Schrader provides examples of these personal ads that are phrased as “Lady 
[…] wishing for smart female friend of medium height”, “Rhinelander, blonde, funny, in 
search of sweet female friend”, or “Düsseldorf! Attention! Female friends […] meet 
regularly every Wednesday […]. Dancing and conversation” (Schrader 34–35).14 Here 
alone are two terms, which could only in context be interpreted as having sexual 
innuendo. On the other hand, however, there are also those terms used by outsiders to 
describe the women they saw, often simultaneously ascribing judgment to them. 
Schrader’s article provides quotes regarding the reflections by a heterosexual spectator of 
such a dance as was described in the ad above, who observes: “These are again tribades 
or lesbians who can find sexual satisfaction only in intercourse” (ibid).15 Two very 
important details can be taken from the description of this observation. The first one is 
the use of the term ‘tribades’ which is defined in the dictionary as  
c.1600, ‘a lesbian,’ from French tribade (16c.) or directly from Latin 
tribas, from Greek tribas, from tribein ‘to rub, rub down, wear away,’ 
[…]. In reference to a specific sexual technique. (“Online Etymology 
Dictionary”)    
The spectator is using both terms quite redundantly, while at the same time emphasizing 
the meaning of the act against nature he is witnessing between two women. Likewise, he 
reduces the significance to something purely sexual, to women who can only find 
pleasure in sexual intercourse and sexual satisfaction only in intercourse with each other. 
                                                
13 Female friend or Acquaintance 
14 “Dame […] wünscht sich kluge mittelgroβe Freundin”, “Rheinländerin, blond, lustig, 
sucht liebe Freundin” or “Düsseldorf! Achtung! Freundinnen […] treffen sich regelmäβig 
an jedem Mittwoch […]. Tanz und Unterhaltung”. 
15 “Es handelt sich bei diesen Frauen wieder um Tribaden oder Lesbierinnen, die ihre 
geschlechtliche Befriedigung nur im Verkehr finden können”. 
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By providing the reader with the term ‘tribades’ he also inherently refers to the specific 
way these women will gain sexual satisfaction by rubbing their clitorises against each 
other. The ‘discovery’ of the clitoris in conjunction with the implications of this sexual 
practice is laden with opportunities for analysis that underscore the theory of defective 
gender roles that was prevalent in the early 20th century in Germany. By focusing on 
sexual practices as the defining factor for gender identity another problematic issue is 
being raised: Where and how to distinguish between female same-sex attraction and 
romantic friendships as well as classifiers within one category. The identifiers ‘femme’, 
‘soft’ or ‘butch’ as addendums to ‘lesbian’ classify the gender role a woman prefers – and 
the sexual practices associated with it – but break down an already small category into 
even smaller parts.  
In contemporary queer studies such narrowing down of categories is perceived as 
counterproductive to the field. In the early years of gender and queer studies it was 
appropriate to create subcategories by defining what gender and queer theory addresses 
and what it excludes. However, the need to define gender and queer theory studies has 
changed as the field has been established. Although there is a consensus about the 
problem in using subcategories as described above, the reality is that it is done regardless. 
The stability of gender identities and gender categories is assumed, creating a conundrum 
that Judith Halberstam describes perfectly when she refers to identity labels like ‘lesbian’ 
as “the term we affix to the pleasurable and cumbersome intersections of embodiments, 
practices, and roles that historical processes have winnowed down to the precise 
specifications of an identity” (Halberstam 50). An identity that is, furthermore, not 
essentially tied to sexual activity per se but can also be understood as a way of seeing the 
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world that is different form the normative patriarchal worldview. Feminist philosopher 
and professor Ruth Ginzberg, not to be confused with Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States Ruth Ginsburg, notes that many lesbians seem to identify as lesbian as part 
of a feminist political act. For her,  
‘being lesbian’ is not only, or even primarily, a matter of who rubs 
genitals with whom, but rather that it constitutes an entirely different way 
of seeing the world. From this perspective, women are no longer in the 
background, helping hands in the drama of patriarchy. Instead, women are 
the primary focus of all sorts of attention, including erotic attention. 
Lesbians who identify themselves in this way perceive lesbianism as a 
consciously chosen path, one that they could have rejected but did not. 
Many regard it as at least partly a political decision, to choose to focus 
their attention on women rather than men. (Card 86) 
While I agree with the opening statement that ‘being lesbian’ is not about who has 
sex with whom, I would debate that it is nonetheless not a matter of conscious choice to 
‘be’ a lesbian. To reduce sexual identity to a political decision of viewing the world 
differently from the normative patriarchal position is to neglect the emotional attachment 
that goes along with sexual attraction.  
Hilde Radusch, German communist activist and (in later life) self-identified 
lesbian, was 30 when the Nazis seized power in 1933. As an active member and 
councilwoman for the German communist party (KPD) she was also openly living with 
women. Recalling her memories from those years she writes in a letter dated January 7th, 
1979: “I heard the word ‘lesbian’ for the first time when I found a police report among 
the documents of the district exchange [Berlin] Schöneberg in 1945. […]” (Radusch).16  
                                                
16 “Das Wort ‘lesbisch’ hörte ich zum ersten Mal, als ich nach 1945 eine Anzeige gegen 
mich in den Unterlagen des Bezirksamtes Schöneberg vorfand”. In this context I would 
like to mention the 2011 radio talk show “Bestrafe wenige und meine alle.’ Über die 
Situation lesbischer Frauen im Nationalsozialismus” that includes anonymous interviews 
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Radusch philosophizes about terminology then and now, remarking, “we young women 
were called ‘Bubi’”.17 Whether this is meant as a feminine version of the German word 
‘Bub’, meaning boy, or whether it has its roots in the word ‘Bubikopf’ (=Eton crop) 
cannot be safely concluded. Both, however, refer to the masculine gender and 
‘Bubikopf’, the term for a women’s short haircut reminiscent of men’s short hair, is part 
of the embodiment of female masculinity. Other sources mention another term that 
appeared in numerous of the analyzed materials: ‘kesser Vater’, which can be translated 
to ‘butch lesbian’ or – more literally – ‘perky father.’ The concept behind the idea of 
‘kesser Vater’ is the manly woman who emulates the patriarchal structure of the 
heterosexual family unit by reigning in the home, dressing masculine and enforcing strict 
gender roles in a relationship. In the aforementioned letter Hilde Radusch observed, “the 
rule of the men in the home should not be replicated. The popular ‘kesse Vater’ (widows 
who want to rid themselves of torture by inflicting pain on others) was already beginning 
to die out in the Weimar Republic” (Radusch).18 This notion of pain and torture, which is 
inflicted on women as part of the term ‘kesser Vater’ (‘butch lesbian’) to describe 
women-loving-women underscores the differences in behavior and appearance that has 
been ascribed to homosexual individuals since the middle of the 19th century. Where 
homosexual men were effeminate and lacked masculine traits, lesbian women exhibited 
attributes that threatened normative heterosexuality by undermining questions of power 
                                                                                                                                            
with women who lived as lesbians during the Nazi era. Their observations of the term 
‘lesbian’ mirror Radusch’s, in that they themselves did not use it to refer to themselves 
until the rise of the new lesbian/women movement in the 1970s.  
17 “Wir jungen Frauen hießen ‘Bubi’”. 
18 “Die Herrschaft des Mannes im häuslichen Bereich soll nicht wiederholt werden. Der 
berühmte ‘kesse Vater’ (Witwen, die sich die Quälerei aus dem Leibe schaffen wollen, 
indem sie andere quälen) war schon in der Weimarer Republik im Absterben”. 
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and legitimacy previously reserved to the patriarchal male rule. Infusing masculinity with 
ideas of power and social privilege subsequently imparts the possibility of subterfuge on 
lesbian women. They can act out, try to pass as male, in an attempt to gain male 
privilege, yet they will never be ‘real’ men. 
In Claudia Schoppmann’s texts the alleged as well as the accuser(s) use the term 
“the warm one” to describe a lesbian in virtually all of the accounts collected.19 Although 
no definite historical reference or evidence for its origin can be found, it is very closely 
related to the practice of calling a gay man “warm brother”, which has a curious German 
etymological origin in and of itself.20 As James D. Steakley explains:  
The doublet schwul/schwül has an interesting etymology: “The adjective 
was taken over in the form ‘schwul’ from Lowe German into High 
German in the 17th century…. The New High German form arose in the 
18th century, probably under the influence of ‘kühl.’ The form ‘schwul’ 
has been used since the 19th century as colloquial for ‘homosexual’” […] 
Magnus Hirschfeld, as usual, has a biological explanation: “In general the 
skin of the Urning is warmer to the touch than that of persons around him. 
It appears that the designation ‘warmer Bruder,’ which is widespread in 
popular usage, has its physiological foundation in this phenomenon (also 
the word ‘schwul’ = ‘schwül’ has a similar meaning”. (Steakley 94) 
Whether or not heightened body temperature was an indicator of homosexuality or not is 
irrelevant for this discussion; it is, however, noteworthy to address the language as a 
marker for the medicalization of the discourse that began during the Weimar Republic 
and continued well into the middle of the 20th century. Moreover, “die warme” (the warm 
one) and the male equivalent “warmer Bruder’ (warm brother) are the only examples 
given of a term that has not been claimed by the gay and lesbian community. 
Reappropriation, the process of adopting something pejorative and turning it into the 
                                                
19 “die Warme”. 
20 “warmer Bruder”. 
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affirmative, has happened for the words ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’ and ‘homosexual’, among others, 
and indeed one can understand reappropriation as “the lexical equivalent of the process 
sometimes referred to as ‘queering’ […] whereby objects and institutions are ‘reread’ 
from a gay perspective” (Harvey and Shalom 69). Coming back to Ferdinand de 
Saussure, such queering can either take the form of changing the value of a signifier and 
signified or by completely substituting the sign. This is possible because of the fluidity of 
language in which words do not indicate pre-existing concepts but rather an ‘exchange 
value’ of meaning that can be altered. As part of the linguistic system of a language the 
sign’s “content is really fixed only by the concurrence of everything that exists outside it. 
Being part of a system, it is endowed not only with a signification but also and especially 
with a value” (Saussure 67). A perfect example for substitution of a sign is the term 
‘gay’, which up until the 1960s was devoid of any sexual connotation and meant ‘happy.’ 
In the 21st century dictionary entries define gay as a denominator for homosexual men 
and some add that the original meaning happy is now dated (cf. “Gay”).  
Reappropriation is an important practice for marginalized groups since it attempts 
to take away the power of the oppressor. I say “attempts” because there have been 
debates about the usefulness and psychological consequences of reappropriation. 
Consider the example of a young teenage boy who is tormented by schoolmates who call 
him gay. Realizing that he is attracted to other men but aware of the negative stereotypes 
this word holds, he is conflicted about using it to refer to himself. Will he become 
everything that is implied in the term if he decides to accept it? Will the fact that, for 
those who oppress him, ‘gay’ is rich with loathing and disgust influence him in how he 
feels about himself? The paradox should be clear: Two systems using the same sign with 
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a slightly different – negative or positive – signified essentially means two conflicting 
messages whose psychological repercussions need to be navigated. From his schoolmates 
the message may be “You are attracted to men, therefore you are less than we are” 
whereas from members of the gay community it could be something along the lines of 
“You are attracted to men, therefore you belong and we value you”. The consequences of 
such ambiguity for the Self can be devastating:  
Individuals embedded in contexts that provide conflicting, contradictory, 
or negative messages must struggle to find a balance between the negative 
selves thrust upon them and the positive senses of self they would like to 
create. […] Confronting the meanings that others provide can be a full 
time task, leaving little room for self-constructed individuality. (Leary) 
Sander L. Gilman uses a very similar concept in his study on Jewish self-hatred that is 
also applicable here. He says:  
Anyone faced with a set of such conflicting, inherently irreconcilable 
signs represses this conflict, saying, in effect, The contradiction must be 
within me, since that which I wish to become cannot be flawed. Perhaps I 
truly am different, a parody of that which I wish to be. […] yet one is still 
not accepted, For the ideal state is never to have been the Other, a state 
that cannot be achieved. (Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred 3) 
Both for the Jewish person caught in this double-bind as well as the homosexual the 
consequence is “the fragmentation of identity that results in the articulation of self-
hatred” (3) 
It should have become clear by now that there is more to these particular terms 
than is obvious at first glance. Gender roles, expectations of sexual acts or the amount of 
masculinity/femininity that is exhibited, are conflated and twisted to fit the mold of a 
linguistic sign. It remains to be seen, then, if the narratives in my analysis make use of 
language-specific terminologies for women-loving-women and how it affects the 
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representation of lesbians.21 Sander Gilman’s insight into the “problem” of Jewish 
masculinity may add a further level of complexity to Jewish female identity that this 
study will have to address. The first problem one encounters in this endeavor is that 
contemporary, orthodox Judaism in Israel defines some women in a relational way to 
men. Without man woman is nothing, only as his companion “for the purpose of enabling 
the continuity of the species through childbearing” (Rubin-Dorsky and Fishkin 362) is 
she ascribed an identity of value. That it is not a freely chosen identity but one allocated 
by Jewish tradition “embedded deeply within the structure of biblical and ancient 
Judaism” (362) illustrates the dimensions of the problem that Jewish women regardless of 
their sexual orientation are coming up against, albeit to differing degrees depending on 
the more orthodox or liberal orientation of their faith community. The relational concept 
posits the heterosexual woman opposite the heterosexual man, anatomically ‘fitting’ them 
together by being able to insert the male penis into the female vagina.22  
                                                
21 I have staked out my analysis to center on lesbian women. An inclusion of 
bisexuality/bisexual women would go beyond the scope of this analysis. Bisexuals, 
people erotically attracted to both sexes, and their persecution during the Holocaust is 
even less documented and researched than the lesbian persecution. This is in part due to 
the fact that individuals were identified as homosexual or heterosexual based on the 
apparent sex of their partner. A self-identified bisexual person with a partner of the 
opposite sex would thus not be picked out as a bisexual. A self-identified bisexual person 
with a same-sex partner, however, would be perceived as homosexual because the snap-
shot of the moment does not give any information about past sexual 
partners/relationships. I am aware that in a reversal of this one could also say that a 
lesbian could possibly be a bisexual woman. The same questions that I will be asking and 
answering for lesbian women during the Holocaust can be posed with bisexual women 
(and men) in mind. 
22 I would argue that homosexual women and men could make a similar claim by citing 
other body parts/orifices and sexual acts. The actual meaning behind the concept lies in 
the reproductive ability associated with heterosexual acts.  
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For Jewish females identity formation in the past revolved around having little 
choice and no voice in the matters of their lives. In the foreword to Celebrating the Lives 
of Jewish Women Maria Cohn Siegel contends that change is happening:  
For almost 2,000 years Jewish women were silenced, excluded from full 
participation in Jewish life by a series of laws that prohibited them from 
study, public prayer, and positions of religious leadership. […] Silence 
was expected. We were raised to listen and be obedient, not to make 
waves. Our needs were subservient to those of the family. […] We no 
longer have to hide our contributions to Jewish life and survival, nor the 
darker aspects of our histories. We are exploring where we came from and 
the influences that shaped our lives, so that we can understand who we are 
and where we are going. We will keep silent no more. We are speaking 
out in clear voices, not concealing the truth from one another. We are 
learning to support each other as we move forward. And we are treasuring 
our differences as we treasure our similarities. We are stepping forward as 
equals, to share in the full responsibilities of Jewish life, to be counted, 
and above all to be heard. We are changing Jewish life forever. (Siegel et 
al., xxi ff.)      
Siegel has touched upon some important aspects of ultra-orthodox Judaism, which 
inform challenges to a more positive Jewish female identity formation: Being 
marginalized within a community, being silenced, and putting one’s needs last. There 
have been few studies that also incorporate religion into their exploration, especially in 
regards to sexual identity formation. Mark A. Yarhouse, Doctor of Psychology, published 
a study in 2001 in which he noted two things that also pertain to Jewish women/Jewish 
lesbians and their identity formation within the religious context. The first is applicable to 
both, stating that “when many people are confronted with conflicts between sexuality and 
religion, they either yield to a teaching in which they do not believe or feel they must 
abandon their religious heritage” (McAdams et al., 38). ‘Sexuality’ in this sense refers to 
any expression of sexual attraction between people and can be applied to any conflict 
between a person’s religion and their thoughts or expressions of sexual feelings. Jewish 
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women who do not fall as much outside the framework of the traditional Jewish religious 
context may find it easier to adhere to or ‘yield to’ the teachings they were brought up 
with.23 A case in point would be the male-female relational concept of complementarity 
in which a heterosexual woman may find the juxtaposition with men a matter of course 
and only argue the dominance structure as explained previously. For a Jewish lesbian 
identity formation, however, it is the relation of herself as a woman to a woman that plays 
a central role in her identity as a lesbian. An identity formation based on this concept may 
still be possible for a heterosexual Jewish woman but will hardly be achievable for the 
lesbian Jew. Furthermore, if we delve deeper into the religious aspect underlying the 
matter, a look at Genesis explains the male dominance inherent in the notion of male-
female relations. God spoke to Eve after her disobedience and chastised her: “thy desire 
[shall be] to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee” (Genesis 3:16). From Genesis on 
the Hebrew Bible does not lend itself for women in search of their identity, be it lesbian 
or heterosexual. On the contrary, from the start Jewish lesbian women will necessarily 
question the conjecture that is made about their desire for men, heterosexual Jewish 
women will struggle with power issues arising from the promise that their husband shall 
rule over them. Females and lesbians have to negotiate their position not toward the 
whole of Judaism but the traditions and texts that form their religious identities. Yarhouse 
explains that “it matters most not whether a person pursues a particular path of identity 
                                                
23 The following discussion will deal primarily with orthodox Jewish traditions as theses 
have the most stringent and repressive laws on homosexuality. There are, no doubt, more 
open faith communities on the spectrum of Judaism from Reformist to Liberal Jews. 
Orthodox Jewish culture, however, will give the most conservative view of what it means 
for Jewish women and Jewish lesbians to attempt individual identity formation within (or 
outside) the context of their faith. 
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synthesis but whether their identity synthesis is congruent with their broader framework” 
(McAdams et al., 39).  
The duality between identity synthesis and congruency with the broader 
framework of life – religious traditions, family beliefs, societal expectations, etc. – are 
struggles in identity formation for Jewish females and Jewish lesbians. I would contend, 
however, that Jewish lesbians in their struggle for identity have a further process of inner 
turmoil and reconciliation to deal with as they try to “try to develop a positive personal 
identity that incorporates both their sexuality and their religious beliefs” (39). As I will 
explain in the following chapter on Memory and Identity, the ‘formation of the self’ is a 
process towards an identity that mirrors who ‘I’ am in relation to my surroundings and 
the group that I share a collective identity and collective memory with. Yet whereas such 
a formation of the self, of identity, outside of a religious tradition can happen relatively 
undisturbed, entanglement within a religious tradition that holds strong values against 
female independence and non-heteronormative sexual identities can lead to dualistic, 
disharmonious, irreconcilable frictions. Dutch psychologist Hubert Hermans identified in 
The Dialogical Self: Beyond Individualism and Rationalism that the self does not 
necessarily have to be one consistent and coherent entity in order to form a healthy 
identity. Instead,   
the dialogical self is based on the assumption that in contrast with the 
individualistic self… there are many I positions that can be occupied by 
the same person. The I in one position can agree, disagree, understand, 
misunderstand, oppose, contradict, question, and even ridicule the I in 
another position. (Hermans et al., 29)   
The plurality that Jewish women – lesbian and heterosexual – are subjected to and 
have to navigate according to Hermans therefore do not necessarily constitute a negative 
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impact on identity formation. I contend, however, that Herman’s stance is not applicable 
to the religious traditions of Jewish life. Between a “rigorous religious commitment, and 
mutually exclusive communal demands” which Jewish lesbians need to reconcile with 
their “identities in relation to the traditions, texts, practices, communities, and lifestyles 
that often seem irreconcilably conflicted” (McAdams et al., 41) there is a choice they 
have to make that heterosexual Jewish women are not subjected to. The two conflicting 
selves of their personalities, their sexual identity and their religious identity, are mutually 
exclusive in an orthodox context and even problematic in a liberal Judaic tradition. Yet, 
as McAdams et al. found in their study for Identity and Story, “neither one of these 
identities is assimilated into the other […] but the dimensions of a primary identification 
that creates the possibility for their viable coexistence” (42) exist.  
McAdams et al. conclusion fits into the discourse of memory and identity of the 
following chapter. Although I will only briefly go into the details of Jewish lesbian and 
Jewish female identity formation, it will become clear that even within the orthodox 
Jewish tradition a non-heteronormative sexual identity can be developed and maintained. 
Shared memory, shared tradition, collective beliefs and rituals can compensate for the 
lack of acceptance by members of the collective or the holy writ that the holds the 
collective together. In this case, the self separates the negative – or dismissive – parts of 
the collective memory and collective identity to find a niche in which the sexual identity 
is acceptable to express.24 The path towards an integrated or coexisting religious and 
sexual identity, though, can only be understood as the attempt of a painful resolve 
                                                
24 This niche is not one of the many ‘I’ positions that Hermans mentioned in his essay. I 
am referring to the self that is not split in any way but finds a way to have both parts of 
the identity exist in unison next to each other. 
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between what is dictated by the religious tradition and the psychological element of the 
self. In the accounts of Jewish homosexuals I studied, no simple single solution to the 
problem was given. What remained was the conclusion that  
homosexual and religious identities seem indeed to be involved in a 
constant process of negotiation that posits the intrinsic validity of both as 
each learns about the other’s experiences, exchanges information about 
these identities, and thereby comes to learn its requirement for viability 
and health as it strives to create a psychic landscape conducive to 
coexistence. (McAdams et al., 57) 
It cannot be denied that women face different kinds of problems in the formation 
of their identity as women than men within the Jewish tradition. Jewish lesbians, 
moreover, also have to arrange themselves and contend with the patriarchy of Judaism. In 
between ‘being’ homosexual and trying to find a way of ‘doing’ homosexuality, i.e. 
having sexual relationships, “the notion of identity synthesis is far more than merely 
nonresonant: It is an oxymoron” (57).  
I would reaffirm that Jewish heterosexual women and Jewish lesbians can only 
reconcile both identities by acknowledging their coexistence and finding differing 
collectives in which to live these identities. The differing selves or “I’s” that Hubert 
Herman cites in his research will only be able to exist fully and consciously if integrated 
successfully. As will become clear when I write about the function of memory as well as 
memory and its meaning for identity in the following chapter, different collectives can 




1.3 Nazi Sexual Policy and their Perception of Women 
In order to understand the differences in the discrimination and persecution of 
gays and lesbians one needs to analyze the official sexual polices and their effect on 
women and female sexuality during the Nazi era. Heinrich Himmler used an address 
during the wedding celebration of a high-ranking SS official to explain why the German 
Reich is first and foremost an example of a patriarchal society: “We are a patriarchal 
society and even with all the mistakes this patriarchal society has we have to adamantly 
hold on to it. The incorporation of the patriarchal society is the better one” (Geheimreden 
94).25 Himmler traces the masculinity of the German Reich back millenia, declaring, “For 
thousands of years the Germanic people and especially the German people, have been 
governed in a patriarchal way” (94).26 The Nazi emphasis on masculinity and patriarchy 
lead to a gendered social hierarchy, which placed women in a status of dependency from 
men. By themselves women were only relevant as mothers of future German children for 
the Führer and relegated to the home.27 The noblest achievement a woman could reach 
entwined the political with the private world: The Mutterkreuz28 was the official 
recognition of the number of children a woman had given birth to. Awarded to those with 
four or more children, the preamble of the statute declares it to be the “visible sign of 
                                                
25 “Wir sind ein Männerstaat, und bei allen Fehlern, die dieser Männerstaat hat, müssen 
wir eisern daran festhalten. Die Errichtung des Männerstaates ist die bessere”. 
26 “Seit Jahrtausenden sind die germanischen Voelker und insbesondere das deutsche 
Volk männerstaatlich regiert worden”. 
27 Alfred Rosenberg (1893-1946), a German politician and writer in a variety of NDSAP 
institutions, engaged in research about witches. His book Myths of the 20th century (1931) 
includes a chapter on the relationship between state and gender. He propagates that the 
destruction of the state can always be blamed on “the disintegration of the ideal of 
masculine breeding” by women (Rosenberg 490). 
28 Cross of Honor of the German Mother. 
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gratitude of the German nation”(Reichsgesetzblatt).29 Claudia Schoppmann remarks 
about this: 
[T]he National Socialist ideology presumed the first purpose of the ‘aryan’ 
woman to be motherhood and marriage – as long as she was not classified 
as genetically inferior. A population policy based on an increase in 
birthrates was the prime requirement for the conquest policy of the Nazis 
[…]. Marriage and motherhood were thus political matters.30 (Jellonek and 
Lautmann 75) 
Thus, hard-won positions in political offices or other official places that women 
fought for during the Weimar Republic were suddenly lost again and assigned to men. 
Furthermore, equating femininity with fertility, a rhetorical device that was so central to 
Nazi rhetoric created a female identity similarly grounded in and written upon the body.  
Bearing and rearing children for the Führer, to raise the Herrenrasse, also tied into 
the racial policies aimed at keeping the blood pure. In this context, Alfred Rosenberg 
argued in his 1935 book Blut und Ehre that “in the hands of the woman lies the 
conservation of our race” (Rosenberg and Trotha 221).31 That this is not to mean equality 
of the sexes and freedom for women to work and live as they please becomes clear in the 
follow-up to the previous statement. Rosenberg continues by railing against emancipated 
women who want to adopt ‘male talents’ and calls women “an entity that lacks abilities, a 
‘plantlike’ passive bearer of the law” (221).32 Himmler constructed a similar argument in 
                                                
29 Als sichtbares Zeichen des Dankes des Deutschen Volkes. 
30 “Die NS Ideologie sah eine prinzipielle Bestimmung der ‘arischen’ Frau zu 
Mutterschaft und Ehe vor – sofern nicht als erbkrank einzuordnen. Eine auf Steigerung 
der Geburtenrate abzielende Bevölkerungspolitik war eine zentrale Voraussetzung für die 
von den Nazis angestrebte kriegerische Eroberungspolitik […]. Ehe und Mutterschaft 
waren unter diesen Voraussetzungen ein Politikum ersten Ranges”. 
31 “In der Hand der Frau liegt die Erhaltung unserer Rasse”. 
32 “ein fähigkeitsloses Wesen, eine ‘pflanzhafte’ passive Trägerin der Gesetze”. 
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one of his speeches to SS members, verbalizing his contempt of what was happening to 
the women of the Reich:  
In my opinion there is far too much masculinization in our lives […]. I 
think it a catastrophe when I see girls and women – especially girls – walk 
about with a wonderfully packed knapsack. One can get sick from it. I 
think it a catastrophe when women’s organizations, women’s 
communities, women’s societies work in a field that destroys any female 
attraction, any female dignity and grace. I think it a catastrophe […] when 
we masculinize women so much that with time any gender difference, any 
polarity, disappears.33 (Himmler 99)  
We see here some of the reasoning the National Socialists had for keeping women 
inside the home and men as the head and ruler of the family. Polarities – gender 
differences – are given as key points for a functioning society. Rosenberg as well as 
Himmler formulate that it is femininity, feminine grace, which is important in a woman. 
She is not fit to think or decide or to rule, but instead has natural abilities for 
housekeeping, nurturing and following the male lead. This view was shared by many of 
the leading female National Socialists of the women’s organizations within the NSDAP 
as well.34 The women’s organizations, though geared towards women, were modeled 
after the men’s organizational structure and their duties were mainly providing a platform 
to share the national socialist message in a more positive way for women. The role 
women were expected to fill was emphasized as an important part of the family unit, 
                                                
33 “Wir haben m.E. eine viel zu starke Vermännlichung unseres ganzen Lebens […]. Ich 
empfinde es als Katastrophe, wenn ich Mädel und Frauen sehe – vor allem Mädel –, die 
mit einem wunderbar gepackten Tornister durch die Gegend ziehen. Da kann einem 
schlecht werden. Ich sehe es als Katastrophe an, wenn Frauenorganisationen, 
Frauengemeinschaften, Frauenbünde sich auf einem Gebiet betätigen, das jeden 
weiblichen Reiz, jede weibliche Würde und Anmut zerstört. Ich sehe es als Katastrophe 
an […] wenn wir die Frauen so vermännlichen, daß mit der Zeit der 
Geschlechtsunterschied, die Polarität verschwindet”. 
34 These include Deutscher Frauenorden (DFO), NS-Frauenschaft (NSF), Bund 
Deutscher Mädchen (BDM), Deutsche Frauenfront (DFF), and 
Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Frauenvereine (RAG) among others.   
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rather than merely functioning as the supporter for the men. Child bearing and rearing, 
the mother cross distinction and especially a focus on femininity were part of these 
women’s organizations. These organizations were dedicated to developing and sustaining 
the femininity that Himmler criticized women for losing. By providing women with 
similar institutions as their male counterparts one of their primary goals of the regime 
was already accomplished: Women could feel included in the NSDAP and it’s vision and 
mission without actually being part of the all-exclusive male institution. In essence, this 
was another step to assuring that women would not disturb the patriarchal hierarchy. In 
simple terms, they were excluded from the ‘boys club’ but by instituting a – similar, yet 
lesser and supervised – ‘girls club’ they were appeased and discouraged from running 
interference.35  
Consider for example the assembly of the female members of the National 
Socialist Teachers’ Association (NSLB) in 1934, which was dedicated to developing 
intellectual gifts of young girls. One of the senior authorities proposed:  
The female mind differs in its approach to mundane occurrences from the 
male mind, which excludes inward involvement and takes a coolly 
businesslike pride in its ‘objective’ attitude. Owing to her natural 
disposition, her greater reverence for life, woman has the capacity for that 
inner devotion which more deeply fathoms the nature of things and 
perceives their true value and substance by means of loving absorption. 
(Bleuel 55) 
The terms “reverence”, “devotion” and “absorption” are merely euphemisms for 
obedience but delivered in a way that was supposed to entice female listeners. The 
rhetorical strategies that the Nazis employed highlighted that women and men were equal 
                                                
35 The same strategy was later applied in regards to the Jewish population. By keeping 
Jews out of Aryan organizations and administrative offices but granting the right to create 
Jewish council and administrative offices a subterfuge was achieved.  
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but inhabited different social spheres – the home and the world –, that there is strength 
and responsibility in raising children for the benefit of the Volk, and that it is the nature 
of the German woman “to do all that is required of her, and to do so gladly” (Scholtz - 
Klink 14).36   
Within the context of women losing their femininity and politics geared towards 
procreation, and thus sexuality, one must also take into account how National Socialists 
perceived (German) female sexuality. Seen as the vessel for German blood and 
recognized for the number of children women bore the German nation, a woman’s value 
was tied to her ability to procreate. In the absence of the medical possibilities open to 
men and women today, sexual intercourse was the only way for men to ‘deposit’ their 
semen into this female ‘vessel.’ The vessel does not do anything; it is passive, it receives. 
The giver produces life, produces semen, and delivers it into the vessel. As the active 
partner in this exchange, the physiological processes of the male were not only more 
visible but also deemed more important. Ejaculation occurs when the man climaxes, a 
process that is preceded by getting an erection. In order to get an erection, however, 
stimulation and a high level of excitement of the nervous system is needed. Thus the 
phallus serves as the visible expression of pleasure and lust in men, while simultaneously 
denoting its necessity for successful intercourse and insemination. Without pleasure an 
erection cannot occur and, consequently, no ejaculation. Female sexuality on the other 
hand, without a bold physiological expression of pleasure and excitement of the nervous 
system, did not include a need for pleasure or orgasm. Because lust was not seen as 
necessary for women to have intercourse it was also perceived as irrelevant in the 
                                                
36 “Sie muss so sein, dass sie alles, was von ihr gefordert wird, gern tut”. 
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expression of their sexuality. In fact, it is only in the absence of the procreation discourse 
that female pleasure seems to come into play. Upon observing lesbian women dancing 
with each other a spectator notes that lesbians “can find sexual satisfaction only in 
intercourse” (Mittag). Here, homosexual female sexuality is perceived as purely for 
personal pleasure and sexual satisfaction while at the same time implying that 
heterosexual women find their sexual satisfaction outside of intercourse. This implication 
at once underscores the lack of sexual pleasure ascribed to female sexuality while at the 
same time giving the impression that heterosexual women can find sexual satisfaction in 
other areas of life unconnected to sexual intercourse. That there is an obligation to 
observe and analyze female homosexuality in this way reiterates the commitment of the 
Nazis to create one stable image of sexual identity. Inevitably, that which is perceived as 
normative and ‘common’ lacks a need to be examined and explained.  
In light of this view of female sexuality, the treatment of female homosexuality as 
not worth persecuting with a separate law, similar to §175, is comprehensible. With 
women being seen as “always available for intercourse” (Mittag) and men such as 
philosopher Ernst Bergmann calling for “forced intercourse” (Bergmann 404) if women 
strayed from the political party line, female sexuality is reduced to the biological ability 
to ovulate and carry a child to term. As Mittag noted, lesbian women were still ‘usable’ to 
bear children and contribute to the population growth. Homosexual men on the other 
hand were considered useless since they could not perform heterosexual intercourse 
anymore and, much more importantly, as the giver of the seed/life, they were also 
considered to be the ones keeping German blood healthy and free of degenerate 
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influences. They could not be allowed to procreate even if they proved themselves to be 
capable of heterosexual intercourse. 
 
1.4 Lesbian Victims 
Having elaborated on the role and function of women in Nazi Germany, the next 
step is to situate lesbian victims within the discourse of the Holocaust and to 
compare/contrast them with other victim groups, i.e. mentally ill, Jews, or Sinti and 
Roma. At the beginning of the chapter I already made a point of illustrating that the 
persecution and discrimination of lesbian women and gay men differed; it is now 
pertinent to detail the nature of these differences as well as similarities, what made 
lesbians an (easy) target for Nazi discrimination, and how their experience relates to that 
of other victim groups. 
The question where lesbians fit into the category ‘woman’ has occupied feminist 
theorists since the 1980s, yet feminist analyses of fascism has largely been excluded 
“from the ‘official’ = male fascism discourse” (Hauer 47).37 Consequently, and although 
the assumption that ‘woman’ “signifies a set of universal commonalities, that all women 
share a common oppression” (Calhoun 9) is still a central idea explored in gender studies, 
the repercussions from being excluded from the discourse have resulted in ignorance of 
the uniquely lesbian experience. Hence the first distinction that has to be made to situate 
the experience of lesbians during the Third Reich is the importance of the gender/gender 
roles that the Nazis maintained. The previously outlined National Socialist view of 
                                                
37 “aus dem ’öffentlichen’ = männlichen Faschismustheoriediskurs“. 
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women reinforced the understanding of the NS view of Germany as a patriarchal system. 
By default, women are discriminated against in a patriarchal society by virtue of their 
sex. Through division of labor women were confined to the home, either metaphorically 
or literally, and their influence in the public sphere was reduced considerably. The Nazis 
managed this with the popular slogan Kinder, Küche, Kirche (children, kitchen, church) 
and “tied women to their traditional role” (Heger 12). Lesbians, as women, were 
subjected to this form of discrimination but also, additionally, to the measures taken 
against them as lesbians who fell outside the traditional – normal – gender role. This 
brings up the first difference in the experience of lesbians that is not applicable to other 
victim groups: The disappearance of their identity as lesbians behind that of being 
women while simultaneously remaining victims of Nazi discrimination and persecution 
on two different levels.38 Two separate ideological constructions become entwined here, 
that of sexism with homophobia, exhibited as a gender-specific persecution. In contrast to 
this, anti-Semitism and racism, for example, were the driving forces behind the 
persecution of Jews or Gypsies. This is not to say that there weren’t gender-specific 
differences in the persecution of these (and other) victim groups, but I would argue that 
these differences are gender-specific experiences within the larger frame of Jewishness. 
Sara Horowitz portrays an example of this in her essay Gender, Genocide, and Jewish 
Memory. “Already in ghetto writing” she says,  
                                                
38 This can at least be said to be true for the Aryan woman who was of importance to the 
Nazis as a possible mother. While I don’t doubt that there were lesbian women in other 





one can see how cultural assumptions and expectations about gender are 
enfolded in the victim’s understanding of ongoing events. Abruptly 
displaced and caught horribly in a genocidal net whose purpose ghetto 
inhabitants learn of only gradually, Jewish men and women struggled to 
survive unbearable conditions – hunger, filth, epidemics, omnipresent 
death. Equally targeted for death, men and women in the ghetto grappled 
with both similar and different situations. For example, men were more 
subject to deportation to labor camps, they performed manual labor and 
endured beatings; they occupied most leadership roles. Women attempted 
to fulfill domestic duties under conditions that made them nearly 
impossible, stretching meager rations and doing without to feed a family. 
They faced the dangers of unwanted (and forbidden) pregnancies, and they 
served as couriers and liaisons in resistance operations. (Horowitz 170, 
emphasis added) 
Women were targeted as Jews and they were equally targeted for death, with little regard 
to their biological sex or sexual identity. Consequently, the gender-specific experiences 
that have been researched as part of gender analysis in the Holocaust discourse ultimately 
examine how men and women within one group faced the torture they we subjected to. 
Thus, the category of race is analyzed in terms of the category gender but there is no 
investigation of the category gender separate from race. Jewish lesbians who were 
persecuted are analyzed in terms of their Jewishness, not their sexuality. Non-Jewish 
lesbians are thus not seen as victims because they are not in the more highly analyzed 
category Jewish. As a result any conversation about lesbian persecution is silenced; 
lesbian victims become invisible. 
Silence and invisibility are also what affected the gay and lesbian community and 
especially lesbian life after the Nazis smothered the blossoming homosexual subculture 
of the Weimar Republic. 1933 marks the end of a semi-open lesbian and gay life when 
bars and other meeting places of gays and lesbians were closed and several laws adopted, 
targeting magazines and newspapers for the community. ‘Gleichschaltung’ describes the 
political process of the Nazis to shut down all anti-fascist organizations and merge the 
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different German states into the German Reich under the umbrella of National Socialist 
leadership. The process involved all regional and local political levels and successively 
those who opposed National Socialist politics found themselves as outsiders in a system 
that tolerated no deviation from the party ideal (cf. Hildebrand 7ff.). For lesbian women 
this meant that the women’s movement of the Weimar Republic and its clubs, 
organizations and publications were also either banned or assimilated into loyal Nazi 
organizations. Claudia Schoppmann notes the importance of this process, explaining that   
through this a complete movement was destroyed which, with its demands 
for equal rights, questioned the traditional gender roles for women and of 
which the Nazis thought as a ‘reservoir’ for lesbian women”.39 (Grau 36)  
In this ‘reservoir’, it was assumed, lesbian women had a refuge and platform of 
likeminded women who also fought for the rights of lesbian women. As part of the Nazi 
Women’s Organizations, however, the influence of these ‘subversive elements’ on the 
rest of the population was considered to be minimal. Partly, because of Nazi politics that 
kept women out of the political sphere and partly because the patriarchal National 
Socialist ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ was based on male dominance and oppression. The 
repercussions of this on the daily life of lesbians and gays may not seem too obvious at 
first. Consider, however, Sabine Schrader’s explanation:  
Starting in 1928, for example, regulations were issued against the 
magazine ‘Die Freundin’, meaning it couldn’t be sold publicly anymore 
and in some cases it was confiscated. Since female homosexuality 
couldn’t be criminally persecuted censorship was enacted with the 
justification that the magazine was ‘offensive’ in content and image. […] 
                                                
39 “Wurde doch damit eine Bewegung zerstört, die mit ihren 
Gleichberechtigungsforderungen jene Frauen traditionell zugewiesene Rollen in Frage 
stellte, und von der die Nationalsozialisten annahmen, daß sie nicht nur ein 




Throughout the German Reich numerous bars had been closed or were 
under observation. Although bars with mainly homosexual patrons were 
still open in big cities, discretion and constant vigilance was needed due to 
the threat of police raids. Thus, the ‘most important und wide-reaching 
communication network’ was destroyed. Given that homosexuals are 
located outside of the normative framework, inconspicuous behavior was 
advisable even in the time before the Third Reich but became imperative 
in a totalitarian fascist state.40 (Schrader 36) 
The ‘Gleichschaltung’, therefore, impacted the homosexual community much more than 
it did any other group of victims. With little means of communicating with each other, 
lesbians were isolated from likeminded people and as apparently single women exposed 
to the efforts of making them adhere to traditional women’s roles. Gay men, though also 
robbed of their community, still had the benefit of being male and thus part of the 
dominant group. Research has shown that many lesbians and gays entered into marriages 
of convenience to escape suspicion (cf. Senatsverwaltung 5). 
While its is unquestionable that the same mechanisms were also applied to other 
victim groups, I argue that the result nonetheless was a different one for lesbians. 
Invisibility is the key term that separates lesbian victims from those groups persecuted 
due to political or racial reasons. Those undesired to join the NSDAP or its female 
counterparts, the political dissenters, Jews, Gypsies, etc. still belonged to their own group 
                                                
40 “Ab 1928 kam es zum Beispiel zu Verfügungen gegen die Zeitschrift ‘Die Freundin’, 
das heißt, sie durfte nicht mehr öffentlich verkauft werden, in einigen Fällen wurde sie 
beschlagnahmt. Da weibliche Homosexualität nicht strafrechtlich geahndet werden 
konnte, erfolgten die Zensurmaßnahmen mit der Begründung, daß die Zeitung in Bild 
und Inhalt ‘ärgerniserregend’ sei. […] Im gesamten Deutschen Reich wurden seitdem 
zahlreiche Lokale geschlossen oder überwacht. Zwar gab es in den Großstädten weiterhin 
Lokale mit überwiegend homosexuellem Publikum, doch war fortwährend Diskretion 
gefordert, da Razzien drohten. Damit war das ‘wichtige und weitverzweigte 
Kommunikationsnetzwerk zerstört’ Da homosexuelle Menschen den Rahmen der Norm 
verlassen, war unauffälliges Verhalten auch in der Zeit vor dem dritten Reich für viele 




and were part of a community, albeit a persecuted one. They were visible because they 
could not hide the reason for their persecution; the most poignant example of this the 
Yellow Star that Jews were forced to wear. Visibility and community mean the ability to 
organize and to some degree actively participate in creating at least a measure of 
normalcy in a world of chaos. In Holocaust memoirs as well as Holocaust research, 
authors regularly mention the significance of community for survival. Thus, Lawrence L. 
Langer writes about Charlotte Delbo’s Auschwitz and After “the immediate threats of 
Auschwitz led to the creation of a community among Mado and her fellow deportees that 
may have sustained some of them as memories from their lives prior to the camp faded 
and vanished” (Langer 352) and Ruth Klüger elaborates in her autobiography Still Alive  
Susi always thought that my mother saved her life. Certainly, my mother’s 
care and concern saved her from a certain degree of psychic damage: the 
mental self-neglect that sets in when nobody gives a hoot whether you 
exist or not. For us, Susi was not only a presence, she was important. And 
thus she existed for herself, too, simply because my mother made her feel 
she mattered. Without us she would have remained isolated; with us she 
was part of a family, and thus valuable. (Klüger 123) 
Sinti and Roma relied on community even more due to their life on the margins of society 
and most of those living in one area or travelling together belonged to close-knit family 
units. Like Jews, the National Socialist viewed Sinti and Roma as “foreign Gypsy people 
who are inimical to German national traditions” (Tebbutt 22).41 Their persecution, 
likewise, was justified by rhetoric comparable to that used to exterminate Jews, accusing 
them “of every conceivable misdeed and crime” (Lewy 10) and laws aimed at 
annihilating their livelihood. One scholar summarized the repercussions of the Nazi laws 
                                                
41 Much like classification of the Jewish people, the Nazis also went to great length to 
create categories of ‘genuine Gypsies’ (Z), ‘part-Gypsies’ (ZM), ‘non-Gypsies’ (M). 
Registrations were made “with the deliberate intent of eliminating the ‘Gypsies’ from the 
‘German national body’” (Tebbutt 23). 
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on the Sinti and Roma, they “have had to rely upon subsistence theft to feed their 
families; thus stealing has become part of the stereotype. Forbidden to use the town 
pumps or wells, denied water by fearful householders, uncleanliness becomes part of the 
stereotype” (11). In such circumstances their community was often the only safety net 
that existed.  
In sharp contrast to this experience of survival communality, lesbian women were 
susceptible to braving persecution alone and often in silence. I distinguish the effects on 
lesbian women from those of gay men as I argue that due to different gender roles lesbian 
women were more affected by the loss of the subculture. They were “threatened more in 
their material, economic existence, in their possibility to survive independently and 
without men” (Hauer 50).42 Lesbian ways of living often contradicted the National 
Socialist ideal of a woman’s role in society and made lesbian women prone to 
discrimination and persecution. Lesbian ‘life scripts’ (Lebensentwurf) focused on 
independence and employment, without being married to a man, giving rise to what 
Heinrich Himmler propagated as masculinization of women and the potential for 
homosexuality in men (cf. Schoppmann, Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik 167). 
Where homosexual men, by virtue of being male, could still live relatively free of 
intervention by the government to a certain degree, lesbian women were subject to 
regulation outside and inside the home as women. That they were not included in §175 
was largely related to the National Socialists view of female sexuality as passive and not 
autonomous. Thus, while there wasn’t a unique ‘Lesbian §175’, lesbian women bore the 
                                                
42 “Lesbische Frauen waren starker in ihrer materiellen, ökonomischen Existenz, in der 
Möglichkeit, eigenständig und ohne Männer zu überleben, bedroht”. 
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consequences of the Nazi’s gender politics. Hence, the fact that their lives did not follow 
the norms imposed by the Nazis made them vulnerable. “People who did not conform to 
social norms, yet had not committed any offense, could be branded asocial, an extremely 
flexible label, and taken into so-called protective custody by the police, without judicial 
authorization” explains Claudia Schoppmann and adds: “This meant they could be sent to 
a concentration camp. Anyone who sought to avoid any aspect of the Nazi’s claim to 
power [was] judged to be asocial” (Schoppmann, Days of Masquerade 21). The category 
‘asocial’ was a very versatile one for the National Socialists and encompassed any person 
accused of behavior deemed unacceptable, from homosexual acts between women to 
unemployment or homelessness. Measures taken against women classified as asocial 
included forced sterilization because they were “deemed unworthy of procreation” 
(Hedgepeth and Saidel 37). Some of those encompassed in this category were 
“prostitutes, lesbians, and indigents” (38) among others.  
The inclusion of lesbian victims in the category ‘asocial’ must be seen as another 
fine distinction between the victim groups of the Holocaust discussed so far, which made 
lesbians an easy target for the Nazis while at the same time contributing to the invisibility 
of this victim group in the 21st century. It essentially criminalized not what lesbians were 
doing but their failure to adhere to the Nazi ideal of a woman. They were not persecuted 
for ‘being’ something, as was the case with Jews or Gypsies, but for not acting the way 




Chapter 2 – Memory, Identity, Trauma and History 
In this chapter I will examine memory and its influence on identity, both on a 
collective and individual level. In the context of a lesbian collective memory and identity 
I will attempt to draw a connection between the representation of lesbian persecution 
during the Holocaust today and its repercussions in the lesbian community in Germany. 
In this endeavor I will draw heavily on trauma studies and relations to the experiences 
communicated by Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Situating the persecution of lesbian 
victims within the bigger picture of Jewish persecution is necessary for an evaluation of 
the accepted historical narrative of the Holocaust. For, as Simone Veil said about her own 
silence about her experience in Nazi death camps,1  
it is often said that the former inmates wanted to forget and preferred not 
to speak. Doubtless this is true for some, but inexact for most. If I take my 
own case, I have always been willing to speak, to bear witness, but no one 
was willing to listen. […] And the foolishness of some of the questions, 
the doubt which sometimes met our narrations […] led us to choose 
carefully our interlocutors. (qtd. in Wieviorka 72) 
“Memory” from a cultural studies perspective is the process of remembering and 
the image that is created in the recollection of something, which creates a bridge between 
the narrative of the past and the future. Memory is, so to speak, a preservation of the past 
in the future through recounting and recollecting while at the same time belatedly shaping 
how the future is perceived. As such, memory must be understood as part of history, as 
                                                
1 Simone Veil is a French Lawyer, Holocaust survivor and has served as President of the 
European Parliament. Not to be confused with French philosopher Simone Weil. 
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its own kind of history, influenced in its expression first and foremost by what is 
permissible in the historical discourse at any given time. Far from being a static 
occurrence, of representing a point in time that has passed, memory – especially 
traumatic memory – probes societies’ underlying conflict with the unresolved 
discomforts of history. Thus memory “poses questions to history in that it points to 
problems that are still alive or invested with emotion and value” (LaCapra 8).  
French philosopher Henri Bergson and French social scientist Maurice Halbwachs 
can be seen as major influences on our modern understanding of memory. Bergson’s 
book Matter and Memory (1913) considers some of the ideas Sigmund Freud drew on in 
his later Interpretation of Dreams. Bergson understood the function of memory to  
utilize a past experience for present action (recognition), either through the 
automatic setting into motion of mechanism adapted to circumstances, or 
through an effort of the mind that seeks in the past conceptions best able to 
enter into the present situation. Here the role of the brain is crucial: it will 
allow only those images to come into being or become actualized that are 
deemed relevant to the needs of the present. (Ansell-Pearson 66) 
Two points in Bergson’s theory are vital for our understanding of memory’s effect 
on identity and trauma: Memory as perceptions for the basis of actions and the filtering of 
memories based on the specifics of the present circumstances. The latter, filtering or – 
more specifically – forgetting and repressing of memory, is one aspect that permeates the 
boundaries between the narratives of history, trauma and identity. Maurice Halbwachs’ 
ideas combine Bergson’s theory with a social science component, situating memory 
within the broader scope of society. For him, memory went beyond the realm of the 
individual, asserting that “experiences, even of the most private, personal, and intimate 
nature, are the result of an ongoing dynamic social process” that are “inscribed in a given 
physical, sociohistorical environment, stored in memory and recollected through 
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continuous interchanges with significant others or significant groups” (qtd. in Apfelbaum 
85). This idea of the collective memory as part of what constitutes history – or what is 
recognized as history – plays a significant role in comprehending the driving force and 
problems of having lesbians recognized as victims of the Holocaust. If one group steps 
forward, which has not been recognized as having been ‘officially persecuted’ under the 
Nazis – does that not open the door for anyone who wants to claim victimhood? Or, in 
other words, where does one draw the line between who to accept as victims and who to 
reject? Collective memory always involves inclusion and exclusion to the degree that the 
collective conscience and the individual conscience can be reconciled. By questioning the 
main collective’s expectations and their process of working through memory; the stability 
– and identity – of said collective is threatened.  
 
2.1 Memory and History 
Maurice Halbwachs’ theories already provide a glimpse into the connection 
between memory and history. It is crucial to remember that memory is not a matter of 
‘true’ or ‘false’ but a representation of what makes sense for the present. The nature of 
memory and forgetting, of ‘false memory’ and repression will be explored in the section 
“Memory and Trauma”. What is comprised in the collective memory must thus be 
recognized as an individual’s experiences negotiated with and through a collective. 
Hence, just as individual and collective memory cannot be judged a true or false 
representation, history cannot be claimed to be an absolute truth. In Theses on the 
Philosophy of History German philosopher Walter Benjamin critiques the 19th and 20th 
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century historians’ method of research as a “process of empathy […] with the victor” 
(Benjamin 258) which ultimately benefits the ruling class of society. He thus sees the 
biased and selective side of history simultaneously also as the influence of power on what 
is represented as history. As a process, however, Benjamin saw a possibility for history to 
be articulated and recognized not ‘as it really was’ – for there can be no absolute ‘truth’ 
in historiography – but as a chance to capture the fleeting image of the past. These 
fleeting images are the memories that represent parts of the experiences of a society; they 
are glimpses of a past that has not yet passed away completely. As such, memory 
transcends the temporal limits of its construction; it is a reconstruction of the past in the 
present, meaningful only to those who have access to its frame of reference. Who has 
access will be determined either by who is in power or by who is within the collective 
that formed the frame of reference. It is a dual exchange, for “it is in society that people 
normally acquire their memories” while at the same time being dependent on society to 
“recall, recognize, and localize their memories” (Apfelbaum 85). The relationship 
between history and memory therefore necessarily has a similar duality in which memory 
does not only shape history but the historical representations subsequently influence the 
broader cultural context. Walter Benjamin understood the dangers of this as a distorted 
form of history or “officially sanctioned forgetting” (Leslie 133). 
Perceiving history as officially sanctioned forgetting draws attention to one of the 
problems that arises when history and memory discourses meet. Memory, with its ties to 
the individual, with certain subjectivity, clashes with assumptions about history as 
objective and detached from personal experiences. The present-ness of memory and the 
past-ness of history seem to be in polar opposition, and history seems “willing to question 
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the epistemological status of its object of study – the past – but less willing to engage 
with how ‘the past’ itself is variously conceptualized and constituted as […] memory” 
(Hodgkin and Radstone 3). In an encounter between history and memory, the 
autobiographical, the witness testimony, the personal account is often preferred over 
history and attributed with ‘truthfulness’ that history apparently lacks. This may explain 
the attraction of autobiographical accounts with their implicit promise of a true 
experience, true suffering, and true catharsis. The problem such non-communicated 
assumptions can cause, especially in regard to the Holocaust, are evident in the public 
outrage about the ‘fake memoir’ Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood by 
Binjamin Wilkomirski/Bruno Grosjean in 1995 (German: Bruchstücke. Aus einer 
Kindheit 1939-1948). Hailed as an authentic memoir of a child survivor of the Holocaust 
his book was deemed a fraud in 1999, a narrative work of fiction. Some critics argued 
that although the content doesn’t change with such a revelation, the re-categorization 
from the genre of memoir to that of fiction affects the reader, saying “once the professed 
interrelationship between the first-person narrator, the death-camp story he narrates, and 
historical reality are proved palpably false, what was a masterpiece becomes kitsch” 
(Studien 281). The ‘truth’ that is indirectly anticipated in reference to memory and 
memories becomes a challenging concept for discourses that embrace both history and 
memory. Dominick LaCapra argues that the relationship between memory and history is 
mutual: “Memory is both more and less than history, and vice versa. History may never 
capture certain elements of memory […]. Yet history also includes elements that are not 
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exhausted by memory” (LaCapra 20). In this challenge lies history’s value as a test for 
what actual memories are, what “is or is not factual in remembrance” (20).2  
Turning our attention to the way memory and history are represented in 
memorials and museums elicits similar questions and conflicting opinions that both 
discourses contend with individually, mainly: what can be remembered and how? From 
the choice of where to place a memorial to what it should signify one enters into a 
“struggle over meaning: whose monument is permitted, and what meanings may it 
convey? And since these sites are also often publicly established […] they are 
inescapably implicated in the construction of narratives […] of national identity” 
(Hodgkin and Radstone 11). It is at this intersection from theoretical discourse to tangible 
construction of a place of remembrance that history determines the past and regulates 
how it should be remembered in the present and future. Ascribed precise historical value, 
memorials dictate not only who will be remembered and how but also “who should be 
forgotten, which acts or events are foundational, which marginal; what gets respected, 
what neglected” (13).  
 
                                                
2 LaCapra differentiates between primary and secondary memory, with primary memory 
belonging to one person, unmediated and not processed beyond the experience itself. 
Secondary memory is what he views as the processed primary experience, either by the 
one who experienced the event or by a secondary observer (i.e. a historian). Secondary 
memory involves contextualizing, testing accuracy and relevancy of a memory for the 
past and future. 
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2.2 Memory and Trauma  
A connection between memory and trauma can intuitively be drawn from the 
understanding of trauma as an event or a series of events that happened in the past but has 
not been processed and integrated fully into memory. The term ‘trauma’ and ‘traumatic 
memory’ have become essential concepts in memory studies because it is this memory, 
which has not been fully processed yet, that is the object of memory studies. To 
understand the implication of cultural trauma, an excursion into the psychoanalytic realm 
is necessary. The arbitrary starting point for this will be Sigmund Freud, not because his 
theories are the first or best – he changed his arguments many times throughout his life – 
but because most of the cultural trauma discussion is rooted in his concepts.  By starting 
with Freud I will not dwell on his psychoanalytical premises long but provide the basics 
that help understand what cultural trauma is and how it shapes society.3  
 In his development of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud saw memory as ambivalent 
in nature precisely because the processing of experiences seemed to him manipulated by 
a person’s unconscious. In his terms there “is in general no guarantee of the data 
produced by our memory” (Freud 3:315). While we can thus be sure that recollections of 
experiences exist, we cannot, according to Freud, know if what we remember is actually 
what happened. Next to the concept of the unconscious that Freud developed there stands 
the concept of repression. Repression, that which “is suppressed” but “continues to exist 
in normal people as well as abnormal, and remains capable of psychical functioning” 
                                                
3 When referring to cultural trauma and the concept of society I denote a system of 
relations and the organization of such relations within a bigger unit or group. Culture in a 
society defined like this functions as an element of order. Its values, beliefs and norms 
(among other elements) create meaning for the society. 
 
 60 
(Freud 5:608), are recollections that disrupt memory by resisting processing. The 
previously mentioned unconscious, an inaccessible part of the mind, is where these 
disruptive experiences are stored, not forgotten but lying dormant, ready to involuntarily 
surface and disrupt life in the present. In this way memory – traumatic or not – is not only 
a means for remembering experiences but also for forgetting or suppressing them. 
Experiences important for functioning in the present are more likely to be processed and 
integrated, whereas those that are not important are filtered out and experiences that are 
non-negotiable at the present time remain in a state of unconscious existence.   
With an eye on holocaust studies, LaCapra describes trauma as “a lapse or rupture 
in memory that breaks continuity with the past, thereby placing identity in question to the 
point of shattering it” which simultaneously raises “problems of identity for others 
insofar as it unsettles narcissistic investments and desired self-images” (9). Regardless of 
the origin of trauma, traumatic memory must hence be understood as equally disrupting 
to an identity as the inability to process experiences within a group with the same frame 
of reference. Where in one case a traumatic event stands at the beginning of disrupted 
memory, the other side represents the inability to process an event that may in itself not 
have been traumatic. In the end, whether by distortion or by silence, trauma is not 
processed into memory as an event of the past but crops up again in the present to disrupt 
and challenge an individual or a collective.  
For individual trauma to develop into a collective or cultural trauma several 
conditions have to be met for which memory is essential:  
It must be remembered, or made to be remembered. Furthermore the 
memory must be made culturally relevant, that is represented as 
obliterating, damaging, or rendering problematic something sacred – 
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usually a value or outlook felt to be essential to the integrity of the 
affected society. Finally, the memory must be associated with a strong 
negative affect, usually disgust, shame, or guilt. (Smelser 36, emphasis 
added)  
 
The trauma of the Holocaust offers several approaches to this cultural trauma. On 
the one hand there is the trauma of the victim(s), the group(s) affected by the traumatic 
events. On the other hand there are the perpetrators and the cultural trauma of the German 
generation from the 1920s until today.4 What is made to be remembered today are the 
German Jews as primary targets of the Nazi extermination machinery, along with other, 
smaller groups. The sacredness that has been defiled by the National Socialists are such 
German values like ‘Kultur’ (culture), ‘Aufklärung’ (Enlightenment) and ‘Ästhetik’ 
(aesthetics), which play an important part in the history of Germany. The memory of the 
Holocaust for Germans is, finally, guilt-ridden and associated with shame. Or more 
accurately, it was associated with guilt and shame. Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich’s book The Inability to Mourn, published in 1967, describes the silence and 
inability of the German people to work through and overcome their past in the postwar 
years until the 1960s. It wasn’t until the historic ‘Warschauer Kniefall’ by German 
chancellor Willy Brandt that a conversation about the Holocaust was started in earnest. 
Agnes C. Mueller’s 2015 book The Inability to Love takes up the themes of guilt and 
shame, exploring how an inability to mourn the past may have turned into the inability of 
Germans to have positive relationships with and attachments to Jews against the 
backdrop of the Holocaust. Expanding from Mitscherlich’s approach, Mueller explores 
                                                
4 By this I mean the German generation born before WWII who fought in it, the 
generation that was born into the Third Reich and was brought up as followers, the 
immediate post-1945 generation of silence and all subsequent generations who dealt with 
the trauma of the Holocaust in their own unique ways. 
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“how and why the relationship between Jews and Germans today continues to be fraught, 
complex, and at times painful” (Mueller 6).   
Professor of Macrosociology Bernhard Giesen describes the importance of the 
kneeling, stating, “this representative confession of collective guilt was no longer 
relativized by reference to the sufferings of the Germans […]. Brandt took the burden of 
the collective guilt of the nation although he was innocent as a person.” Moreover, he 
“enacted a new narrative that confessed the collective guilt of the German nation with 
respect to the Jewish victims, to an international public that acted as a third party” (130). 
Brandt’s kneeling as a public act of humiliation and confession of guilt for the whole 
German nation paved the way for a narrative about the Holocaust that incorporated 
traumatic memory and changed the collective cultural trauma narrative away from guilt 
and shame to repentance and a new beginning. Thus, 25 years after the end of the war, 
the collective cultural trauma of the Holocaust had finally reached a stage of change. 
Figure 2.1: Willy Brandt. Kneeling in Warsaw at the monument for the victims of the 
ghetto uprising against German occupation 
Hubmann, Hans. "GHDI - Image." GHDI - Image. Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, 




Predictions from the 1980s say that the next stage means “the stigma will become the 
theme of stories and histories that can be narrated and represented to an audience that is 
no longer haunted by personal memories or stigmatized by collective guilt” (Giesen 137). 
The stories and histories that can be – or are made to be – remembered now are 
not the only histories. Along with the generally accepted victim group of the Jews, who 
are rendered problematic because of the sheer number of deaths and the arbitrariness with 
which they were persecuted, there are also other victim groups for whom collective 
cultural trauma status has not been achieved and who thus have no way as a collective to 
come to terms with their history. An article in Die Zeit related to the Holocaust memorial 
being planned in Berlin summarizes the dilemma society faces in deciding how to 
memorialize the trauma of the Holocaust:  
From a memorial for Jews only it must follow that we also need to build 
appropriate memorials for all other groups of victims. [...] Every solution 
outside of such a variety of monuments would be dishonest. But so far 
only lip service has been paid to tolerance. For none of the other victim 
groups a government initiative or private pressure group exists, as if their 
dead were dead of inferior rank, which can be more easily left to fade into 
oblivion. It is the macabre irony of this second solution that we continue to 
adhere to the categories of prisoners of the SS, who pitted all groups 
defined as x or y against each other in the concentration camps. If we 
accept only the memorial for the Jews, then it irrefutably means we are 
creating a hierarchy of monuments based on number of victims, in which 
the influence of survivors of the Nazi killings stipulates the categories of 
death and writes in stone their magnitude.5 (Koselleck) 
                                                
5 “Aus einem Denkmal nur für die Juden allein folgt zwingend, daß wir für alle anderen 
Opfergruppen entsprechende Denkmäler errichten müssen. […] Jede Lösung unterhalb 
dieser Vielfalt von Denkmälern wäre verlogen. Doch bisher ist es nur bei 
Lippenbekenntnissen zur Toleranz geblieben. Für keine der anderen Opfergruppen gibt es 
eine staatliche Initiative oder private Gruppen, als seien ihre Toten Tote minderen 
Ranges, die eher der Vergessenheit anheimgegeben werden dürfen. Es ist die makabre 
Ironie dieser zweiten Lösung, daß wir uns weiterhin an die Häftlingskategorien der SS 
halten, die in den Konzentrationslagern alle so oder so definierten Gruppen 
gegeneinander ausspielte. Akzeptieren wir einmal das Denkmal nur für die Juden, dann 
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Koselleck raises an interesting question in his article concerning not only how to 
commemorate victim groups and their suffering but also that many victim groups do not 
have the means to lobby for themselves. Examples for his thesis of having to 
commemorate the Holocaust with one memorial are that “there is no reason to let the 
people killed as Slavic subhuman beings fade into oblivion. Numerically their number is 
higher than the ones of Jews and other groups. Around three million non-Jewish Poles 
died” and that, likewise, there is no moral or political reason to exclude the hostages shot 
all over Europe, sometimes entire villages including women and children (Koselleck).6 
Who is included and excluded from the memory of the Holocaust also influences the 
present and future identity of an individual and a collective. Along with the memory that 
is created, reconstituted, erased, passed down to the following generation or lost in the 
folds of history, consequences arise for identity formation.  
In this context, a speech by German Federal President Joachim Gauck given in 
commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27th, 
2015 offers pertinent insight into what present or future German identity Gauck imagines, 
based on the interrelatedness of Holocaust history and a collective memory. The title of 
his speech “No German identity without Auschwitz” (Keine deutsche Identität ohne 
Auschwitz) is also the quintessence, in which Joachim Gauck extrapolates the historic 
guilt of the German people but also their willingness to “make the confrontation with the 
                                                                                                                                            
erhebt sich daraus unentrinnbar jene oft zitierte Denkmalshierarchie, die je nach Zahl der 
Ermordeten und je nach Einfluß der Überlebenden die nazistischen Tötungskategorien 
festschreibt und in unterschiedlichen Größenordnungen versteinert”. 
6 “so gibt es keinen zwingenden Grund, die als slawische Untermenschen umgebrachten 
Menschen der Vergessenheit auszusetzen. Rein numerisch übersteigen deren Zahl bei 
weitem die der Juden und anderer Gruppen”. 
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crimes of the past a core of their historical narrative” (“Deutsche Identität” 1).7 He then 
addresses critical voices of those who believe that there is a generational difference and 
the possibility of forgetting in the younger generation. While he does admit there will be 
changes in the way things will be remembered, he is also quite sure that the Holocaust 
will not be forgotten,  
’[e]ven if the Holocaust isn’t a core element of German identity for all 
citizens anymore one thing remains for sure: There is no German identity 
without Auschwitz.’ Remembering the Holocaust is a matter of all 
German citizens. ‘It is part of the history of our country.’8 (2) 
Upon closer examination one must interpret this speech twofold: It is a fitting example 
for the way history is conflated into a narrative of collective memory while at the same 
time illustrating the dynamics of memory work which seem to be in play only in 
Germany. In his work The Texture of Memory James E. Young observed about memorial 
culture – and thus the metaphorical and literal fossilization of memory – in Germany that 
it is ambiguous and surprising. “While the victors of history have long erected 
monuments to their triumphs and victims have built memorials to their martyrdom, only 
rarely does a nation call upon itself to remember the victims of crimes it has perpetrated” 
(Young 21). As such, Gauck’s insistence on the centrality of the Holocaust for the 
identity of the future German nation is contextualized within the framework of German 
guilt. He attempts to create a collective narrative of the Holocaust spanning more than 70 
years and multiple generations. In admitting that there has been a working-through of the 
                                                
7 “die Konfrontation mit den Verbrechen der Vergangenheit zu einem Kernbestand ihrer 
Geschichtserzählung gemacht”. 
8 “’Und mag der Holocaust auch nicht mehr für alle Bürger zu den Kernelementen 
deutscher Identität zählen, so gilt doch weiterhin: Es gibt keine deutsche Identität ohne 
Auschwitz.’ Die Erinnerung an den Holocaust bleibe eine Sache aller Bürger, die in 
Deutschland leben. ‘Er gehört zur Geschichte dieses Landes’”. 
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guilt and shame of the war crimes he calls Germany a “believable partner for a peaceful 
and equal cohabitation of citizens and nations” (“Deutsche Identität” 1).9 There is a 
discrepancy in his idea of a German nation that swiftly and freely practices 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which ignores even the rather recent struggles that on the 
surface had nothing to do with the German National Socialist past. The move of the 
government from Bonn back to Berlin (1994-1999), for example, created similar 
ambivalence to finding a new national holiday after the reunification of East and West 
Germany.10 The collective memory has established an image of Germany that will have 
to change in the individual memory of the future generation to truly lead to a new 
national identity. 
 
2.3 Memory and Identity 
Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) has, as mentioned before, been the major 
influence for our modern understanding of memory from a social science perspective. 
The importance of his hypothesis about individual memory and collective memory as 
constituents of a social framework has widely been accepted among social scientists and 
historians. His epistemological position on the nature of memory is grounded in the 
context of the dialectical relations that exist between individual and collective memory. 
                                                
9 “zum glaubwürdigen Partner für ein friedvolles und gleichberechtigtes Zusammenleben 
von Bürgern und Nationen”. 
10 Options that were discussed, according to James E. Young, were May 8th (1945) as the 
rebirth of the nation, July 20th (1944), which marked the unsuccessful assassination 
attempt on Hitler, or November 9th. While November 9th could have been perfect as a 
commemoration for the beginning of the Weimar Republic (1918) or the day the German 
people broke through the Berlin Wall (1989), it was also the day of Kristallnacht (1938).  
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Within the framework of a group an individual recalls experiences and processes, 
integrating them into the collective memory of the group. Thus “the various groups that 
compose society are capable at every moment of reconstructing their past” and to form a 
collective memory since “society can live only if there is sufficient unity of outlooks 
among the individuals and groups comprising it” (Apfelbaum 83). Halbwachs’ idea of the 
collective is rooted in his sociologist understanding that no individual lives in isolation. 
In his essay On Collective Memory he reasoned  
one is rather astonished when reading psychological treatises that deal 
with memory to find that people are considered isolated beings. These 
make it appear that to understand our mental operations, we need to stick 
to individuals and first of all, to divide all the bonds which attach 
individuals to the society of their fellow. Yet it is in society that people 
normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, 
recognize, and localize their memories. (Halbwachs 38) 
Individual memories are therefore also always part of a social process in the measure that 
they are processed, shaped, questioned and evaluated through the exchange with others. 
These ‘others,’ just like the individual himself, contribute recollections to a collective 
memory with shared references and definitions that can “reappear […] because at each 
moment society processes the necessary means to reproduce them” (183). Individual 
identity, derived from individual experiences, thus depends on membership in a group for 
validation and legitimization. It furthermore means that as an individual’s affiliation with 
one group changes, memory may be ascribed different values according to the new 
framework. If no referential framework exists, however, individual experiences will 
become non-communicable and, depending on the group’s collective memory, may 
remain invisible. Simone Veil’s quote at the beginning of this chapter illustrates this 
invisibility and silence in a collective that does not have a frame of reference for her 
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experience. Without a frame of reference against which to process and recollect 
memories, an individual’s sense of identity will be disturbed. In light of the silence and 
opposition to recognizing the persecution of lesbian victims during the Holocaust, two 
things stand to reason: (1) that the collective memory lacks a shared frame of reference as 
it exists for other victim groups and (2) that a lesbian collective has been denied the 
legitimization to process its memory of the Holocaust. Benjamin’s ‘empathy with the 
victor’ becomes empathy with those who are validated as witnesses for the Holocaust by 
having been officially classified as undesirables in the politics of the National Socialists. 
Processing individual memory as well as collective memory and bearing witness 
is dependent not only on a shared frame of reference but also on language. The problem 
of what the sign ‘lesbian’ means now and what it meant for the women living as women-
loving women during the Third Reich demonstrates the limitations for individual 
recollections to become part of the collective memory. What is perceived as ‘lesbian’ in 
the 21st century? Who identifies as ‘lesbian’? Is ‘lesbian’ evident only and reduced to a 
sexual act? Is it a lifestyle? Queer theorists have been exploring questions like these for 
the past 20 years. Some answers to these questions lie in our use of language, in de 
Saussure’s triad of what signifier and signified are compounded in what sign. Much of 
the invisibility of lesbian life and lesbian persecution remains due to a lack of language to 
express lesbian experience. In a heteronormative world, the term ‘girlfriend’ only denotes 
romantic love when uttered by a male, ascribing a platonic relationship when used by a 
woman to refer to a female friend. Any ambiguity of language is therefore dependent on 
the collective that shapes and processes the experience of the individual. Within the 
constraints set by the collective an experience can thus be perceived differently than how 
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the individual memory recollects it. I would argue, however, that within one collective 
the passing of time can change a linguistic frame of reference, making it possible for 
different collectives to overlap.   
In a reflection of the interviews she conducted with female ‘lesbian’ witnesses of 
the Holocaust Claudia Schoppmann concluded:  
quite a few women-loving women especially of the older generation 
cannot or do not want to identify with the term [lesbian] that still has a 
negative connotation today and which marks them as outsiders. Lesbian 
experience varies from culture to culture, era to era and individual to 
individual. It is naturally impossible to determine for time and eternity 
what the historically modern term ‘lesbian’ means, especially due to the 
ways it has been studied […] by sexology.11 (Schoppmann, Zeit der 
Maskierung 27) 
In a collective memory that excludes lesbian existence as experienced by lesbian 
women and denies a positive language for an individuals’ experiences and memories, it is 
not only the individual that is silenced but the collective that shares these experiences. As 
a consequence an individual’s identity, which would have been negotiated within and 
against the collective identity of the group, is missing. I would argue that part of the 
inaccessibility of knowledge about lesbian life and persecution during the Third Reich 
stems from the fact that they disappeared under the sign ‘woman’ with the stigma 
‘asocial.’ Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone summarize this in Contested Pasts. 
The Politics of Memory, stating “Meaning is always part of a system of symbol and 
                                                
11 “viele frauenliebende Frauen insbesondere der älteren Generation können oder wollen 
sich mit diesem bis heute negative belegten Begriff [lesbisch], der sie zu 
Außenseiterinnen abstempelt, nicht identifizieren. Lesbische Erfahrung variiert von 
Kultur zu Kultur, von Epoche zu Epoche und von Individuum zu Individuum. Natürlich 
ist es unmöglich, für alle Zeiten verbindlich festzulegen, was der historisch modern und 
durch die Sexualwissenschaft stark pathologisierte Begriff ‘lesbisch’ bedeutet”. 
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metaphor, and in the absence of such a system, memories cannot acquire meaning” 
(Hodgkin and Radstone 98).  
The concept of identity can be traced from the enlightenment until today as 
different versions and emphases towards a ‘project’ of the self, a conscious – or 
unconscious – undertaking to produce an image of the self that the individual wants to be. 
In 1570 the term ‘identity’ was recorded for the first time as signifying “the quality or 
condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular 
qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness” (Benwell and 
Stokoe 18). The idea that identity is exactly and only one, excludes what I will term 
fragmented identities, those identities that remain after trauma because traumatic memory 
could not be integrated successfully.12 Such an enlightenment idea was situated in the 
turn to reason and science and away from the medievalist belief in class hierarchy. There 
was limited exclusion to the principle of identity, as it was perceived to be grounded in 
reason; there was no distinguishing marker set between a queen or a maidservant to have 
the ability and right of engaging in the project of the self.13 From the enlightenment 
period of the 18th century the outlook on identity changed with the romantic movement of 
                                                
12 When I use the term fragmented identities, I am not referring to the clinical diagnosis 
of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). 
Although the definition of DID is similar to the idea of a failure of integration of 
traumatic memory after trauma, the key difference is that in DID the fragmented 
identities are seen as distinct personalities. One diagnostic criterion from the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM-5) is a “Disruption of identity 
characterized by two or more distinct personality parts. This disruption may be observed 
by others, or reported by the patient” (American Psychiatric Association 300.14). 
Disruption as described here refers to behavior of a person, whereas the fragmentation of 
identity that I discuss is the failure in the mental process to create an image of oneself 
that successfully integrates ones memories.  
13 Foucault’s theories are examples for the extensive work that has been done in this field.  
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the 19th century. Romanticism classified the development and search for the self as “an 
expression of something innate, but predicated on sensibility and feeling rather than 
cognition” that was part of the very nature of self-expression necessary for humanity, “an 
extension of, or in harmony with, the self” (Benwell and Stokoe 19). This romanticist 
view of identity as something natural, a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of the self, is still 
discernible today in our understanding that there is an ‘authentic’ true self. This 
‘authentic’ identity, however, has lost the character of harmony with the self and is 
instead understood as static. It has become one ‘authentic’ identity, which cannot change.  
During the early 20th century, the identity discourse changed to a medical 
discourse, as evidenced by Sigmund Freud’s research of psychoanalysis and psychosocial 
behavior. Freud’s ideas about the unconscious and the approach of psychoanalysis to 
uncover the hidden truths of the self alter the previously mentioned idea of identity as a 
project of the self into an act of mediation between an other and the self. This reverses the 
idea of the natural self but takes up the angle of reflexivity that could be found during the 
Enlightenment era. Reflexivity – within the psychodynamic framework – was used by 
French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist Jacques Lacan, whose essays on the Mirror Stage 
identify unconscious identity formation in infants. He surmised that between the age of 6-
18 months an infant will be fascinated with mirrors and through them “is able to conceive 
of itself as a whole, but simultaneously ‘other’ or alien. This imposes a comforting 
illusion of unity, coherence and distinctiveness” (Benwell and Stokoe 21). Lacan’s theory 
is not only applicable to infants but, when using ‘mirrors’ in a metaphorical sense as the 
community, culture and society around us, also serves as an evocative example of how 
memory (both individual and collective) forms identity. Once ‘I’ see the memory that ‘I’ 
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have as both my individual memory and the ‘other’ collective memory, ‘I’ can 
understand that my identity is based on both; ‘I’ need the ‘alien’ other to complete the 
identity that makes me distinctive. For an individual ‘me’ only exists through the distinct 
memory that ‘I’ have in conjunction and coherence with the collective memory of 
society.  Memory therefore serves as a validator for an individual’s experience as much 
as that of the collective and with that also initiates identity formation in an individual. 
The question ‘Who am I?’ can be answered from three angles of identity formation 
theory used in the field of developmental psychology. On an individual level, identity 
means  
aspects of self-definition at the level of the individual person. These may 
include goals, values, and beliefs, religious and spiritual beliefs, standards 
for behavior and decision-making, self-esteem and self-evaluation, 
desired, feared, and expected future selves, and one’s overall ‘life story.’ 
[…] Theories of personal identity tend to focus especially on individual-
level processes, often emphasizing the agentic role of the individual in 
creating or discovering his or her own identity. (Schwartz et al., 3) 
The enlightenment and romantic notion of the process of the self is emphasized here by 
the conscious decision-making that is taking place in part of the decisions. While I would 
argue, however, that not all of these aspects of self-definition are conscious – values and 
self-esteem are often unconsciously learned and copied from parents and role models 
rather than consciously chosen – the idea of a ‘life-story’ as a framework highlights the 
continuity and fluidity of identity.  
The second approach is situated between the individual and the collective identity 
and connects the two of them. The relational identity defines processes and approaches as 
located within interpersonal space, within families, or in the roles that one 
plays within a larger system. A common theme in these perspectives is 
that identities cannot be established by individuals on their own – claims 
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to a particular identity need to be recognized by a social audience if they 
are to be secure. (3) 
The central information in this quotation is the caution that identities cannot be 
established in isolation, and that there needs to be an entity against which one’s identity 
can be defined and by which it needs to be recognized. For lesbian women during the 
Nazi era, this meant official non-existence and social invisibility, as the National Socialist 
society did not recognize their identity as valid. Although their own identity self-
evaluation classified them as lesbian women, for the authorities they appeared only as 
women and often with the addenda asocial or inferior. Hence, the only role that lesbian 
women could play in the Nazi society if they wanted to survive was that of the adapted, 
dutiful German woman and housewife.  
The third and last angle from which to approach identity formation is the 
collective identity, which is understood as an individual’s  
identification with the groups and social categories to which they belong, 
the meanings that they give to these social groups and categories, and the 
feelings, beliefs, and attitudes that result from identifying with them. (4) 
Here, too, we can draw on Maurice Halbwachs’ concept of dialectical relations between 
individual and a collective memory that has the basis for the collective to highlight what 
the identification with social groups and categories means. Collective memory creates the 
group that an individual can relate to because of shared memory. Identification with the 
group creates meaning beyond that memory and leads to the formation of a belief system 
and of viewing the world in certain terms, which, in turn, creates more shared individual 
and collective memory.   
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It is in the intermediate stage between the individual and the collective identity, 
however, that the role of memory comes into play the most and has to be negotiated. The 
question of who is included and excluded from memory as discussed in the introduction 
to this chapter directly impacts if – or how – an individual can establish a sense of 
identity against this backdrop. I would like to add here that the terminus establish is in 
my opinion appropriately descriptive in the context of discussing identity, whether 
sexual, religious, or personal. To establish something denotes active participation, 
making something stable. Contrary to the opinion that sexual orientation begins with the 
choice an individual makes, which is then manifested as identity I would argue that at the 
beginning of the process stands the realization of sexuality. This process can be broken 
down into three steps. First the heterosexual will become aware of their feelings for 
members of the opposite sex. They may then choose to act on these feelings and, as their 
actions are accepted or valued, their sexual identity will be established. It is a progression 
from realization to choice and lastly identity formation. All this will be negotiated within 
and against the collective they have access to. Thus the ambiguity of minority identities 
can partly be traced to the tradition, knowledge and memory, which are nurtured. 
Philosopher William S. Wilkerson writes about the confusion inherent in the triplicity of 
this concept, that  
in our contemporary situation, an individual who has not yet come out 
lives in a confusion where heterosexuality is strongly encouraged and 
homosexuality discouraged. Developing an identity requires one to 
interpret this confusion and compose it into a coherent pattern. The 
identity thus formed reflects back upon this process and changes the 
feelings themselves. The social interaction that structures experience 
presents possibilities for identity that allow the feelings to be patterned 
and interpreted in light of social roles. This means that individuals involve 
themselves in the process of composing their feelings as they interpret 
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their desires and understand their relation to social circumstances. 
(Wilkerson 88) 
Social circumstances and social roles may change depending on what example of identity 
one is looking at. The overall result, however, is the same for the Jewish woman in search 
of a home within her faith community as a feminist as well as the female Holocaust 
survivor without the ability to mourn because ‘lesbian’ is not a recognized Holocaust 
victim identity. It requires one to interpret the confusion of the past and the present in 
order to bring it into a cohesive whole.  Collective memory of lesbian persecution can 
therefore only be established once the unrecognized and invisible lesbian victims are 





Chapter 3 – Lesbian Persecution in Historical Representations 
To show historical representations of lesbian persecution I have picked a selection 
of different life narratives to show how lesbian persecution was evident between 1933 
and 1945. Hilde Radusch serves as an example of a leading communist who was 
persecuted by the Nazis, survived in hiding with her girlfriend and became a driving 
force in the 1970s lesbian movement. Honored with a memorial site in front of her last 
home, the commemorative plaques are introduced in an accompanying TV clip as “the 
first memorial site in Berlin for a lesbian woman persecuted during National Socialism” 
(Immer Kämpferin, Nicht Opfer. 00:49).1    
The documentary hybrid novel Aimée & Jaguar is an attempt at reconstructing the 
life that Elisabeth Wust and Felice Schragenheim shared for a brief year before the latter 
was deported to a concentration camp in 1942/43. Written by Erica Fischer, the novel is a 
collection of narrative, interviews, diary entries, and legal documents that challenges 
currently held beliefs about the way lesbian persecution is portrayed and understood. In 
light of the different nature of the relationships between the interviewees and Lilly or 
Felice, respectively, the interpretation of persecution and lesbianism – and lesbian 
persecution – will change throughout the analysis. 
                                                




The book Zeit der Masquerade (Life of Masquerade) is a compendium of 
interviews with ten women who identified as lesbian during the Nazi era and survived to 
tell their stories. I have excluded the first, Hilde Radusch’s, account from this book and 
included it instead in my analysis of Radusch as a standalone example based on archival 
research. Selecting these accounts over others is a choice born of the aspiration to include 
the lesser-known and unknown counterparts to the movie Aimée & Jaguar or prominent 
figures like Hilde Radusch in order to gain more puzzle pieces to the still incomplete 
picture of what lesbian persecution during the Holocaust looked like for women of 
different walks of life.  
I have deliberately excluded memoirs from concentration camp survivors in this 
analysis, as the majority of them describe lesbian behavior within the camps from the 
outsider perspective of heterosexual onlookers.2 What was perceived in the camps, 
however, must be understood in relation to the surroundings it was observed in. The 
caring or loving behavior of two women towards each other under the duress of life-
threatening circumstances does not necessarily constitute lesbian sexual orientation. 
Similarly, the negativity with which such witnessed lesbian acts and/or behavior is 
mostly portrayed oftentimes says more about the social attitude of that time rather than 
the degree of persecution lesbian prisoners were subjected to. It would go beyond the 
                                                
2 Negative and stigmatizing examples can be found in Krystyna Zywulska’s Wo früher 
Birken waren – Überlebensbericht einer jungen Frau aus Auschwitz-Birkenau, Fania 
Fénelon’s Mädchenorchester in Auschwitz, and Simha Naor’s Krankengymnastik in 
Auschwitz. Aufzeichnungen des Häftlings Nr. 80574. More positive are Anja Lundholm’s 
Das Höllentor and Luce D’Eramo’s Der Umweg. 
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scope of this dissertation to include the distinct and intricate themes of these particular 
accounts as well.3  
3.1 Hilde Radusch 
Since 2012, visitors walking through Berlin Schöneberg and reaching the corner 
of Eisenacher Straße/Winterfeldtstraße will find three commemorative plaques dedicated 
to the memory of Hilde Radusch, “the first memorial site that commemorates a lesbian 
woman” (Vehling).4 The three tall plaques show a portrait of Radusch with the quote “I 
never felt like a woman… but don’t ask me as what else”,5 the stylized outline of her 
head beside her poem We walk the way, and her name printed in bold next to a spiral of 
keywords and phrases.   
                                                
3 A good starting point for those interested to know more about the portrayal of female 
homosexuality in autobiographical accounts of female camp survivors is the German 
article “Es war verpönt, aber das gab’s” (Meier). It will shed more light on the special 
topics that need to be addressed when analyzing the netherworld of camp life.  
4 “der erste Gedenkort, der an eine lesbische Frau erinnert”. 
5 “Ich habe mich nie als Frau gefühlt… aber frage mich nicht, als was sonst”. 
 
Figure 3.1: Hilde Radusch Memorial 




Hilde Radusch, born 1903, was 18 when she left her hometown of Weimar and 
moved to Berlin in 1921. Away from the conservative influence of her parents, she joined 
the communist youth group and later the KPD (German Communist Party). Her political 
interest and attitude led her to write articles for the Frauenwacht, a magazine for 
communist girls and young women (Schoppmann, Zeit der Maskierung 35). Radusch 
worked at the telecommunications office Berlin, after her training as a kindergarten 
teacher at the Pestalozzi-Fröbel-House failed to provide her with employment in the field. 
It is there that she met her first girlfriend and noticed that she was “different than the 
others” (Schoppmann, Days of Masquerade 31). As an emancipated woman and a 
political activist, she was elected to the workers council and, as one of the few 
government employees who was also a member of the communist party, she aroused 
interest. She was only 26 when the communist party “honors her success with a 
nomination for the Berlin city council assembly, which she [was] part of from 1929 – 
1932” (Netzwerk Frauengeschichte vor Ort).6 At the beginning of April in 1933, the 
National Socialists arrested her for her communist activities, and six months passed in 
different prisons under ‘protective custody’ until she was released. 
Hilde Radusch’s political activities as a communist overshadow and dominate the 
perception of her as a woman identifying and living as a lesbian. The ‘protective custody’ 
she was subjected to in 1933 ended the relationship to the girlfriend she had at the 
telecommunications office. In an effort to avoid more harassment by the Nazis and 
because “at that time everybody was as faithful as never before; lesbian life basically 
                                                
6 “honorierte diesen Erfolg mit ihrer Nominierung für die Berliner 
Stadtverordnetenversammlung, der sie von 1929 bis 1932 angehörte”. 
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only took place in a relationship” (Schoppmann, Zeit der Maskierung 37),7 it wasn’t until 
1939, when Hilde Radusch was 36 years old, that she met the woman she would spend 
the rest of her life with. Moving around to avoid the Gestapo and SS, she had just settled 
in a new apartment when she met one of her neighbors, severely handicapped Else 
‘Eddy’ Klopsch. Soon the neighbors were getting to know each other and became more 
than friends. In order to stay under the radar of the Nazis and not endanger Eddy, Hilde 
Radusch ceased her official communist activities and stayed in the background helping 
Eddy to create a private ‘Mittagstisch,’ a restaurant where no alcohol is served. In her 
personal documents, not many references can be found relating to this time beyond 
innocuous matters of what needed to be organized or what official appointments either of 
them had.8 This can easily be understood as a security measure against the National 
Socialists in case any of her written material was seized and pertained to signs of her 
sexual orientation and relationship with Eddy, as well as the illegal communist activities 
she was still involved in. In August 1944, warned by a friend of Eddy’s, the couple fled 
to a small town about 45 minutes south of Berlin.  
This incident is significant for an analysis of the reasons of Hilde Radusch’s 
persecution by the Nazis. The event that preceded the couple’s flight was a warning by 
                                                
7 “Damals waren alle so treu wie noch nie; das lesbische Leben spielte sich praktisch nur 
in der Partnerschaft ab.” 
8 During my research I spent two weeks in the archives at the Frauenforschungs-, 
Bildungs-, und Informationszentrum (FFBIZ), which holds the complete estate of Hilde 
Radusch. I concentrated on documents from 1933-1945 in my research, especially 
diaries, calendars, and letters. In addition, I read excerpts from unpublished short stories, 
poems and correspondence relating to the interview(s) Radusch gave to Claudia 
Schoppmann for her book Time of Masquerade and the makers of the documentary film 
Muss es denn gleich beides sein (“Does it have to be both at once”), Petra Haffter and 
Pieke Piermann.   
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someone who worked at the police and knew of the order Heinrich Himmler had given on 
August 18th, 1944 as part of what is known as “Aktion Gewitter” (“Mission 
Thunderstorm”; Reiter 73). As retribution for the unsuccessful attack on Hitler on July 
20th, all political enemies and especially members of the former communist and socialist 
parties were to be taken into ‘protective custody’ and were later sent to concentration 
camps. As a KPD member Hilde Radusch could well have been among the approximately 
5,000 arrested sent to Dachau, Neuengamme, or Ravensbrück (Becker and Studt 191). 
Although both she and Eddy fled, it was not their lesbian relationship that caused the 
problem. “In principal, Eddy could have stayed and kept managing the restaurant but then 
she would have been asked where I am. They could have beaten her to death but she 
would never have said anything” recalls Radusch in an interview (Schoppmann, Days of 
Masquerade 37). Hilde’s affiliation with communism, not their relationship, made Eddy a 
possible accessory and target for Nazi persecution. Given that this had happened before 
when Eddy applied for permits to open her restaurant and was dismissed by the SS with 
references to the “woman she lives with who ‘isn’t politically correct’” (38), it seemed 
safer for both of them to go into hiding.  
Hilde and Eddy survived in their hiding place outside of Königs Wusterhausen 
near Berlin. After the War in 1945, Hilde started working for the Berlin district offices in 
the department for the ‘Victims of Fascism.’ When she decided to leave the newly 
reformed KPD because her own political ideas had grown and differed from what she 
saw as the new communism, it was the leadership of the communist party that denounced 
her as a lesbian to her employer and caused her to lose her job at the district offices. It is 
in this official file, quoted earlier, in which Hilde Radusch saw the word ‘lesbian’ for the 
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first time in 1946. Claudia Schoppmann’s biographical narrative about Hilde Radusch 
ends after another paragraph, briefly mentioning her involvement in the founding of the 
lesbian group L74 and her interest in other feminist-political causes.9 
 Ironically, then, the only very explicit experience of persecution due to her 
lesbian sexual orientation that stands out did not come from the side of the National 
Socialists but by some of her communist ‘comrades’ in 1946. Radusch herself does not 
include her lesbian identity either when talking about the time of persecution between 
1939 and 1945 in the documentary Muss es denn gleich beides sein! The title, with the 
strong and somewhat defiant exclamation mark, already hints at the uncompromising 
woman the viewer is bound to meet in the following 45 minutes. Filmed in 1985, Hilde 
Radusch is 81 years old, talks about politics, changing ideals, and her life.10 She comes 
across as masculine, the stereotypical ‘butch’ with short hair, flannel shirt and a deep 
voice with raspy undertone from cigarette smoke. Her tone is engaging, her mind sharp 
and when she loses herself in a politically inspired answer the viewer can imagine why 
she was voted city council assembly member at an early age. Yet, throughout the 
documentary, and although the interviewer asks questions which could possibly lead 
away from politics and to her personal life, she keeps up a wall. Does it have to be both at 
once? The title becomes a question: Does it have to be about the political and the 
                                                
9 “L74” or “Group L74” stands for “Lesbos” and the founding year 1974. It was a group 
founded by and for older lesbians in Berlin as a way to counter the movement of the 
younger lesbian generation with different ideas and utopias. Hilde Radusch was part of 
L74 and also wrote articles and poems for their magazine UkZ – Unsere kleine Zeitung 
which was published for 26 years from 1975-2001 (cf. Lenz 125). 
10 I was fortunate to be able to view the documentary at the archive of the FFBIZ in 
Berlin but have been unable to acquire a copy of it. I can thus only rely on the notes I 




personal at the same time? And in its original title with the exclamation mark at the end it 
turns into a resolute answer: No! No, it does not have to be about the personal when the 
more important one is the political. That, at least, is the interpretation one takes away 
from the documentary in which Radusch exhibits an obvious lack of identification as a 
lesbian. Although she is revered as a lesbian woman, was very active in the lesbian 
movement, few of her own written records or what has been recorded of her go into detail 
about her life as a woman living with and loving a woman. Persecution as a lesbian 
always takes second place after her persecution as a member of the communist party. I 
would argue that this part of her identity did not factor into her life until after she gave up 
her political identity as a communist. In losing – or leaving – one identity behind she 
created a void, which she filled with activities directed towards and benefitting the 
identity bestowed on her later, that of a lesbian woman. It is no surprise that the death of 
Else Klopsch in the 1960s and Hilde Radusch’s new-found enthusiasm for the budding 
women and lesbian movement fall closely together. This, however, creates a conflict in 
recognizing Radusch as a lesbian persecuted because of her sexual orientation during the 
Holocaust. Ilona Scheidle, one of the members of the initiative Netzwerk Miss Marples 
Schwestern that fought for the memorial site, illustrates her own reasons for seeing 
Radusch as a victim:  
The meaning [of the memorial] is that she was persecuted as a political 
person but she lived as a lesbian and after 1945 her lesbian orientation was 
one very important aspect that brought political conflict between her and 
the [KPD]. After ’46 she left the party in protest, she just does not fit in 
any one box.11 (Immer Kämpferin, nicht Opfer. 30)  
                                                
11 “Die Bedeutung ist eben, sie ist verfolgt als politische aber sie hat lesbisch gelebt und 
nach 1945 war ihre lesbische Orientierung eben auch ein Punkt wo es zu politischen 
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Scheidle’s differentiation between lesbian victims of the Holocaust and lesbian 
persecution during the Holocaust is an important one to note as it potentially rationalizes 
the opposing positions, which have hitherto been described. The initiative for a Hilde 
Radusch memorial site arose against the background of the debates surrounding the 
monument for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust. It can be seen as a successful 
attempt to include lesbian women in the victim narrative of the Holocaust or, if one were 
to take up Ilona Scheidle’s words, it is a memorial for a woman who was persecuted 
during the Holocaust and happened to be a lesbian. The words on the commemorative 
plaque that spiral inward from Radusch’s name are a good indicator for which 
interpretation is the more accurate one. Starting with ‘Lateral thinker’ it moves on to 
‘Lesbian’, ‘switchboard operator’ and ‘KPD’ among others. Her political, social, sexual 
identities are included along with achievements like ‘survived in hiding1944/45’ or 
‘Lesbian Group L74.’ The information flyer printed for the dedication of the memorial 
site states that it serves as a contrast to the official ‘Homomonument’ in Tiergarten Park 
with and in which “women were again to be forgotten or rather excluded” (Netzwerk 
Frauengeschichte vor Ort).12  
Unlike the other women analyzed in this chapter, Hilde Radusch is 
commemorated and remembered today as a communist lesbian woman who was 
persecuted by the Nazis and survived. For the lesbian movement, the fact that her sexual 
orientation was known to the SS and used against her girlfriend to deny work permits 
counts as evidence for further discrimination and possible deportation had they both not 
                                                                                                                                            
Auseinandersetzungen mit der Partei gegeben hat [sic]. Sie ist dann ’46 auch ausgetreten 
aus Protest, sie passt in keine Schublade rein”. 
12 “Wieder einmal sollten Frauen vergessen bzw. ausgegrenzt werden”. 
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left Berlin and gone into hiding. Her identity as a lesbian and persecution as a woman, I 
would argue, is thus claimed for the collective memory of lesbian life during the 
Holocaust without fully contextualizing the influence of her political identity.  
 
3.2 Aimée & Jaguar 
The documentary novel Aimée & Jaguar. A Love Story, Berlin 1943 by Erica 
Fischer was published in German in 1994 and translated to English in 1995. A mixture 
between a fictional novel and a documentary novel, Erica Fischer relied on memories 
provided by surviving main characters or their relatives and interspersed her story with 
accounts from them. Adding these ‘truths’ or ‘facts’ to her story, in conjunction with the 
use of documents that survived until 1994, she created a narrative hybrid that more fully 
Figure 3.2: H. Radusch “Words”. Commemorative plaque at the memorial site for Hilde 
Radusch in Berlin-Schöneberg.  
Netzwerk Frauengeschichte vor Ort. “Hilde Radusch Gedenkort”, 2012: n. pag. Print. 
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engages readers as it facilitates believability. The previous examination of the problems 
associated with authenticity in memory is helpful here as well, as similar issues arise in 
representations of memory. Genre expectations, among others, influence how the reader 
views and identifies with the text. While Fischer’s technique is not new, it remains a 
highly successful strategy.   
The story of Aimée & Jaguar is set in Berlin and begins with Inge Wolf, who is 
looking for a household for an internship year. German Nazi housewife Lilly Wust offers 
Inge that chance and soon her life is transformed by the people Lilly meets through Inge, 
especially Felice Schrader/Schragenheim, whom she falls in love with. Later, Lilly learns 
that Felice is Jewish. The reader is then taken back to Felice’s childhood and youth, as 
Fischer tells her life story up to the point she first stays with Lilly for the night. Her 
Jewishness, persecution of Jews in general, and how she is affected are explored, before 
Fischer weaves both storylines together again. In an apparently organic progression, the 
reader subsequently follows Lilly and Felice along as they live their life among Germans 
but become ostensibly disconnected from the National Socialist ideology and the war that 
is happening around them. The last 100 pages of the novel are part Lilly’s diary entries, 
part personal accounts, part narrative and explain what happened to Lilly after Felice is 
deported.13 The appendix includes pictures, postcards, and legal documents pertaining to 
Felice’s and Lilly’s time together. 
                                                
13 It needs to be noted here and will be of interest later on that the 311 pages of the book 
(excluding the appendix) can be divided into 64 pages about Lilly and Felice, 60 pages 
Felice’s life story, roughly 80 pages of Lilly and Felice living together and the last 100 
pages being exclusively about Lilly and the time after Felice was deported (these 
numbers refer to the German edition).  
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The first thing to address before analyzing the documentary novel is the preface to 
the German paperback edition of 1998, which does not appear in the available English 
translation. With reference to the movie based on her book that was about to be released, 
Fischer recapped the accomplishments of her book to give “young people the opportunity 
to deal with National Socialism through such a haunting singular fate” (Fischer, Aimee & 
Jaguar. Eine Liebesgeschichte 11).14 She attributes Lilly’s “end of isolation”15 (12) as a 
closeted lesbian to her new-found fame and delineates how lesbian women write her 
because they identify with her and “married women who feel the need to tell her about 
their secret love for a woman” (12).16 In Fischer’s words Lilly has become the mother 
confessor of the nation, almost a religious figure, who is the confidante for lesbian and 
straight women alike. This would not be too bad if one could look uncritically past the 
following paragraphs that denunciate the negative behavior of old friends towards Lilly. 
Fischer has the impression that she is stuck in the middle: “I have to defend Lilly when 
the opinions are too harsh but I’m also part of the story. Psychologically, I can 
understand Lilly’s very German silence about the different parts of her past but I can’t 
really forgive her” (13).17 She reflects on the issue of individual guilt. Lilly’s guilt as the 
German who failed to protect her Jewish lover; the guilt of those who uncritically view 
her Nazi followership as normal; the guilt of those who cannot see that Lilly combines 
                                                
14 “jungen Menschen ermöglichen, sich anhand eines so eindringlichen Einzelschicksals 
mit der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus auseinanderzusetzen”. 
15 “Ende ihrer Isolation”. 
16 “verheiratete Frauen, die das Bedürfnis haben, ihr über ihre geheime Liebe zu einer 
Frau zu erzählen”. 
17 “muß ich Lilly verteidigen, wo das Urteil allzu harsch ausfällt, bin ich aber auch 
Beteiligte an der Geschichte. Ich kann zwar Lilly’s allzu deutsches Schweigen über die 




differences which may be irreconcilable, as a German perpetrator and a lesbian victim. 
It’s valid to question at this point how far Fischer herself is guilty of these same errors, 
given that Lilly was the one who survived where Felice died, making her unable to tell 
her own story. Fischer admits that “the Jewish survivors and Felice’s friends cannot and 
do not want to make peace with Lilly Wust” (13) and what sounds rather factual negates 
the feelings and emotions still at work in these people.18  
Elenai Predski-Kramer is one of the friends who talked with Fischer for the 
second edition of her book. Kramer recalls her feelings upon having seen the book in 
passing the first time and why she can’t reconcile with Lilly Wust:   
The crazy hope: ‘Is my friend Felice still alive; did someone find her and 
write about her?’ The hope was false but the pain grew because by then 
Elenai Predski-Kramer couldn’t rule out anymore that Lilly Wust sold out 
Felice Schragenheim to the Gestapo. An upsetting suspicion that is fed by 
the lively memories of the witness which don’t seem to be congruent with 
the sentimental and sad lesbian story of the German Hitler follower Wust 
(Aimée) and the persecuted Jew Schragenheim (Jaguar). A story in which 
the war allegedly destroyed the big love, in which one woman 
unfortunately dies somehow and the other is broken and lost in sorrow 
forever.19 (Sperber) 
                                                
18 “die jüdischen Überlebenden und Felices Freundinnen können und wollen keinen 
Frieden schließen mit Lilly Wust”. 
19 “die verrückte Hoffnung: Lebt meine Freundin Felice noch; hat jemand sie gefunden 
und über sie geschrieben?" Die Hoffnung trog, der Schmerz aber wuchs, weil Elenai 
Predski-Kramer inzwischen nicht mehr ausschließen mag, dass Felice Schragenheim von 
Lilly Wust an die Gestapo verraten wurde. Ein schlimmer Verdacht, der sich speist aus 
den eigenen lebhaften Erinnerungen der Zeitzeugin, die so gar nicht in Deckung zu 
bringen sind mit der rührselig-traurigen Lesben-Geschichte von der deutschen Hitler-
Sympathisantin Wust (Aimee) und der verfolgten Jüdin Schragenheim (Jaguar), die das 
Buch erzählt. In der angeblich die widrigen Umstände des Krieges eine große Liebe 
zerstört hätten, in der die eine Frau leider irgendwie ums Leben kommt und die andere 




The reader is inevitably left to wonder what is fact and fiction, if there is one ‘truth’ or 
maybe no ‘truth’ at all because witnesses contradict each other and scratching the surface 
seems a violation of the dead. I will come back to a thorough critique of the book and the 
lesbian love story after my analysis of the representation of lesbian persecution. In this 
context the preface’s last sentence is important, however, as it stands in direct opposition 
to the topic of the novel as well as its atmosphere. Fischer hopes that the preface helps “to 
read the bittersweet love story of Aimée and Jaguar with all its refractions without losing 
its timeless beauty and romance” (Fischer, Aimee & Jaguar. Eine Liebesgeschichte 14).20 
Before the reader has even read the first sentence, he is primed to suppress instances that 
may not fit into the rhetoric of the romantic love story and accredit more meaning to 
those scenes that support it. 
From the opening scene of the novel, the role of women under National Socialist 
rule is described and emphasized. Ilse Wolf has to complete a yearlong internship to 
“arouse joy at one’s domestic and social vocation” (Fischer, Aimee and Jaguar: A Love 
Story 3), and to prepare for the children every woman was expected to raise. Lilly Wust 
remembers: “I turned into a good little housewife and had children. Basically, I was 
brought up to have a family and run a household, and that’s what I did” (4). With four 
children, she says, she would have expected her husband to help out with some of the 
housework but the clear division of male and female roles emphasized in chapter one 
made such an arrangement impossible. “He had no idea what to do with small children,” 
reiterates how little men were taught about childcare, and Lilly states matter-of-factly 
                                                
20 “die bittersüße Liebesgeschichte von Aimée und Jaguar mit all ihren Brechungen zu 
lesen, ohne daß dabei ihre zeitlose Schönheit und Romantik verlorengehen”. 
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“there were thousands of households like ours, households that had no interest in 
anything but their offspring. We women swapped recipes, that was more important to us 
than anything else” (4). Her account of family life conveys a sense of normalcy, which 
similarly points to her sheltered life as a German woman adapted to living under the rule 
of the NSDAP. It is curious to notice that this peaceful existence Lilly seems to lead does 
not end the moment she learns of Felice’s Jewishness but cracks open only after Felice 
has been deported. Her diary, her ‘Tränenbüchlein’ (‘little book of tears’), is her record of 
what happens after Felice is gone. It remains one of the two confirmations that losing 
Felice set something in motion in Lilly, which the war or even the awareness that she 
may be a lesbian and in love with a Jewish woman did not previously touch. Are those 
consequences and remnants of persecution through the Nazis? Reading Lilly’s diary one 
comes across an entry written after she has been summoned to the Gestapo for having 
visited Theresienstadt. While “everyone [is] in a state of upset except Lilly,” she notes “I 
don’t know how it is that at the moment of greatest danger I can keep my wits about me. 
[…] It is not only Felice who has nerves of steel” (220). As the questioning by the 
Gestapo turns into hours Fischer narrates  
‘You knew Schragenheim was a Jew. You did know. Talk!’ they shouted 
at her. Lilly hadn’t known, she said. Lilly was astounded to discover that, 
rather than being afraid, she was totally alert. She needed to remain 
vigilant to perceive the traps they were setting for her; she could not afford 
to be inattentive. One careless answer and she, and Felice and their 
friends, would be done forever. (223) 
Lilly’s persecution, I would argue, rather than being about herself or her perceived sexual 
orientation is aimed at gaining information about Jews still hiding out in Berlin. As a 
mother of four, still married to a German soldier and with obvious connections to Jews in 
hiding, Lilly was more valuable for the Gestapo as a source of information about other 
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Jews they could capture rather than one possibly lesbian woman. Having demonstrated 
that she was ‘usable’ as a mother and housewife her duties to the Führer could be 
maintained in the future as well. Additionally, according to Fischer, the Gestapo protocol 
states that “there was no lesbian love between us” as Lilly’s answer to the question if they 
had a sexual relationship (223).  
The sexuality of Lilly Wust is a topic from the start. Inge becomes an accomplice 
to the “visits from [the] gentlemen friends” although she “neither understood nor wished 
to understand her employer’s political or sexual preferences” (6). Though Lilly is 
married, she has affairs with friends of her husband as that there is no love or passion 
between them anymore. In fact, both Lilly and her husband have extra-marital affairs, 
however, there are no love affairs with women either before or after Felice. On the 
contrary, Lilly gets married again after the war in 1950 (cf. Aimee and Jaguar 263). 
Curiously, in regards to men Lilly describes her physical arousal as nonexistent, which 
goes along with Nazi expectation that women do not need to feel pleasure to have 
children. Although she says she “enjoyed having my children” she instantly comes 
around to “But the way they were made, that’s another story” (8). With Felice, Lilly feels 
changed:  
men took their pleasure with me and I felt used. With Felice it was just 
totally different. She was my counterpart, my complement, literally. I felt I 
was both myself and Felice. We were a mirror image. She needed only to 
touch me and I… When she kissed me I surrendered to her completely. 
Sex was pleasing for me for the first time in my life. […] With men I was 
always the inferior one. The men did it to me. A woman has to wait, that’s 
how I was raised. With Felice, I myself could be the one who loved. (34) 
While this sounds quite positive, Lilly’s initial reaction of being with Felice is one 
of uncertainty, carefully feeling her way along the familiar and yet unfamiliar body. After 
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the first night of being at the receiving end of Felice’s touch it is Lilly who decisively – 
after a little power struggle – takes the lead to practice what she learned the night before 
(cf. 33). After a few more times it is for Lilly as if “she had always been ‘this way’” (34).  
The first time the theme of persecution comes up, it is directed at Jewish people, 
not lesbians. Erwin Buchweiser, one of Lilly’s lovers and Albrecht’s biological father, 
tries to justify his NSDAP party membership with ignorance: “I joined the party in 1931 
because I liked its platform. And there was nothing in the platform about those things. 
[…] That Jews were taken to concentration camps and killed there” and he adds, “I never 
did any Jew harm, not even verbally, but everyone says that. Today I sometimes ask 
myself: Why did we take so little notice? But do you think any of us little people took it 
seriously?” (10). In his statement Erwin Buchweiser outlines not only his own thoughts, 
but those of Günther and many others of the ‘little people’ he talks about. Lilly Wust’s 
claim that she can smell Jews, the pivotal point in the book and the initial reason Felice 
and Lilly meet at all, is anchored in reasoning like this. Fischer’s ability to weave 
historical facts and documents into the narrative also brings up many of the important 
dates in the persecution of Jews by the National Socialists. Especially in the part about 
Felice’s life and upbringing, where Jewishness plays a major role after Nazi politics make 
clear that their lives are in danger, limitations and changes imposed on Jews are 
recounted. From switching schools to being restricted more and more in their daily life 
Erica Fischer uses the space of Felice’s biography to bring in the beginning stages of 
persecution against Jews. In fact, while Felice’s and Lilly’s characters are meant to be 
read together as lesbians persecuted based on their sexual orientation and relationship 
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status, it is in the context of Felice appearing in the story that the topic of persecution – of 
any kind – is brought up.  
Lesbian persecution is not evident in the novel Aimee & Jaguar unless one 
understands it as the persecution of a Jewish person who also happens to be in a lesbian 
relationship. This would be the same interpretation given earlier with the example of 
Hilde Radusch who was the communist lesbian persecuted for her political ideation. 
Constructing their relationship in this way, however, leads to the question if Felice and 
Lilly were in a lesbian relationship at all or if they were using each other for their own 
purposes. Felice’s friend and fellow Jew Elenai Predski-Kramer was and is convinced 
that it was Lilly who had her own agenda, others who are not mentioned explicitly think 
likewise. In analyzing the book, more questions come up than are being answered. Told 
by the sole survivor of the relationship with no one who has evidence to prove her 
otherwise, Lilly claims this love story between a German woman and a Jewish woman 
existed. A romantic, eternal, and true love that would have – or so she and the reader can 
imagine – endured the War and the future. A happy ending and finally something good 
that even the Nazis could not destroy and which blossomed even in spite of their 
persecution. A problem remains in the incongruences between what is ‘authentic’ 
memory and what Lilly has tried to bury in her memory of the past. Fischer records in the 
epilogue her frustration with the holes in Lilly’s story and her manner of brushing over 
what does not fit in. She says “Lilly presents herself as a dull housewife who was so busy 
changing diapers that she didn’t have time to keep up with what was going on in the 
world” (270) as if that would excuse her blue-eyed ignorance about what could happen to 
Felice if she got caught. “But this view of herself contradicts her recollections of her 
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family”, Fischer goes on, “her Communist father, her mother’s Jewish lover, and her 
brother, who was killed in the Spanish Civil War. She could not have been as apolitical as 
she presents herself” (270). Instead, there are the holes in her biography she skips over, a  
murky patina of obscurity covers a period of ten years of her life. Have 
they been suppressed, forgotten or consciously petrified, as so many of her 
compatriots have done? Lilly always stressed her family’s acquaintance 
with Jewish people – ‘Don’t forget the father of my brother!’ – and yet she 
didn’t notice what was being done to Jews in Germany from 1933 on? 
(271) 
In taking at face value what Erica Fischer tells the reader, however, one can 
quickly forget the narrator’s point of view. When we read about Felice’s thoughts we are 
relying on Fischer’s ability to narrate a story from the memory of Lilly Wust, the 
documents she has available and the testimony of other witnesses. We rely on her as an 
impartial listener, witness, narrator. Knowing that Erica Fischer is Jewish and admits in 
her (German edition) introduction that there was also some righteousness on her part in 
wanting to tell this story, motives and narrative angles coalesce. Erica Fischer is frank 
with the reader, acknowledging about a conversation with Lilly: “She expected me to 
accept her view of herself without question, of course: Lilly at Felice’s side as a victim of 
Nazism” (271).  
In the end, Fischer’s representation of lesbian persecution is not what Lilly may 
have had in mind, nor is it what lesbians seeing the cover of the book may want it to be. 
The love story is told on a different level from what was happening to and between Jews 
and Germans during the Nazi era. The structure of the book with its different parts also 
clearly marks partitions the events into smaller compartments that seem to be detached 
from each other. What happened to Felice before she met Lilly, what happens to Lilly 
after the war ends. The interruption of the narrative with interviews, diaries and 
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flashbacks creates an illusion of standing still. The imminent danger of persecution – of 
both Jews or lesbians or anyone who is against the Nazis – is only conveyed in small 
intervals when survivors can tell their story in a few sentences. The overall ‘love story’ 
and dynamic of the relationship between Lilly and Felice, however, remains static. Up 
until the acknowledgement that Felice is really dead there are letters, packages, cards; 
correspondence from concentration camps to the ‘real world’ with content that seems 
trivial and isn’t given context. Besides the historically established facts of Jewish 
persecution, e.g. the enactment of Nuremberg Laws, transports in cattle cars, Gestapo 
punishments, that Fischer intersperses by way of interviews, there is no connection 
between any act of persecution against Lilly and Felice as a couple. Even Lilly’s trip to 
Theresienstadt and her consequent interrogation at the Gestapo station are depicted as if 
danger, degradation and discrimination, were nonexistent. Lilly, though lesbian, is 
German and not persecuted throughout the story, whereas Felice is subjected to 
persecution constantly. When both are together, the love story shifts into the foreground, 
masking persecution of any kind. 
 
3.3 Days of Masquerade 
The ten biographical sketches Claudia Schoppmann collected in Days of 
Masquerade show the influence of the Nazis on a whole lesbian subculture and lesbian 
movement from the mid-1920s until well into the 1970s. As one from the older 
generation of lesbians portrayed in the book, Jewish artist Gertrude Sandmann survived 
the Nazis in hiding with the help of German friends. Born in 1893, she is able to 
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experience the ‘roaring twenties’ and witnesses the slow blossoming of a new lesbian 
movement in the 1970s. She says “the clubs, this subculture that is spurned today, [were] 
our first attempt, the first and only and very much welcomed opportunity to get together 
with likeminded women – a very important beginning”, and adds how important it was 
for the process of finding her identity as a lesbian: “It was a huge relieving experience to 
see that so many other women were just like oneself. One came to the club like one 
‘came home’, that’s where one belonged” (Schoppmann, Days of Masquerade 85). 
Sandmann’s impressions about the importance of lesbian subculture for lesbian identity 
formation make the Gleichschaltung and closing of homosexual entertainment 
establishments a vital part of the oppression that was to follow. Anneliese, born in 1916 
and dubbed “Johnny” due to her appearance in male attire, is only 15 when she starts 
exploring the lesbian subculture of Berlin. Of the many places to go before 1933 only few 
remain after Hitler’s coming into power. “After the Nazis came to power they were all ‘a 
bit afraid’ of criminalization, roundups or suspensions. […] A feeling of imminent threat, 
of helplessness starts to spread. Some of Johnny’s friends even change their appearance 
or marry in order to be less visible and vulnerable” (46).  
Hiding, whether in plain sight under the guise of heterosexuality, or literally, 
when other mitigating circumstances are present, is the red thread woven throughout the 
biographies in the collection. For lesbians the separation into male and female 
organizations that the Nazis practice makes it easier to find likeminded ‘friends.’ 
Nevertheless, societal pressure and national socialist upbringing make it hard to find the 
courage to go into bars. The fear of being seen and reported to family or – even worse – 
the police is always present. Thus one account cannot only be interpreted as a standalone 
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incident but must be perceived as an event, which, in different permutations, was feared 
by those who frequented gay and lesbian bars and clubs. Margarete Knittel recounts:  
It was hard to persuade my girlfriend to come to the ‘Zauberflöte’ with me 
just once because she was afraid her sister or mother would get wind of it. 
Sure enough, we ran into two other house occupants of Else’s who were 
just as shocked to see a familiar face. I said to Else ‘They are just as afraid 
as you are, they don’t want this to become public anymore than you do’, 
and I went over to them. One of the women was getting a divorce and 
feared to be found guilty in the divorce if her husband would know the 
real reason for it. Of course they didn’t have to be afraid of us.21  
(Schoppmann, Days of Masquerade 88) 
Psychological pressure – fear above all – may not have been seen as actual persecution 
under Nazism but is part of the UN understanding of persecution now. It is also one of 
main mechanisms the Nazis employed that were directed at lesbian women. In the 
previous quote it became apparent how much of lesbian life was lived and experienced 
outside the home. As women, staying true to their Führer-appointed roles as wives and 
mothers inside the home was expected. Lesbian women therefore stood in direct 
opposition of what their prescribed life should have been. All of the women, for example, 
are portrayed as working regular or at least odd jobs, earning money and showing 
independence from men. Otherness, attracting attention, is being avoided for fear of 
being found out and questioned. Lesbianism, while not officially an offense, presents still 
enough of a stigma to make it essential that it be kept a secret unless family members and 
friends are supportive.  Elisabeth Zimmermann only adds: “One didn’t talk about it. One 
tried to protect oneself instinctively. You shut yourself out and acted accordingly: 
careful” (114).  
                                                




The exception to this rule is Claire Waldoff, born 1884 in Gelsenkirchen as Clara 
Wortmann. With hits such as Hermann heeßt er and Rrrraus mit den Männern aus’m 
Reichstag she is already a national cabaret star by 1933 and although the Nazis would 
have liked to issue an occupational ban due to her song lyrics – and most likely also her 
open liaison with Olga ‘Olly’ von Roeder – Claire Waldoff can perform unchallenged. 
Her only complaint in an interview in 1946 with the Südost-Kurier is that Nazis 
repeatedly tried to violently break apart the crowd that had gathered to hear her sing (cf. 
73). There are differences, though, between her and other artists/performers who chose to 
leave Germany, like Claire’s friend Marlene Dietrich or writer Thomas Mann. Claire is 
not too critical of the Nazis and therefore not an enemy of the Reich per se. While her 
lyrics may provoke resentments in some, her personal life can be overlooked by most. 
Annette Eick, another woman from the collection, is not as fortunate in avoiding 
persecution by the Nazis precisely because of her religious affiliation. Schoppmann 
explains:  
The carefree times were over soon after Hitler came to power. The reason 
for the escalating threat and persecution in the following years was her 
Jewish heritage but not her lesbian identity. Contrary to the religious 
affiliation registered with the civil registry office it was easier to hide ones 
lesbian identity than Jewishness. (103) 
The other women in the collection talk about Jewish friends, and they can share stories 
about girlfriends who need to go into hiding or are deported by the Nazis. For those who 
are not doubly stigmatized as ‘Jewish and …’: Jewish and lesbian or communist, 
socialist, anti-Nazi or catholic, life is about pretending to fit in while trying to go through 
the process of finding their lesbian identity. Elisabeth Zimmermann, born 1913, says it 
took her a long time to come out because  
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the orientation, whether for a man or a woman, remained deep under the 
surface for a long time. It wasn’t only the parental education that kept me 
from experiencing it but long years passed […] which wasn’t a rarity 
during the ‘Third Reich’ with its repressive sexual morals that ostracized 
women’s relationships. (117) 
That discovery would mean more than just interrogations by the police or repressions and 
surveillance through the Gestapo becomes clear in one of Zimmerman’s almost 
haphazardly added subordinate clause, reiterating the fear of consequences in case of 
detection: “so long as you don’t let your sexual tendency slip, otherwise you’d have 
landed yourself in once of the camps” (120).  
Curiously enough – or maybe only a natural consequence of the Weimar Republic 
and traditional German upbringing – most of the protagonists in the compilation talk 
about the alienation they feel towards their parents once their sexual orientation has 
become common knowledge. The possibility of being rejected by the family and expelled 
from the home they knew is a real fear for the 20 – 30 year old women in the 
biographical sketches. The repercussions of such actions like homelessness, financial 
troubles or a loss in social status seem to weigh harder, though, than detection by the 
Nazis. The psychological damage that was noted earlier can thus likewise be seen as 
consequence as well as causation for persecution based on lesbian sexual orientation. 
Connecting the examples in this chapter is the inconspicuousness lesbians had to exhibit 
to navigate their life and escape persecution. Walking carefully on the narrow line 





Chapter 4 – Lesbian Persecution in Fictional Representations 
In this chapter I will analyze fictional texts in regards to the lesbian persecution 
observable within. I will start out with Claudia Schoppmann’s book Verbotene 
Verhältnisse and move on to the 1998 movie Aimée & Jaguar, which is based on the 
biographical novel I examined previously. This chapter is thus a step further away from 
the ‘historical’ or non-fictional character of chapter three. It seems important to pause 
here for a moment and clarify the genre expectations created by using the terms 
‘historical’ and ‘fictional.’ I am not referring to the opposition real/unreal or truth/lies 
when using these terms. Instead, in talking about historical representations I employ 
Thomas Couser’s definition of life-writing genres whose “forms may be highly variable, 
but they are united in being concerned with the identities of actual people” (Couser). 
Although the movie Aimée & Jaguar is based on Erica Fischer’s text, director Max 
Färberböck created a cinematographic piece of fiction that does not make the claim of 
being biographical in nature.1 The last movie discussed here, Novembermond, moves the 
chapter even further towards the realm of the fictional as it is not grounded in any 
historical or hybrid context.  
 
                                                
1 Neither the front nor the back covers of the DVD mention that the movie is based on a 
true story or that it is based on Erica Fischer’s book by the same title. It is only almost 
two minutes into the movie as part of the credits that her book is referenced. Those 




4.1 Verbotene Verhältnisse 
Claudia Schoppmann’s Verbotene Verhältnisse,2 about fictional representations of 
lesbian persecution, can be analyzed based on the fictional elements of the texts as well 
as the quotations from the court proceedings. The text is thus neither purely historical nor 
completely fictional but a sort of hybrid text. As Schoppmann herself notes in her 
preface: “I tried to show the most probable version of the events without 
misappropriating any discrepancies; […]. Nevertheless, all stories will only be 
approximations of reality, which is subjective and is experienced differently”3. The court 
proceedings she used to piece together the narratives of ten lesbian relationships are 
furthermore doubly subjective since the prosecution, whose goal was conviction, 
compiled them. Their agenda was driven by the legal situation created through §129Ib 
and the ability to instigate investigations into claims of lesbian relationships. Those 
things that made it into the files, a memory recounted, a letter that was included (or 
excluded) depending on the helpfulness for the trial, need to be carefully analyzed not so 
much in terms of accuracy but as one version of an event. Each event tells the reader only 
what was relevant for the persecution of the women’s crime but does not give a more 
comprehensive picture of each woman involved.  
There are numerous elements that all ten reconstructed stories have in common, 
which are part of the context of discrimination and persecution against lesbian women in 
                                                
2 English: Forbidden Relationships. 
3 “So habe ich die mir am wahrscheinlichsten erscheinende Version der Geschehnisse 
dargestellt, ohne Widersprüchliches zu unterschlagen; […]. Doch können die 
Fallgeschichten letztendlich nur eine Annäherung an das sein, was sich in Wirklichkeit, 
die ja stets subjektiv unterschiedliche erlebt wird, zugetragen haben mag”. 
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Austria during the time of the Third Reich. The first element I will look at is who 
reported the women and what reasoning can be elicited for going to the police. In three 
instances it was a close family member who reported the lesbian activity of their 
daughter, wife or niece. Three reports mention colleagues and the landlord, in one 
instance it turns out to be the lover herself, one case is built on letters intercepted by the 
Gestapo and in one example it is not clear who got the ball rolling. With the exception of 
the intercepted letter(s), what becomes clear while reading the accounts is the motive that 
can be attributed to the person filing the police report. Three distinct emotions play a role 
in nine of the ten tales: Revenge for a perceived injustice, fear of being accused of a more 
severe crime themselves, and malice.  
Examples for revenge can be found in “A tipsy story” in which the landlord 
Bachmann reports his female tenant Elisabeth G. of having lesbian relationships.4 The 
precursor to this event, however, is the theft of linens by Elisabeth G. from Bachmann’s 
mother two months previously. In “Just vengeance?” Berta H. has her husband arrested 
for threatening to kill her.5 The husband, Franz H., supposedly as an act of revenge or 
maybe even malice, then tells the police what he thinks his wife has been doing with 
other women.  Likewise, the actions of father Johann W. can be viewed as acts of 
revenge as well as malice. Johann W. files a report with the police about his daughter 
Margarete W. and her lesbian relationship after she has moved out of her parents’ home 
in defiance of her parents’ rules. Ironically, his daughter had accused him of sexual abuse 
four years earlier and his actions seem to be motivated “by anger that his daughter does 
                                                
4 “Eine beschwipste Geschichte”. 
5 “Nur ein Racheakt”. 
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not want to talk to him anymore and has also moved out” (Schoppmann, Verbotene 
Verhältnisse 32).6 In the case of the aunt and the niece, the perverted lesbian behavior is 
mentioned in relation with the actual crime committed: theft of clothing and food stamps. 
The aunt “furiously enters the police station Berlin-Steglitz. She is determined to press 
charges against Edith T.: her niece. […] The niece is not unknown to the police, she has 
been convicted for theft and fraud three times previously” (Schoppmann, Verbotene 
Verhältnisse 105).7 In this case, although the initial investigation starts in Berlin, Edith T. 
is later charged in Vienna where she had been arrested on other charges.  
Malicious intent can be attributed to Johanna W. in “A morally flawed person”,8 
female colleague of Karoline M., who incriminates her of “groping my chest and 
especially my breasts with both hands” (Schoppmann, Verbotene Verhältnisse 72).9 Other 
colleagues chime in, stating that they had seen Karoline M. “making a move on her 
female colleagues” (72) on other occasions and that she had sexually harassed them (cf. 
73).10 Additionally, it is claimed that she admitted to having an “abnormal disposition” 
towards women, making it essentially a confession of her lesbian nature.11 What does not 
figure into the equation is the fact that Karoline M. had been married for ten years and 
had two children living with her at the time the accusations were made against her. In 
                                                
6 “wohl aus Ärger darüber, daß seine Tochter nicht mehr mit ihm reden will und überdies 
ausgezogen ist”. 
7 “betritt […] erbost das Kriminalkommissariat Berlin-Steglitz. Sie ist fest entschlossen, 
Anzeige zu erstatten: gegen Edith T., ihre Nichte. […] Die Nichte, dreimal wegen 
Diebstahl und Betrug vorbestraft, war kein unbeschriebenes Blatt mehr” 
8 “Eine sittlich nicht einwandfreie Person”. 
9 “mit ihren beiden Händen an meinem Oberkörper und insbesondere meinen Brüsten 
abgriff”. 
10 “sich an ihre Mitarbeiterinnen heranmacht”. 
11 “abnormal veranlagt”. 
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fact, while her colleagues claim to have been sexually harassed by her, they also 
complain she constantly talked about “sexual intercourse with her boyfriend who is 
currently in the military [and] did not spare us the bawdy details” (73).12 Only after 
having heard rumors about a previous involvement with a young woman – a prostitute 
who admitted to having seduced Karoline M.! – did the colleagues interpret Karoline 
M.’s behavior as sexually harassing. Despite these incongruences, however, Karoline M. 
was found guilty under §129Ib for being a threat to the morals of the younger workers. 
Based on the information provided by Schoppmann it seems more likely that there wasn’t 
any lesbian behavior on Karoline M.’s part, but that the underlying reason for her 
persecution was to remove her from the factory. Schoppmann concludes: “It is quite 
possible that the real reason for her dismissal and subsequent charges was a disruption of 
working morale. In addition, the management appeared to have been dissatisfied with her 
performance” (75).13 
The involvement of unrelated other charges in the cases prosecuted with §129Ib 
are worth noting for several reasons. Except for “Lady seeks Lady as friend” the stories 
reflect that the initial charges had little or nothing to do with lesbian behavior.14 It 
appears, instead, that accusing women of unnatural acts of sodomy with other women 
served to discredit them and get justice when the original crime was not prosecuted, or it 
would be easier to prosecute on the basis of §129Ib. In all nine cases where such a 
                                                
12 “über den Geschlechtsverkehr mit ihrem derzeitig eingerückten Freund geäußert und 
dabei mit schlüpfrigen Details nicht gespart”. 
13 “Vermutlich lag in der Störung der Arbeitsmoral der eigentliche Grund für Karoline 
M.s Entlassung und ihrer vergleichsweise harte Strafe. Außerdem schien die 
Betriebsleitung mit ihren Leistungen unzufrieden zu sein”. 
14 “Dame sucht Dame als Freundin”. 
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strategy seems to be employed, the underlying rationale that becomes obvious is moral 
superiority. The perpetrators involve the police because they see it as their moral 
obligation to do so. In this context sins of theft, fraud, or mythomania are reduced to 
insignificance for the benefit of that which threatens the very fabric of a moral society.15 
While Austria was not officially subjected to the National Socialist ideals prior to its 
annexation in 1938, it had carved out its own traditions and values amidst revolutionary 
upheavals after World War I and with multiple nationalities composing the new Republic 
of Austria.16 Politically, until the annexation, Christian Socialist chancellors governed 
Austria and propagated values infused by Catholicism. Like §175 in Germany, §129Ib 
had existed in Austrian history long before the National Socialists came to power. The 
Nazis did not change it and thus its function must be separated from the goal of the Nazis 
to exterminate homosexuality. An examination of the rate of convictions for Vienna 
based on  §129Ia+b reveals that there was only a marginal increase for men and women 
between 1938 and 1945. Fluctuations before 1938 range from 104 to 224 convictions and 
between 1938-1945 from 145 to 258 in Vienna. Of these, women accounted for no more 
than 20 convictions in 1943 and otherwise ranged between 8-12 per year (cf. 140). The 
court decisions offered in the stories document a different objective from those of the 
National Socialists, one that is geared towards upholding traditional morals in society. 
                                                
15 Mythomania is a term used in psychiatry to describe habitual or compulsive lying. 
16 For a very comprehensive overview of the cultural and political movements and their 
influence on Austria before 1938 I recommend John W. Boyer’s Culture and Political 
Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power, 1897-1918 and Nazism and the Radical 
Right in Austria, 1918-1934 by John T. Lauridsen. 
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Sodomy became any act “which serves to infringe on the general sense of shame and 
morale in sexual regards” (75).17   
Persecution of women accused of having had sexual contact with another woman 
presents itself in two forms.18 On the one hand there are the people accusing these 
women, and on the other hand there is the official persecution through the police and the 
court system. Oftentimes the assumption was made by the latter that a victim/perpetrator 
– or seduced/seducer – dynamic was at play, as will become clear when analyzing the 
final sentencing in each case. Before analyzing the court verdicts, however, it is 
necessary to parse out two things: What counted as lesbian behavior in the first place? 
And how did lesbian behavior transgress the morals of society? The stories present a 
variety of acts that were classified as lesbian behavior, though with few exceptions the 
women stated in their confessions that they did not identify as lesbians. It is vital to point 
out in this context that the information Schoppmann used to write the stories came from 
court documents and interrogations. One is caught in a double bind between what was 
explicitly and enthusiastically being recorded by the police, and the emotional 
predicament of the women being interrogated. Schoppmann notes that such an 
interrogation will have been experienced as threatening and intimidating by most of the 
women, evident prominently in confessions that were made and later recanted as well as 
                                                
17 “das allgemeine Scham- und Sittlichkeitsgefühl in geschlechtlicher Hinsicht zu 
verletzen”. 
18 I hesitate to call the relationships presented by Claudia Schoppmann ‘lesbian’ 
relationships or to ascribe the term ‘lesbians’ to the women involved except when they 
themselves state that they are lesbians. To do otherwise would mean reducing a complex, 
loving relationship between two people to a mere sexual act in which both parties happen 
to be female. The impact of this on the representation of lesbian persecution during the 
Holocaust will be discussed at a later point. 
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court statements about having been pressured by the police to say what they wanted to 
hear (cf. 14). Thus Elisabeth G. withdraws her confession with the statement that a police 
officer “cajoled me to confess by claiming that M. and I would then probably be 
released” (21),19  Marie K. admits she confessed, “because I wanted to be left in peace 
and not be incarcerated” (84),20 and finally there is the curious rationale of Elisabeth L. 
who admits to being bisexual “since the court suggested in its sentence that an admission 
of lesbian predisposition may potentially constitute exonerating circumstances” (89).21 
Regarding the influence of the Nazis after 1938, one woman reports, “the confession ‘of 
having had a love affair’ was coerced by the Gestapo officer” (98).22 These four 
examples should amply illustrate the problem one experiences in trying to analyze the 
representation of persecution based on documents compiled by the legal apparatus that is 
the oppressor.  
 Acts of lesbian behavior range from letter writing to kissing and touching of 
breasts and genitals or rubbing bodies against each other. I would argue, however, that 
the exact nature of the act was not important but that instead the reasoning of the police, 
based on two suppositions, determined whether women were persecuted. The first 
superstition is evident in statements such as the one given in the report on the two pen 
pals. Although it was obvious from the letter that sender and recipient didn’t know each 
other personally “the Gestapo Linz concluded that ‘both women had a same-sex affair’ 
                                                
19 “mir zuredete, ich solle ein Geständnis ablegen, dann könnten ich und die M. bestimmt 
freigehen”. 
20 “weil ich Ruhe haben und mich nicht einsperren lassen wollte”. 
21 “daß das Eingeständnis einer lesbischen Veranlagung sich möglicherweise entlastend 
ausgewirkt hätte”. 




and that ‘the issue is unacceptable not only because it is criminal under Austrian law but 
more so because L. is an educator” (80).23 The underlying concern expressed here is that 
of moral decay and seduction of the youth (age 18) by Elisabeth L. (age 28) since no 
actual illegal act is committed by expressing sexual thoughts and fantasies on paper. It is 
the mere idea of a lesbian woman influencing and seducing the people in her 
surroundings, which is the problem. The court’s conviction of Karoline M. (age 35) as a 
person “posing a threat to the younger factory workers in moral regards” (75) 
underscores the notion that lesbianism was a moral problem, which needed to be 
eradicated.24 The second assumption playing into the persecution of ‘lesbian’ women is 
intricately linked with the voyeurism of the police and a view of female sexuality 
congruent with that of the Nazis. It is the belief that female sexuality can only occur for 
procreation but not for pleasure. In all of the stories recounted by Schoppmann the 
accused women are asked about and answer questions pertaining to the sexual 
satisfaction that their behavior gave them. Aloisia E. and Sophie P., for example, are 
sentenced by the court with the statement that “both women intended and planned an act 
of sodomy, meaning the abuse of the body of another person of the same sex for sexual 
gratification” (121).25 Margarethe T. vehemently denies having kissed and hugged 
another woman “for sexual gratification” (98),26 whereas the confession of Franziska P. 
                                                
23 “kam die Gestapo Linz zu dem Schluß, daß die beiden Frauen ein 
gleichgeschlechtliches Verhältnis’ pflegten und daß es sich bei der L. um eine 
Jugenderzieherin handelte und diese Sache allein aus diesem Grunde neben der 
Strafbarkeit nach dem österr. St.G.B. untragbar ist”. 
24 “in sittlicher Hinsicht für die jüngeren Arbeiterinnen eine Gefahr bedeutete”. 
25 “von den beiden angeklagten Frauen eine Unzuchtshandlung gewollt und beabsichtigt 
war, also ein der Sinnlust dienender Mißbrauch des Körpers einer anderen Person 
desselben Geschlechts”. 
26 “zur geschlechtlichen Befriedigung”. 
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and Margarete W. reads: “P. used her hand to play with the genitals of W. until she 
reached sexual climax” (34).27 It can therefore be said that the persecution of lesbian 
women was grounded in the understanding that female sexuality excluded pleasure and 
sexual fulfillment for women and that, conversely, acting out sexually with another 
woman violated the perception of women as nonsexual. If a woman cannot experience 
pleasure with men but desires another woman for sexual satisfaction she emasculates the 
male and reduces him to the role of sperm donor – a reversal of roles from identifying 
women as the bearer of children and a sign of independence from men. It is not surprising 
that in order to exonerate themselves from the allegation of lesbianism most women cite 
children, husbands or boyfriends as proof that they have ‘normal intercourse.’ One judge 
rationalizes his rather mild sentencing decision with the fact that the women were in a 
state of sexual destitution due to their husbands fighting in the war (cf. 34). 
As far as the sentencing is concerned, four components seem to have determined 
the gravity of the punishment. First, the confessions that were given; second, with what 
intentions the crimes were being committed; third, whether they were a one-time 
occurrence or repetitive acts; and fourth, whether mitigating circumstances were present 
like children, husbands, or the element of seduction. In all cases the court did not impose 
the maximum punishment of up to five years in prison against the women. A maximum 
of six months in prison were given to Leopoldine B. on grounds of “repeat offenses with 
different women, a continuation over a longer period of time, lack of judgment, and the 
                                                




fact that she was the driving force” (54)28 and Thomas N. for having a long criminal 
record and, most likely, also because he was Czech.29  Otherwise the sentences usually 
ranged between three to four months in prison. Twice sentences were suspended and 
changed to three years on probation instead. In the case of Franziska P. and Margarete 
W., where it was the father who initiated the arrest and questioning, the judge reasons 
that “given the remorse of the accused and the minor level of the charge the simple threat 
of punishment seemed more convenient than its immediate execution” (34).30 This 
verdict was given with the condition, however, that the women agree to cease having 
contact with each other. In the example of the jealous husband in “Only an act of 
vengeance” Stefanie K. and Berta H. are also released and – unexpectedly – all charges 
dismissed.31 Motivation seems to have been the general pardon by Hitler from September 
9th, 1939, which stated “court cases due to violations of the law that had been committed 
before September 14th, 1939 and in which a prison sentence of less than three months was 
expected should be suspended” (43).32 When analyzing both instances closer it becomes 
obvious very quickly that these rationalizations are merely smokescreens, which hide an 
issue embedded deep in the culture of National Socialist ideology: Patriarchy. For 
Margarete W. and Franziska P., the confession of their sexual act, a behavior against the 
                                                
28 “die mehrfache Wiederholung mit verschiedenen Frauenpersonen, die Fortsetzung 
durch längere Zeit, mangelnde Einsicht und der Umstand, daß sie die treibende Kraft 
gewesen ist”. 
29 Thomas N. was not sentenced for any same-sex activity but because he took part in the 
thefts in the story “A momentous theft” (“Ein folgenschwerer Diebstahl”). 
30 “in Berücksichtigung der Reue der Angeklagten und den geringeren Grad des 
Verschuldens [erschien] die bloße Androhung der Strafe zweckmäßiger als deren 
sofortige Vollstreckung”. 
31 “Nur ein Racheakt”. 
32 “Strafverfahren wegen Zuwiderhandlungen, die vor dem 14. September 1939 begangen 
wurden und bei denen eine Gefängnis- beziehungsweise Arreststrafe von nicht mehr als 
drei Monaten zu erwarten war, eingestellt werden”. 
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male-centered rules of society, is coupled with an admission of remorse: “Why I got 
these ideas I don’t know, maybe because I read romance novels. We did feel ashamed 
afterwards” (34).33 Although confessions were made in some of the other stories, too, this 
one is the only one that has the two women attempt an explanation of their behavior. The 
use of the word ‘ashamed’ can be read as shame for having committed an illegal act, 
shame for feeling (illegal) physical pleasure or shame for having feelings that society 
deemed unnatural. In conjunction with the fact that the court demands they never see 
each other again and that a threat of punishment would work better than direct 
punishment, a patriarchal power structure is assumed. I would argue that by dropping all 
charges but keeping a threat in place, patriarchic control is evoked and sanctioned to 
observe the women. In this way psychological persecution is created that not only forbids 
Margarete W. and Franziska P. to meet but also influences any other contacts they may 
be trying to meet lest they be accused of sodomy again. Such psychological measures 
similarly extended to the second story, in which it is Stefanie K.’s admission to being 
‘different’ that may well have been the deciding factor:  
I may have an abnormal disposition and I am more attracted to women 
although I have never touched a woman before. I have known of my 
disposition since my youth. I have had dealings with a man once but it 
disgusted me. I have always liked women and would’ve liked to kiss them 
but I wouldn’t have known what else to do.34 (42)  
                                                
33 “Wieso ich überhaupt auf solche Ideen kam, weiß ich nicht, vielleicht durch das Lesen 
von Romanen. Wir haben uns darnach schon geschämt”. 
34 “Ich bin wohl abnormal veranlagt und fühle mich zu Frauen hingezogen, doch habe ich 
noch nie eine Frau angerührt. Ich weiß von meiner Veranlagung schon seit meiner 
Jugend. Ich habe einmal mit einem Manne zu tun gehabt, doch empfand ich Abscheu. Ich 
habe Frauen immer gerne gehabt und hätte sie küssen wollen, hätte aber nicht gewußt, 
was ich sonst zu tun gehabt hätte”. 
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Did the judge possibly see this confession as a chance to find more lesbians if he 
let Stefanie K. go and have her followed instead? Could the justification be similar to the 
one used previously, that the fear of punishment was more effective than conviction and 
time in prison? Or did it have nothing to do with Stefanie K. and instead everything with 
Berta H. and her three children, her husband and her pregnancy? Here, we would have a 
housewife conforming to the heteronormative ideal of the women’s role who may have 
strayed from the straight path but remained inconspicuous otherwise. She is rewarded by 
a system that places emphasis on motherhood and marriage. Stefanie K. on the other hand 
is now known in the police records as a self-proclaimed woman with feelings towards 
other women and could, very possibly, face the same intimidation and threat of future 
punishment as the women in the previous story.  
The last two items that I want to draw attention to regarding the persecution of 
lesbian women are class and religious affiliation. All of the women described in the 
stories are from the lower class, mostly female workers conscripted to laboring in 
strategic factories, prostitutes, thieves, and unemployed housewives. In some cases it is 
noted that the women appeared in court without a defense attorney because they could 
not pay him, in others the repetitive nature of a crime or previous convictions are held 
against them. It begs the questions whether higher social classes were more adept at 
blending in, more proficient at hiding or better connected to make arrangements like fake 
marriages with male homosexuals? Or was the lower class targeted because, as I have 
argued before, §129Ib was a means to enforce moral behavior? As such, the lower social 
class would have been subjected to enforcement of order and structure with measures 
directed at behavior in the workplace, where they were visible to the general public. The 
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virtues of orderliness and structure that German housewives of the middle and upper 
class were to implement in their homes and families were beyond the grasp of the lower 
class to achieve while they were trying to make ends meet. §129Ib thus became a method 
of control, the judge, the jury and the executioner of any antisocial behavior under the 
guise of relating to sexually explicit acts. 
The lack of religious affiliation as mitigating factor in the stories is perhaps the 
most interesting deviation from the fictional representations analyzed in this section. 
Although Claudia Schoppmann uses the introduction to exemplify the case of Lilly 
“Sara” R. and Marie W., a Jewish woman and an Austrian woman denunciated in April 
1940, there is hardly any material to warrant an analysis. With the exception of an 
excerpt from the police report, which notes that the two women were accused by 
neighbors of having had a sexual encounter, we do not find out more than that. Was there 
a lawsuit? Was Lilly R. deported to a German concentration camp? Did the neighbors 
report a Jew living with Marie W. or did they perceive two lovers? The complete lack of 
any presence of Jewishness in the ‘lesbian acts’ brought to court can be perceived as an 
indication that it was possible to be persecuted solely on the basis of sexual orientation as 
a lesbian without other crimes as a smokescreen. What speaks against an interpretation 
like this, however, is the fact that all cases presented by Schoppmann were not romantic 
lesbian relationships but fell under the category of sexual acts between two women and 
were thus perceived as morally wrong. In the Nazi view of femininity love and being 
nurturing were perceived as positive. Part of the reasoning for not instituting a §175 for 
women was the argument that it would have been too difficult to differentiate between an 
innocent female hug and an erotic one. A lesbian affair or a sexual act between women as 
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presented to the court, however, excluded even the idea of love and reduced the incident 
to a behavior borne from lust. With that, the moral issue of §129Ib came into play again 
and any involvement of religious affiliation became obsolete.  
 
4.2 Aimée & Jaguar: 
Aimée & Jaguar is a 1998 movie loosely based on the documentary biography by 
Erica Fischer discussed in the previous chapter. Focusing exclusively on the short period 
of time that Lilly and Felice share in Berlin, the film displays their growing feelings for 
each other alongside the escalating danger that Felice is in as a Jew in Nazi Germany. 
The two storylines are intertwined in such a way that an analysis of the representation of 
lesbian persecution is always by necessity connected with the persecution of Jewish 
people in the Third Reich. There are three independent, yet intertwined, ways of 
examining Aimée & Jaguar in terms of lesbian persecution that also show the dynamics 
between the main female characters. One is to look at each character individually and 
analyze where and how they are persecuted as individuals. The drawback, however, is 
that there are multiple layers of persecution and one needs to sift through all of them in 
order to find those that are lesbian in nature. Another is to take the love affair between 
Felice and Lilly as the starting point and examine persecution against them as a couple. In 
this approach, the dichotomy between being persecuted as a German versus a Jewish 
lesbian as well as the dependency of one woman on the other is clearer than with the first 
approach. Lastly, it is also possible to start with the group of lesbians that Felice is part of 
and go from there. A problem, which may manifest itself in this method, is that most 
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members also have other reasons for being wanted by the police. Here, lesbian 
persecution is overshadowed by Jewishness or acts of resistance, with some participants 
of the group not even being female or Jewish.  
I chose to start with Felice and Lilly as this approach also grants me the 
opportunity to address the problematic issue of the love story first before going into an 
analysis of the characters. The movie is touted with the subtitle ‘A love greater than 
death’, exaggerating the book subtitle ‘A love story’ by far.35 The DVD back cover lays 
out the summary of who-meets-whom, concluding with the climax: “In the middle of the 
war begins a passionate love”.36 The main question everything revolves around at this 
point is whether what the audience sees on the screen is actually a passionate love story 
or whether it is not rather an exploitation of feelings in exchange for safety. Scholars are 
undecided on the matter, with some claiming that the audience “is predisposed to 
approach the story of Felice and Lilly as a love story, an episode in the past that is of 
interest not so much for its Nazi context as for its reworking of the ‘eternal’ themes of 
forbidden love, nonconformity, and tragic loss” (Taberner 232) and others contending 
that Lilly symbolizes “narcissistic lesbianism” (Parkinson 149) without real feelings for 
Felice.  
I struggle with reading the events in the movie as either an exclusive love story 
between Felice and Lilly or a merely narcissistic self-staging by Lilly. Rather, I see how 
doubtful it is that a German mother of four who claims to be able to smell Jews can fall in 
love with a – Jewish – woman in a matter of weeks. Likewise, I can also see the doubts of 
                                                
35 “Eine Liebe größer als der Tod”. 
36 “Mitten im Bombenkrieg beginnt eine leidenschaftliche Liebe”. 
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those who accuse Felice of only acting in self-preservation and playing the lover. The 
problem I perceive in such readings of the movie is the small but important detail that the 
movie would not work without a love story. If Lilly and Felice are not lovers then the 
movie is about a German woman who hides a Jewish woman in her apartment during the 
war, and as such is not something that can be sold as novel to an audience in the 1990s. 
Yet while it is tempting to construe Lilly and Felice’s lesbian behavior as evidence for 
the persecution of lesbians during the holocaust history, Felice’s Jewishness makes it 
impossible to see past the racial repercussions of the plot.37 In the context of the movie, 
the ‘love story’ between the two women seems to amplify the discrimination against the 
Jews while obfuscating outright persecution of women on the basis of their sexual 
identity. There is, in fact, a juxtaposition between the two that marks Felice first and 
foremost as a Jew and identifies Lilly as the Nazi-housewife-turned-lesbian. Their 
characters inhabit different spheres that make it difficult to distinguish between the subtly 
represented acts of discrimination against lesbian women and the more obvious 
persecution of Jews. The display of the yellow star serves as the identifier for Jews and 
the constant referral to the absence of this symbol in the circle of women surrounding 
Felice emphasizes that they are persecuted first and foremost as Jewish women.  
A poignant example for this can be found in the behavior of Ilse’s father after he 
overhears Felice and Ilse argue in small basement space where Felice is hiding 
(Färberböck 36:31). After Felice exclaims “I gave you my friendship, Ilse, and my love 
                                                
37 The best definition that I can argue for is that there is lesbian behavior (sexual acts, 
kissing, etc.) occurring between Lilly and Felice but not a love story.  
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and I don’t have more than that” (36:29)38  he opens the door and demands to know 
“Who is in love with whom” (36:29)?39 Following this short exchange Ilse narrates the 
rest of the situation: “My father was actually a communist and a helpful person. Felice 
asked him politely if he had never heard of Sappho before. That’s when he looked like 
the whole Kremlin together and threw her out”.40 The issue at hand for him is not that 
Felice is a Jew as he appears to have been hiding her for some time. Ilse’s mention of him 
being a Communist underscores this notion and suggests that he helped Felice precisely 
because she is persecuted by the Nazis for being Jewish. Once another aspect of her 
identity is revealed, that of her being a lesbian, the father faces an inner conflict that he 
can only resolve by throwing her out.  
Two things happen here at the same time that are noteworthy for the analysis of 
representation but also as glimpses into what life may have been like for lesbians. First, 
the ease with which Felice inserts a joke about lesbianism downplays the danger that she 
is in and the added complication of having to look for another hiding place. There seem 
to be no negative repercussions for her, her character is represented as unafraid, carefree, 
and ingenuous at avoiding Nazi detection by pretending to be one. On the other hand, one 
sees how in this instance sexual identity overrides Jewishness and compassion for ‘the 
Jew’ turns into contempt for ‘the lesbian.’ This, however, has less to do with a national 
socialist perception of homosexuals and more with the fact that the father is a communist. 
                                                
38 “Ich hab dir meine Freundschaft gegeben, Ilse, und meine Liebe und mehr hab ich 
nicht”. 
39 “Wer liebt hier wen”? 
40 “Mein Vater war ja eigentlich Kommunist und ‘n hilfsbereiter Mensch. Felice fragte 
ihn ganz höflich, ob er noch nie was von Sappho gehört habe. Da schaute er wie der 
ganze Kreml auf einmal und setzte sie raus”. 
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In order to understand the actions of the father one needs to look at the conflict-laden 
relation between communists and national socialists in the 1930s and their stance on 
homosexuality. Klaus Mann penned a scathing article in 1934 directed at anti-Fascists 
who used (male) homosexuality for political means to discredit national socialists:  
Where does it come from that we read the combination ‘murderer and 
pedophile’ as often in anti-fascist newspapers as we read ‘betrayer of the 
Volk and a Jew’ in Nazi newspapers? The word ‘pedophile’ as a 
swearword: because there seem to be many in the national socialist 
organizations who love young men rather than women.41 (Mann)  
Communists viewed all Nazis as ‘faggots’ and treated them accordingly before 
the Nazis rose to power in 1933. Susanne zur Nieden attributes this mainly to Ernst Röhm 
and the Röhm-Putsch.42 She explains that “in the early 1930s German social democrats 
and communists repeatedly picked up on the homosexual orientation of some national 
socialist leaders […] in order to discredit the whole national socialist movement” (Nieden 
133). She goes on to illustrate the effect, saying that by combining and linking 
homosexuality to national socialism “quiet a depreciating stereotype of the Nazi was 
constructed and it was suggested to the general public that homosexuality was widely 
                                                
41 “Woher kommt es denn, daß wir in antifaschistischen Zeitungen die 
Wortzusammenstellungen "Mörder und Päderast" beinah ebenso häufig lesen wie in den 
Naziblättern die von "Volksverrätern und Juden"? Das Wort "Päderast" als ein 
Schimpfwort: nur weil es in nationalsozialistischen Verbänden viele geben soll, die junge 
Männer lieben statt Frauen”. 
42 Ernst Röhm was a close friend of Adolf Hitler since the 1920s and rose through the 
military ranks to become Chief of the SA. His homosexuality was an open secret among 
the Nazi leadership but he was protected from persecution because of his usefulness for 
Hitler. By 1934, however, Röhm had gained too much power and had become a problem 
for Hitler. The final nail in the coffin was Röhm’s insistence on strengthening the 
military power of the SA against Hitler’s orders. He was arrested and shot on Hitler’s 
orders in June 1934 (cf. Nieden 134ff.). 
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prevalent in NS organizations” (133).43 Being a homosexual was the worst thing 
communists and social democrats could imagine in someone. In this particular scene the 
communist father faces the contradiction of his political beliefs: saving a Jew while 
helping a homosexual. As a Jewish person Felice evokes his hatred for the Nazis and thus 
sympathy for her. And although from a communist perspective all Nazis are seen as 
homosexuals and hated by the communists why does he attribute more value to her 
sexual orientation than to her Judaism? How does a Jewish lesbian figure into the 
equation? I would argue that in this instance the discrepancy lies in the father’s persona 
as a male and as a father. Although Felice’s homosexuality would not have threatened 
him in his masculinity it was a threat to his daughter, particularly given the nature of the 
discovery with Felice telling Ilse she doesn’t have more to give than her love. As was 
discussed in the analysis of the documentary biography Aimee & Jaguar, neither this 
scene nor anything remotely similar ever happened or was remembered by the 
interviewed people. In the scope of the movie, however, it is a necessary scene that 
moves the plot forward. It forces Felice to find another place to stay and Lilly is the 
obvious choice. Furthermore, for an audience that is expecting a plot about two lesbian 
lovers under the Nazis such a separation of empathy for Jews on the one hand and 
incomprehension for homosexuality on the other could be seen as expected. Given that 
the movie was not marketed as ‘Jewish’ but as ‘lesbian’ the expectations of the audience 
will – I assume – have been sympathy for homosexual persecution with little attention to 
                                                
43 “In den frühen dreißiger Jahren griffen deutsche Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten 
immer wieder die homosexuelle Orientierung einiger nationalsozialistischer Führer auf, 
vornehmlich die Ernst Röhms, um so die gesamte nationalsozialistische Bewegung zu 
diskreditieren. Durch die Verkopplung mit Homosexualität wurde von der 
antifaschistischen Linken ein äußerst abwertendes Nazi-Stereotyp konstruiert und der 
Öffentlichkeit suggeriert, Homosexualität sei in den NS-Organisationen weit verbreitet”.  
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the Jewish framework involved. Although this underscores the dichotomies of the movie 
itself, it raises questions of cultural implication. Can one create the two categories 
‘Jewish’ and ‘homosexual’ in a movie set during the Third Reich and attempt to portray 
only one of them while rejecting the other? I would argue that the particular nature of the 
Holocaust as a foremost anti-Semitic event makes such an approach virtually impossible 
without generating discussion about legitimacy, truth and taste. In critiques of Aimée & 
Jaguar and other Holocaust movies this phenomenon is visible in statements about 
Holocaust movies since the 1990s that employ “quoting the Holocaust devoid of meaning 
[…], an extended view on other victim groups” and display “a not exclusive Jewish 
victim group”44 (Goede 27ff.). Another author concludes that “it has come under fire 
among Jewish critics particularly for its innocuous portrayal of Lilly Wust” and “reveals 
a level of sentimentalization [that] seems linked to a problematic redemptive national 
narrative” (Cormican 106). What these and other critics question is a focus on the wrong 
thing, an emphasis on the category ‘homosexual’ that blends out Jewishness as well as 
the victim-perpetrator problematic in the character of Lilly as a German Nazi. 
Understanding the necessity of the lesbian relationship, however, I would say that such 
an emphasis is needed and not necessarily misplaced.  
A similar fact is also observable at another point in the movie when Felice’s 
grandma inquires about the fiancé she has not met yet. Her questions, directed at Ilse, 
show concern for Felice: “How is he? Who is he? Can he feed her? What does he look 
                                                
44 “Sinnentleertes Zitieren des Holocaust […], ausgeweiterter Blick auf weitere 
Opfergruppen” and “eine nicht ausschließlich jüdische Opfergruppe”. 
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like? […] When will he take her away” (Färberböck 42:30).45 That Felice fabricated a lie 
to placate her grandma is evident as much in Ilse’s irritation at the question as through the 
pleading and alarming gaze Felice directs towards her. Instead of telling her grandmother 
about her identity as a lesbian she chooses to invent an elaborate story about an absent 
fiancé. Here, generational differences are probably to blame as much as knowledge that 
belonging to a minority group does not preclude one from oppressing – or not 
sympathizing with – other minorities. As a Jew herself it is improbable that the 
grandmother would report her to the Germans, unlike family members did in the stories 
collected by Claudia Schoppmann. It is more likely a matter of different generations with 
Felice not wanting to shock or burden her grandma in the then-current difficult 
circumstances. I would say, however, that it is a self-imposed act of discrimination by 
Felice given that she could open up to her grandma. The inevitable hurt, pain and shame 
that are inflicted through this dialogue are woven like a red thread through Felice’s life 
and stand as the quintessence of lesbian persecution. 
Yet another interesting moment in the movie in regards to social acceptance of 
lesbian women can be found in the scene between Lilly, Felice and Lilly's parents as 
Felice is introduced. The aforementioned comparison between recognition of lesbian 
identity and Jewish identity is played out in the stunned exclamations made by Herr and 
Frau Wust. While one zooms in on the Jewish identity, the other focuses on sexual 
identity: “‘Jewish.’ ‘And a lesbian.’ ‘Well, that is… that is…’” (1:37:55).46 Although 
both revelations could be potentially dangerous to the women – and the parents! –, the 
                                                
45 “Wie ist er? Wer ist er? Kann er sie ernähren? Wie sieht er aus? […] Wann wird er sie 
wegbringen?”. 
46 “‘Jüdin.’ ‘Und lesbisch.’ ‘Ja, das ist... das ist...’”. 
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movie glosses over this rather important fact in an indifferent manner. With a light joke 
the explosive atmosphere is assuaged and the parents welcome Felice into the family 
without further ado. Portraying Felice’s coming out as a Jew, a lesbian and the lover of 
Lilly in this manner is a stark contrast to Felice’s attempt of keeping her grandmother in 
the dark about her sexual identity. Yet the reasons for her secrecy are easily 
comprehended if one keeps in mind two facts: age and religion. Felice’s thought process 
could either be attributed to the Jewish stance on homosexuality or be seen as a matter of 
dealing with an older generation and wanting to spare herself any arguments born from 
different generational views on sexual identity. For Lilly’s parents, the German heritage 
of the parents needs to be seen as the significant factor. Throughout the movie the parents 
are depicted as opponents of the Nazis and "good" Germans. Their status as Germans 
protects them from the persecution Felice or her grandma are subjected to as Jews, 
although they do have to tread carefully as outspoken opponents of Hitler and supporters 
of communism. Without the danger of detection or imminent deportation and death 
hanging over their heads, however, this German couple can afford to welcome the Jewish 
lover of their newly-outed daughter into the family. The happiness that ensues after this 
short exchange highlights how portraying Jewish and lesbian persecution happening on 
two separate levels with the love story as a vehicle amplifies the persecution of Jews 
while at the same time almost completely obfuscating that lesbians were also persecuted 
on account of their sexual orientation. By keeping the focus on the love story between 
Felice and Lilly, a quest for happiness has become the central point of the movie. While 
Felice and Lilly work on finding their happiness, the Germans are out to find them and in 
the measure that they are happy and able to show it, they also make it easier for the 
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Germans to hunt them down. An example of how this plays out can be seen in Günther 
Wust’s fit of rage after Lilly demands a divorce and, following that, the reaction of all the 
other ‘U-Boote’ about how Lilly is endangering all of them with her actions.47 As has 
been mentioned before about the role of women in Nazism, divorce was not part of a 
woman’s role and acting different from normative roles invited questions. Against this 
backdrop the deportation scene can also be interpreted as the logical conclusion to the 
extraordinary day Felice and Lilly have spent together. They are physically out in the 
open and their love is tangible; they freeze the moment in time through pictures of them 
together. And while they are still savoring their happiness the SS-Officers await them 
with crushing cruelty. The measure of both their suffering is directly proportional to the 
happiness they had shared only shortly before. In fact, without a display of their careless 
day the impact of both their pain would be diminished. In this context the importance of 
pictures as proof of sexual orientation is noticeable. It was the picture found on Lotte 
after she had been shot that leads the Gestapo to Felice and Lilly. The picture of a fleeting 
moment of two women sitting closely together, conveying love and intimacy, captures 
not only the image of Felice and Lotte but much later also literally Felice trying to escape 
the Nazis.  
The crucial kissing scene prior to Felice’s deportation is yet another instance in 
which persecution due to lesbianism or Jewishness is conflated into one singular event. 
Ordered by an officer hidden in the shadows of the room to kiss one last time, an 
understanding is evoked that the Gestapo is present to incarcerate both Lilly and Felice 
due to their illicit lesbian relationship. That the relationship is indeed a homosexual one is 
                                                
47 Submarine (Unterseeboot), term given to people who went into hiding.  
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conveyed through the act of kissing and intensified by the officer's voyeuristic insistence 
to repeat the kiss as it “will be the last” (1:45:26).48 As discussed previously in the 
analysis of the Nazis’ sexual policies and their view of women, any sexual act involving 
women was perceived as solely taking place for male gratification and the benefit of the 
German Reich. Though there may not have been encouragement by the regime to watch 
lesbian acts, the voyeurism of the officer in the scene can be presumed to stem from the 
anti-feminine stance of the German government. He is at once playing out his male 
dominance over women by watching the intimacy between Felice and Lilly from the 
shadows while also demonstrating his control as a member of the ruling party by 
“allowing” it. Drawing the attention of the audience to the intimate nature of the 
relationship serves to distract from what happens next and why. Felice is torn from Lilly, 
attempts to escape but is finally captured in the neighbor’s apartment. Two things are 
striking in this scene and mark it again not as persecution against lesbians but Jews: Lilly, 
also quite clearly a lesbian, is not taken away by the Gestapo; and more importantly the 
officer confronting the neighbors who are trying to hide Felice does not confront them 
with the fact that Lilly and Felice are lesbians but instead states that they knew she was a 
Jew. 
Another subtle glimpse of what consequences an open expression of lesbian love 
could have had is an utterance by Ilse after Felice has been deported to Theresienstadt. 
She chides Lilly for trying to visit her beloved Felice, knowing that such an expression of 
feelings towards a Jew could lead to her death. Even in this statement, however, problems 
of defining boundaries between a lesbian relationship and a close female friendship 
                                                
48 “Machen ‘se nur weiter. Noch einen Kuss. Der Letzte”. 
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become obvious. Without the explicit sexual acts that the love story conveys, the 
relationship between Felice and Lilly could well have been a close female friendship in 
which one friend tried to rescue the other. The fact that Lilly, as the German, the mother 
of four and decorated with the Cross of Honor of the German Mother (Mutterkreuz), is in 
a position of providing relatively safe shelter and food is a problematic part of the movie 
that also needs to be explored. Some critics of the movie mention that the relationship 
between Lilly and Felice wasn’t one of set on equal footing. Esther Dischereit writes: 
“Felice Schragenheim is never in a ‘free’ relationship, or to say it differently: it has a 
very definite character of prostitution. How else could it be. One has a valid passport, the 
other doesn’t, is wanted, one only had to find her and she is dead” (Dischereit).49 
Regarding the relationship between Aimée and Jaguar as one of prostitution is possible 
but only if one ignores the timeline of events in the movie. To the audience it is disclosed 
by minute 06:30 of the film that Felice is Jewish. While everyone around her is leaving to 
seek shelter from the air raid someone calls after her, then lifts the lapel of her coat to 
reveal that she is not wearing a yellow star. The confession Felice makes to Lilly Wust 
about her Jewishness, however, does not take place until one hour and 30 minutes into 
the movie. At 1:33:36 Felice admits “I am Jewish, Lilly” and at 1:57:00 the final credits 
mark the end of the movie.50 I would refute Dischereit’s argument by pointing out that for 
the majority of the film Lilly is not aware that Felice is Jewish. She knew that something 
was strange, indicated by her hysteric rant before Felice discloses her Jewishness: “I have 
                                                
49“Felice Schragenheim jedenfalls befindet sich zu keinem Zeitpunkt in einem "freien" 
Liebesverhältnis, oder anders ausgedrückt: es hat einen deutlich prostitutiven Zug. Wie 
könnte es auch anders sein. Die eine hat einen funktionierenden Pass, die andere nicht, 
wird gesucht, man braucht sie bloß zu finden, und sie ist schon tot”. 
50 “Ich bin Jüdin, Lilly”. 
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understood that there always has to be something that I am not allowed to know!” 
(Färberböck 1:30:49).51 Yet, she had no idea what it was that kept Felice away from her 
or with her. While Dischereit’s analysis thus may ring true for Erica Fischer’s book I do 
not think there is an element of prostitution in the movie. Felice, Jaguar, at first hid in the 
basement of the newspaper office she worked at and it never becomes clear why she 
leaves to move in with Lilly, other than because she makes the conscious decision to do 
so.  
Believable cases can be made for Felice using Lilly to survive.52 An indicator is 
Ilse very early on mentioning that Felice, to her, was many people and that she was able 
to manipulate people through her charm. Her jealousy that Felice can never pass up 
“anything with blonde locks like mine” is also a reference to Felice seeing Lilly the first 
time and being intrigued by her. The movie implicitly touches on the Jewish victim vs. 
German savior part of their relationship without ever making it explicit that Felice may 
be using Lilly precisely because she is German and can protect her. Two references are 
made in this regard, one by Ilse before Ilse’s father throws out Felice, and one by the 
whole lesbian circle after Lilly reveals that she wants to file for divorce. Sitting together 
in Lilly’s kitchen after she has told a flabbergasted Günther that she wants to divorce him 
because she has never loved him, Felice thunders “What? What did you do? Are you 
crazy?” and Klärchen chimes in: “If he goes to court we will all be finished” (1:16:44).53 
                                                
51 “Ich habe verstanden, dass es immer etwas geben muss was ich nicht wissen darf!” 
52 While comparably convincing cases can be made for Lilly being the one who uses 
Felice, these rely on the information from Fischers documentary biography. The movie 
does not offer details for such an interpretation. 




Here, the status of Lilly as a German is emphasized and underscored by the choice of the 
director to represent Lilly as the blonde German housewife vis-à-vis the stereotypical 
dark-haired Jewish Felice.  
Similarly stereotypical is the representation of gender role expressions as set forth 
by the National Socialists and the way lesbian women were thought to twist them on the 
other. At the beginning of the movie Lilly Wust is the epitome of the ideal Aryan woman. 
She is a mother staying at home with her children – four boys – whom she devotedly 
cares for and doesn’t want to send away to the country. Although she has an affair, or 
multiple according to Ilse, she fulfills her duty as a wife when her husband is home 
(45:02). After Günther has found out that Lilly has been sleeping with Felice, he urges 
her to stand up to the lesbians upstairs in the apartment: “Go to them, show them what a 
woman is and a mother” (1:15:46).54  For him, it is clear that a woman can only have two 
roles, that of a mother and that of a wife. He is willing to forget what he saw as long as 
she stays in line with these two responsibilities.   
Quite interesting when it comes to women’s gender expression is the way both 
Felice and Lilly are dressed. Except for one short scene, Lilly, for example, is depicted 
throughout the movie wearing dresses or a dress and an apron. The one exception that 
shows her in a pantsuit shortly before her birthday party displays an air of unnaturalness 
and dress-up play. While she is standing in front of a mirror, admiring herself, she also 
tries smoking a cigarette. As inexperienced as she is at smoking – she starts coughing – 
she is at wearing pants, which stands in sharp contrast with the next shot in which she is 
                                                
54 “Geh hin, zeig ihnen was ne Frau ist und Mutter”. 
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wearing a blue ball gown and dances with Felice. Lilly’s feminine attire looks much more 
natural on her than it does on Felice. Felice, by contrast, is only occasionally shown 
wearing dresses. For the most part she wears pantsuits, with blouses underneath sweaters 
and the collar showing. Lilly’s birthday party is Felice’s perfect occasion to dress up and 
she appears in a masculine black tuxedo with a black top hat. That she is not only dressed 
masculine but also knows how to play the role of the male seducer is accentuated by 
juxtaposing her with Lilly in the ball gown. Felice is the active part, initiating the dance 
and guiding Lilly where she wants her to go. Felice subverts the female role on a variety 
of levels, starting with the way she dresses, the fact that she works outside the home at an 
office, and that she is part of the resistance. The fact that she does any of that despite 
being a Jewish woman who moreover refuses to wear the yellow star, is additionally a 
subversion of the role ascribed to her as a Jew while simultaneously playing into the 
stereotype of the Jew as abnormal.  
 
4.3 Novembermond 
The 1985 West German movie Novembermond revolves around two women, the 
German November and the French Férial, who meet in Paris shortly before the beginning 
of World War II.55 Soon after meeting each other they fall in love, an event that is closely 
                                                
55 The DVD cover specifies it as a West German production, given that in 1985 the 
German Democratic Republic still existed. As far as a historical examination of the 
National Socialist past is concerned “die Euthanasie-Opfer, die Sinti und Roma, die 
'Asozialen', die Homosexuellen und andere Minderheiten [gehören] zu den lange 
vergessenen Opfergruppen" (Danyel 191). An East German movie dealing with 
Jewishness and female homosexuality set during the Third Reich would have been 
impossible in light of the (non-)commemorative culture of the GDR. 
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followed by the German invasion of France. As a Jew, however, November has to go into 
hiding in order to escape arrest and deportation. Férial and her mother attempt to hide 
November with relatives in the country, which, after an initial success, leads to 
November’s discovery and amidst rape and psychological terror she tries to make her 
way back to Paris to be reunited with Férial. Hidden in Férial’s apartment she avoids 
detection and both survive the war. 
While the main characters seem to be in a similar situation as Felice and Lilly in 
Aimée & Jaguar, overt persecution or discrimination based on their sexual orientation 
does not take place in the movie. However, subtle hints do not escape notice. Asking 
about the status of her naturalization in France, the officer November talks to remarks: 
“Why don’t you marry? You are pretty enough for it” (Grote 06:30).56 Although he does 
not have any indication of her private life he assumes a heteronormative word view. His 
comment, though not meant as a proposition to marry him, leaves November at a loss for 
words. While I would not claim this incident to be a discriminatory act against a lesbian 
woman it does set up the stage early on for a reading of November’s character as 
something else besides Jewish. Her uncomfortable silence as the only response to a rather 
harmless question and the ensuing conflicting emotions on her face are indicators for the 
audience that there is more to this than meets the eye. Ten more minutes into the movie 
this first impression is confirmed but still not explained. Laurent, who has met November 
at his mother’s café and invited her to dinner, boldly declares “November I am in love 
with you” only to be rejected by November: “But I am not in love with you, Laurent. I 
                                                
56 “Warum heiraten sie nicht? Hübsch genug sind sie doch”. 
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like you very much” (16:50).57 Whether he knows that November is in love with his sister 
is unclear at this point, although Laurent discourages a male friend of his from asking 
November on a date with a cryptic “You are not her type” (18:46).58 The camera then 
proceeds to follow his look outside through a door that has been left ajar. Through 
Laurent’s male gaze the audience sees November and Férial sitting in a dim room, 
immersed in conversation, arms around each other and exchanging hugs. A closeness 
loaded with romantic overtones is implied by the way the women face each other, how 
they look at each other and by the arm resting lightly on November’s shoulder. Yet by 
using Laurent’s male gaze that this scene must be interpreted as revealing sexual desire. 
It is crucial to note here that throughout the movie male characters facilitate 
communication of lesbian identity between November and Férial. Men are thus given the 
authority to identify their relationship as something more than benign friendship, in turn 
also making it impossible for the female characters to claim their sexual attraction and 
desire as their own. Without the authority given to the male point of view the women’s 
relationship would have remained ambiguous. Only after Laurent has seen the two 
women like this does a conversation about the true nature of their relationship take place. 
Again, Laurent is depicted as taking male authority by initiating this conversation and 
through his choice of words a normative expectation is created as to what constitutes the 
rules of heterosexual relationships from a masculine – and thus authoritative – point of 
view. 
                                                
57 “November, ich bin verliebt in sie” and “Aber ich nicht in sie, Laurent. Ich mag sie 
sehr”. 
58 “Du bist nicht ihr Typ”. 
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‘Férial, did she say I was in love with her?’ ‘No… no, she didn’t tell me 
that.’ ‘Not in my wildest dreams would I have thought I would be 
competing with my big sister.’ ‘Laurent, what shall we do about it’ ‘If you 
ask me, there isn’t much I can do. She has already chosen you!’ ‘It does 
happen.’ (19:24 – 20:00) 
What stands out is Laurent’s understanding of love as a competition and choice without 
actually acting on it. The male pursuer vies for a female’s love until she ostensibly 
chooses him as the best suitable companion. This creates the view of female sexuality as 
being nothing more than a means to an end, the need to procreate, without any sexual lust 
and desire on the woman’s part. Thus, Laurent mirrors the view the National Socialists 
held towards female sexuality, though he does not go so far as to deny the existence of it. 
In fact, through his acknowledgement of the romantic relationship between Férial and 
November it is now possible for them to display their affection for each other. Before, 
this was only implied, but afterwards the women are shown holding hands, kissing and 
sleeping in the same bed (cf. 23:33). Any discriminatory acts against the women as 
lesbians only occur after Laurent has legitimized their lesbian relationship by conceding 
that it exists. It is arguable that even though Laurent is French the fact that he is male 
makes him a representative of the sexual normative values of the National Socialists. I 
would refute this, however, by directing attention to his nonchalant way of giving in and 
giving up. He does not fight his sister, does not force either Férial or November to submit 
to his will. In short, he acts as a gentleman.  
In the next scene Férial and November are seen in a restaurant, this time openly 
showing their feelings for each other by holding hands and radiating a sense of intimacy. 
Eventually they get up to dance, first dancing with arms outstretched, then turning slowly 
as they hold each other close. The reactions this display of affection elicits from the 
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waiters and patrons are indignation, disgust and anxiety. “This is going too far. Garcon! 
Is this a nightclub? Would you tell the ladies that we do not wish to be disturbed?” says 
one man, causing the waiter to go up to the pair and plead: “You can’t dance here, this is 
a restaurant” (20:40). Instantly linking the two women to the setting of a nightclub 
conveys how sexual their dance is considered to be. It is not something to be done in 
public. And while one woman covers up her (female) child’s eyes exclaiming “This isn’t 
appropriate for you” the man sitting across from her is shown at the same time as 
following the women’s every move, staring, leering and – presumably – aroused by what 
he sees.59 While it can be argued that they are dancing in order to avoid paying the bill, 
one of Laurent’s many tricks, it is noticeable that this is the only scene taking place in a 
public space where people can see November and Férial being (somewhat) intimate with 
each other. This, I argue, is the essence of their sexuality being expressed mainly through 
the actions of the spectators and not themselves.  
Compared to Aimée & Jaguar, Novembermond remains fairly nonsexual, so much 
so that a review in the TAZ from August 1989 cites a review by the women’s magazine 
Emma:  
That’s what I have to put up with! I’m sitting in the theater and next to me, 
in front of me and behind me are men who notice That’s lesbian love, 
lesbian sexuality, so boring, so uninspired, paraded and staged by women 
who should know better. I have to be ashamed of this.60 (“Flimmern & 
Rauschen”) 
                                                
59 While male homosexuality is mostly viewed as revolting, the image of two women 
caressing each other tends to be seen as positively arousing by men. Leaving female 
homosexuality free from persecution can thus also be understood as an act benefitting the 
male population in patriarchal Nazi society.  
60 “Das muß ich mir bieten lassen! Da sitz’ ich im Kino, neben, vor und hinter mir 
Männer, die zur Kenntniss nehmen: Das ist lesbische Liebe, lesbische Sexualität, so 
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Indeed, watching the movie as someone self-identifying as a lesbian is unsatisfactory at 
best and disappointing at worst. The representation of lesbian love does not go beyond a 
depiction of silent, shy kisses and long shots of gazing into each other’s eyes, leaving any 
sexual activity to the imagination of the audience. What is shown are naked feet under a 
blanket and a landlady who enters, then exits the room swiftly with a short “Pardon” 
(Grote 23:33) after she has seen Férial and November sleeping in one bed.61 In the case 
of the landlady the act of leaving can be viewed as tactful, yet the cinematographic 
arrangements throughout the movie are similarly tame. The absence of explicit sex scenes 
may be explained by the time of the production, the early 1980s, and the effect on the 
intended audience. A film presumably about lesbian women, Jewish women and the 
Holocaust – if one goes by the cover image and the description – targets women as the 
intended audience. Culturally held beliefs about lesbian relationships, sex between 
women, and how women view sex scenes on TV also influences the representation of 
sexual acts on screen. Another important aspect for an understanding of the 
cinematography is that Alexandra von Grote is a woman, a fact that could impact what 
choices are made about representation of women – and sex between women – on screen.  
Persecution, when it does happen, is closely linked to November’s Jewishness. 
From the threatening neighbors who intimidate her rescuers to the events that occur once 
the Germans have captured her, it is her religious affiliation that makes her a target for 
                                                                                                                                            
langweilig, so uninspiriert, vorgeführt und inszeniert von Frauen, die es wissen müssen. 
Da muß ich mich ja schämen”. 
61 The rape scene on the other hand, though also not shown, is not quiet or subtle. The 
threatening General is displayed grabbing November, the camera leaves the room along 
with the younger soldier and as the audience hears November scream his face shows 
emotions of disgust and shame. 
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German violence. While she is taken away from the farm where she had been hiding 
because of her Jewishness, she is then subjected to sexual violation based on her sex. And 
though her rape metaphorically and literally happens behind closed doors, the audience 
can envision what is happening to November from the inhumane screams echoing in the 
corridor. Even her cry of “But I’m a Jew!” does not keep the Nazi officer from raping her 
(58:10ff.).62  Unequivocal confirmation of the rape is the image of the general zipping up 
his pants, shoving a bleeding, beaten up November into the hallway and ordering guards 
to move her to the local Nazi brothel ‘Pompon Rouge.’ Neither this violation of her body, 
however, nor the subsequent abuse November endures at the hands of the men at the 
Pompon Rouge appear to be linked to her sexual identity. On the contrary, she is branded 
with the name of her sin while at the brothel, having the word ‘Jude’ (=Jew) tattooed on 
her arm.63 When penetrating the surface, however, the connection between sexuality and 
anti-Semitism becomes discernible. In his study Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders Raul 
Hilberg confirms “that gender indeed mattered during the Holocaust, that anti-Semitism, 
racism, and sexism were inextricably linked in Nazi theory and practice” (Hilberg). As a 
tool of control and repression, sexuality was the common denominator tying Germans 
and non-Germans, men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals together. 
Consequently, November’s treatment as a ‘subhuman’ Jewish woman can be viewed as 
an act of threefold persecution grounded in her identity as a Jew, a woman and a lesbian. 
                                                
62 “Aber ich bin doch Jüdin”. 
63 Although records exist about brothels in concentration camps, the women forced to 
work there were selected by ‘racial’ criteria: “there is no evidence that Jewish women 
were ever knowingly used for regulated forced sex labor in official concentration camp 
brothels. Mostly, those selected to serve as prostitutes were in the asocial category” 
(Hedgepeth and Saidel 38). This makes the use of a Jewish woman like November in a 
brothel highly unlikely but not impossible. 
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The Nazi rapes her as a Jew, the male gaze meanwhile perceives women as arousing 
because of their sexuality.  
Throughout the movie the Nazis who invaded France subject Férial to subtle 
discriminatory actions. As an apparently single woman she is pressured to work while 
trying to fend off the advances of men. In order to avoid being suspected of hiding a Jew 
she gains employment at a Nazi newspaper, which also brings her closer to Marcel, a 
male friend who works there. “’Well, what can I do for you?’ ‘I am a good secretary… I 
want you to employ me.’ ‘Well…now…and may I ask why?’ ‘It has its advantages… 
Didn’t you say that yourself?’” (01:11:56).64  The scene is set up in a way to suggest that 
there is more behind Férial’s request for work than she lets on, a point that is not lost on 
Marcel who seems to perceive it as a chance to flirt with her. Short from entering into a 
heterosexual marriage, which her role as a woman requires of her, Férial proceeds to 
perform a tightrope walk between encouraging Marcel to go out with her and not letting 
him get too close. Hence he is depicted as bringing her presents, from food to nylons, 
fulfilling his male role while she dresses up and appears on his arm as his escort. 
The only act of active persecution that Férial faces in the last scene of the movie 
is similarly not addressing her sexual orientation. She is jeered at, dragged down the 
street and her hair is cut off because her fellow Frenchmen believe her to have cooperated 
with the Germans. The shame that the crowd wants to bring out into the open is directed 
at the French loyalty Férial apparently sold-out. These people have never seen November 
                                                
64 “’Nun, was hast du auf dem Herzen?’ ‘Ich bin eine gute Sekretärin, ich möchte bei 
euch arbeiten.’ ‘Sieh mal an. Und weshalb?’ ‘Weil das ganz schöne Vorteile hat. Das hast 
du doch selber gesagt, oder?’”. 
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or noticed her living in the apartment, a telltale sign of how well Férial and her mother 
covered up the fact that they were hiding someone. What they did notice were frequent 
visits by the hated German occupiers and Férial dressed up and going out with one. It is 
not a far-fetched idea to also connect this hair cutting and shaming as well as the way it is 
done with the way Jewish people were treated in the German concentration camps upon 
arrival. I would argue that in both cases the act of cutting off hair and, more importantly, 
the way it is done is designed to shame the victim.65 Férial is dragged across the square, 
cornered and held down while someone cuts off her hair in front of a jeering crowd. She 
does not have a chance to defend herself or explain. While November – the Jew – is 
looking on from the back and finally makes her way towards the front of the scene, Férial 
is treated the same way Nazis were ‘welcoming’ Jewish prisoners to their concentration 
camps. The roles are reversed, the love story between two women an irrelevancy within 
the big picture of the movie. The person first coming to the aid of Férial is not November 
but her brother Laurent, another French citizen and immediate family member. 
November, the lover, ideally the more important person in Férials’ life, is far away and 
engaged in taking the first steps in a world not out to hunt her anymore. The different 
identities that can be seen, the various labels that can be assigned to both women, are 
(apparent) Nazi-collaborator, Jewish victim, and lesbian women. But the last label – or 
identity – that of the lesbian, disappears completely behind the former two.  
                                                
65 In an article published in Women and the Holocaust Myrna Goldenberg describes the 
entrance process at Auschwitz-Birkenau as witnessed by a survivor: “After the 
humiliating process of being shaved, she felt so dehumanized, so alone and so deeply 
depressed, that she prepared a noose with which to hang herself” (Goldenberg 328). 
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  Novembermond does not play with gender stereotypes as much as Aimee & 
Jaguar does. November and Férial are usually shown wearing dresses or skirts, with a 
blouse and blazer although Férial looks much more masculine in them. Her blouse is 
always buttoned-up all the way whereas November wears hers in a more feminine style 
with the topmost buttons unbuttoned. Figure 4.1 shows the first time Férial and 
November meet, portraying them wearing what can be considered masculine pantsuits 
(17:28). This is the only time in the movie that they are shown dressed in a very 
masculine way, yet they still do not fit the stereotype of the overly masculine lesbian.  
Although both Aimée & Jaguar and Novembermond can be said to depict 
persecution of lesbians only subtly, making lesbian women invisible in the process, one 
very positive and important aspect can be taken away from them regarding visibility. In 
attempting to weave together the threads of lesbian love between a non-Jew and a Jew, or 
a German and a French woman with a Jewish woman, the movies shine a light on lesbian 
relationships. Both films are celebrations of lesbian love and lesbian relationships, 
Figure 4.1: Férial & November. Grote, Alexandra von. November Moon. Ottokar Runze 
Filmproduktion, Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), Sun 7 Productions, 1985. Film. 
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regardless of its representation of persecution, for the visibility they create. Aimee & 





Chapter 5 – Memorials 
For an analysis of how lesbian persecution during the Holocaust is represented in 
various forms of text, it is necessary to include an evaluation of how Holocaust 
memorials commemorate lesbian victims. While the term ‘memorial’ is most often 
assumed to refer to a site of mourning the past, ‘monuments’ are commonly understood 
as markers of triumph and victory celebration. The Holocaust has provided many spatial 
places of mourning, memorial sites, yet also monuments that evade the triumphant 
celebratory nature ascribed to them. Holocaust monuments in Germany take on a special 
meaning because they, moreover, serve as memorial sites, sites of contemplation and 
abstract man-made references erected not by the victims but by the perpetrators. I will 
thus use the terms memorial and monuments interchangeably as they both in this context 
denote a place of memory, regardless of their status as victim, perpetrator or bystander.  
As explored in the chapter on the construction of memory, membership in a 
shared collective creates a group conscience and collective memory/history. Memorials 
“provide the site where groups of people gather to create a common past for themselves, 
places where they tell the constitutive narratives, their ‘shared’ stories of the past” 
(Young 7). Having shown the lack of representation of lesbian persecution in the 
previous chapters, combined with the similar lack of acknowledgment of persecution, one 
can assume that a collective lesbian history of the Holocaust never developed. I started 
out the introduction with the controversy around the ‘Homodenkmal’ in Berlin in 1998, 
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and I will conclude my analysis by evaluating memorials in Germany and how they 
include or exclude lesbian persecution. I chose the memorial Frankfurter Engel in 
Frankfurt (unveiled 1994), the Memorial for the Gay and Lesbian Victims of National 
Socialism in Cologne (unveiled 1995) and the Berlin Memorial to Homosexuals 
Persecuted Under Nazism (erected 2008). In their differences and similarities, these 
monuments exemplify the various problematic aspects inherent in remembering male and 
female homosexual victims of the Holocaust. Form, location, and inscription are the 
defining characteristics of most memorials, standing in for what is to be remembered and 
often revealing as much about the site of the memorial as the monument itself.  
 
5.1 Cologne Pink Triangle Memorial  
The Memorial for the Gay and Lesbian Victims of the Holocaust in Cologne was 
erected in 1995 and is located close to the Rhine near the Hohenzollern Bridge 
(Hohenzollernbrücke), a prominent meeting place for anonymous sex among homosexual 
men during the Weimar Republic and the initial years of the Third Reich. A pink granite 
triangle, 120cm in height, standing on its edge and wedged between two grey slabs of 
stone displays the artist’s vision of duality. Achim Zinkann describes it as  
two blocks, two colors, two cuts, joined together to a whole. A grey, a 
pink block. Parts of one society. Men, women. Lesbians and gays, 
depressing each other, rubbing against each other, interlocked, lifting each 
other. I will leave any further interpretation to the viewer.1 (Lenk) 
                                                
1 “Zwei Blöcke, zwei Farben, zwei Schnitte, zu einem Ganzen zusammengefügt. Ein 
grauer, ein rosa Block. Teile einer Gesellschaft. Männer, Frauen. Lesben, Schwule, 
einander bedrückend, sich aneinander reibend, ineinander aufgehoben, sich bedingend. 
Weitere Interpretationen überlasse ich dem Betrachter”. 
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Zinkann has given his memorial for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust a meaning 
that transcends the time of National Socialism by invoking a male-female duality not 
found in its equality in the Third Reich. His conceptual design of two blocks, colors and 
cuts that are joined together does not refer to the heteronormative meaning of sexually 
fitting opposite genitals together but a whole, which acknowledges both lesbians and 
gays as equal victims of the Holocaust. While such a reading of victim equality is 
supported by the dedication inscribed on the memorial, a further look at the design 
reveals a definite trend towards mostly indirectly remembering gay men. Using the pink 
triangle as a symbol for remembrance of Nazi crimes against homosexuals is problematic 
for several reasons, most notably for the fact that it was the National Socialists symbol 
for the categorization of gay prisoners in concentration camps. In essence, memorials 
employing the pink triangle adopt the symbol their oppressors used to classify and 
stigmatize them to remember homosexual victims. While it could be argued that this is 
also a form of reappropriation, I doubt this is the case here. Reappropriation necessitates 
using a word – or in this case a symbol – to refer to oneself. Yet it is the rainbow flag and 
anything rainbow-colored that has become the symbol for the lesbian and gay movement, 
not the pink triangle.2 In Insa Eschebach’s Homophobie und Devianz, Klaus Müller 
contextualizes the use of the pink triangle as a new interpretation of the 1970s gay and 
lesbian movement but labels it questionable:  
The change of the pink triangle from the National Socialist marker of the 
subhuman to the collectively proud characteristic of homosexuals in the 
                                                
2 An image search online and scanning advertisements aimed at lesbian and gay 
customers in print and online media revealed that the instances in which a pink triangle 
was used were few and far between. It was mostly the triangular shape that could be seen 
as the basis for rainbow-themed paraphernalia.  
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1970s and 1980s suggests an indentation of history that still appears 
abridged. […] The political signal remained an abstract symbol: It is 
reminiscent of the pink triangle but ignores those who were forced to wear 
it. The National Socialist invention of the pink triangle rose to become the 
international symbol of ‘gay and lesbian pride’ because we weren’t 
‘persecuted’ by individual and collective memories of the persecuted. Our 
memories remained impersonal.3 (Müller 129)    
Consequently, what looked like an inclusive memorial for gay and lesbian victims 
of the Holocaust must already be questioned as such after having examined the design 
and the influence for the design. The pink triangle was reserved for male homosexuals, 
lesbians were – if anything – classified as asocial and had to wear a black triangle (cf. 
“Chart of Prisoner Markings”).  
                                                
3 “Der Wandel des rosa Winkel vom nationasozialistischen Kennzeichen des 
Untermenschen zum kollektiv-stolzen Erkennungszeichen Homosexueller in den 1970er- 
und 1980er- Jahren suggeriert eine Verzahnung der Geschichte, die heute bei allem 
Verständnis verkürzend wirkt. […] Das politische Signal blieb letzendlich ein abstraktes 
Zeichen: Es erinnert an den rosa Winkel, nicht aber an die, die gezwungen waren, ihn zu 
tragen. Die nationalsozialistische Erfindung des rosa Dreiecks wurde zum internationalen 
Symbol von ‘gay and lesbian pride’, weil wir nicht ‘verfolgt’ wurden von individuellen 
und konkreten Erinnerungen an die Verfolgten. Unsere Erinnerungen waren 
unpersönlich”. 
 
Figure 5.1: Cologne Pink Triangle 
Lenk, Jörg. “Gestaltung - Rosa Winkel Mahnmal.” Mahnmal für die Schwulen und 




Though one could argue that the artist Zinmann incorporated lesbian victims with 
the grey stone slab, which envelops the pink triangle, without background knowledge of 
the classification system such an interpretation remains superficial. While many Jewish 
Holocaust memorials incorporate the Star of David into their design it is important to 
distinguish between the history of this symbol as opposed to the triangle that was 
invented by the Nazis. The Star of David has had meaning in Judaism long before 
Nazism adopted it either as the supposed shape of King David’s shield or an emblem on 
it – it is thus historically grown and accepted as part of Judaism. Today, the star is also on 
the flag of the State of Israel, without any connection to the Nazi usage of it as the yellow 
star of Jewish shame. Contrasting these examples grants insights into the choices that 
victims of the Holocaust have made to commemorate their suffering. In an attempt to 
take away the power of the symbol of oppression, memorials for homosexual victims of 
the Holocaust similarly incorporate the pink triangle – the symbol of their oppression – in 
the act of remembrance most of the time. Unfortunately, however, it is also an indicator 
that lesbian victims are excluded on a non-verbal level even if they are mentioned 
explicitly in the inscription of the memorials. Thus even the culture of memory has 
pushed lesbian victims to the margins, excluding them by utilizing the singularly male 
symbol for homosexuality in concentration camps and keeping them from having the 
chance of being recognized as equally having been victims of persecution within the 
camp apparatus.    
Contrary to this notion, the inscription embossed on the flat topside of the pink 
triangle is a confirmation of the inclusive interpretation intended by the artist. It reads: 
“Killed, Silenced” on one side and in a 180° angle to these words the dedication “To the 
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Gay and Lesbian Victims of National Socialism” (Lenk).4 In contrast to other memorials 
that focus attention on the term ‘persecuted’ (verfolgt),5 the inscription of the pink 
triangle in Cologne centers on two things: First, that homosexuals were brutally killed 
and second that homosexuals were denied their identity by being silenced. The German 
word ‘totgeschwiegen’ literally translates to ‘having been silenced to death’, in the sense 
that no one was able – or willing? – to talk about someone or something. It is a verb 
already in the past tense, conveying the long period of time that has passed until 
remembrance became possible in 1994/1995 as well as the circumstances of silence 
during the Nazi era. I would argue that it is much more than just a suitable description for 
the persecution of lesbian women and what happened to them after 1945. An indicator for 
this is the positioning of the two terms ‘killed’ and ‘silenced’ on the triangle. Although 
they are on the same side of the triangle there is a spatial distance between the two. One 
is at the top, farther away from the viewer and the other one is located at the bottom. The 
empty space in between the term communicates both the things that were left unspoken 
and are lost to the later generation as well as those things deemed too harsh to engrave on 
a memorial. In a sense the space is a canvas for each viewer, which can be filled with his 
or her own words that are evoked by the terms ‘killed’ and ‘silenced.’ The viewer takes a 
metaphorical road from death to life – or vice versa – when approaching the memorial 
from this side. In order to take in the rest of the memorial and connect the words with the 
                                                
4 “Totgeschlagen, Totgeschwiegen. Den Schwulen und Lesbischen Opfern des 
Nationalsozialismus”. 
5 The emphasis on persecution is especially prominent in monuments memorializing the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust, which makes sense as they were targeted exponentially 
and most viciously for annihilation. In light of the arguments that center around 
Paragraph §175 and its exclusivity for male homosexuals, including lesbians as part of 
Holocaust memorials means being aware of the terms one wants to use. 
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meaning of the memorial, the viewer has to walk around the triangle to read the 
dedication right side up. There is no taking in the meaning of the memorial, the scope of 
the persecution of gays and lesbians, without the viewer making a geographical shift 
themselves. Even then, the other side of the memorial eludes the viewer as soon as the 
shift has been made. The duality that the artist wanted to evoke with his creation thus 
stands as an opposite for two distinct victim groups with two diverse histories of 
persecution. Without diminishing the suffering of either victim group, the Cologne 
Memorial for Gay and Lesbian Victims of the Holocaust thus manages to establish a 
space of remembrance that integrates the historical differences between gay and lesbian 
persecution.6 The inscription and its placement can therefore be said to take the design of 
the monument a little further, explicitly including lesbian victims but making it clear that 
there were different degrees of suffering and persecution between male and female 
homosexuals.  
The location of the Cologne memorial, next to the Hohenzollern Bridge and in an 
area that had historically been a cruising site for male homosexuals looking for 
anonymous sex, reiterates the exclusion of lesbian victims. The same constructive 
criticism that can be employed to the flaws in design, which excludes lesbians by using 
the pink triangle, can be applied to the choice of location. Historically, the geographical 
space of the monument only has value for those who are aware of its history and any 
                                                
6 Originally the city of Cologne wanted to have the words ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ replaced 
with the more neutral term ‘homosexuals.’ After some political back and forth and with 




connection to Klappensex can only be assumed for gay men, not for lesbian women.7 The 
Cologne memorial for the gay and lesbian victims of the Holocaust is thus an ambiguous 
illustration that takes into account the differences in persecution:  
Although there was no systematic persecution of lesbians during National 
Socialism they are explicitly named in the inscription of the monument 
because their lives and infrastructure were equally influenced by the 
Nazis.8 (Lenk) 
Nevertheless, one can question why both location and design of the monument were so 
heavily influenced by references to points of gay significance. Numerous sites downtown 
were identified beforehand, which served as meeting places for both gays and lesbians 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Unfortunately, Cologne’s landscape designer, Georg Penker, 
who determined the location for the monument (cf. Lenk), made the decision to push the 
monument to the margin of Cologne. His choice, which can be presumed to be based on 
his knowledge of only male homosexual persecution during the Holocaust is a 
mechanism, I argue, that still echoes the invisibility the lesbian victims of the Holocaust 
suffer. That there is a memorial that unambiguously names the victim groups, must be 
viewed as a positive development in the representation of lesbian persecution during the 
Holocaust. Although the form of the monument and the location at the Hohenzollern 
Bridge is still only a tribute to gay men and their known (read: visible) anonymous sex 
site, the invisibility of lesbians is combated and becomes visible through the inscription 
and the allusion of having been ‘silenced.’  
                                                
7 Anonymous sex in public restrooms, the term exclusively applies to male homosexuals. 
8 “Obwohl es im Nationalsozialismus keine systematische Verfolgung von Lesben gab, 
werden diese in der Aufschrift des Mahnmals ausdrücklich erwähnt, weil auch ihre 




5.2 Frankfurt’s Angel 
As the first memorial for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust, the 
Frankfurter Engel (Frankfurt’s Angel) was unveiled in 1994 in the middle of downtown 
Frankfurt and the center of the existing homosexual culture scene.9 Interesting about the 
location of the memorial are two facts: First, that there is not historical reference to 
homosexual subculture of the National Socialist era. The initiators of the memorial were 
aware that choosing one of these historically important places would have had a major 
drawback, “they were and are located far away and remote; they would have moved the 
memorial out of the public’s eye instead of having integrated it into daily life” (IMH 
e.V.).10  Thus another marginalization of the victims was prevented; in its place gay and 
lesbian present cultural meeting places were honored. Secondly, apart from its 
noteworthy location in the immediate proximity to the heart of downtown Frankfurt, the 
square was intentionally designed for the place of the memorial. Originally only a public 
parking place, the redevelopment has turned the site into “a beloved meeting place in the 
gay and lesbian scene and is commonly referred to as ‘village square’” (IMH).11 Unlike 
the memorial in Cologne, located at the boundary of the city in a place historically known 
for the imagined infamous, anonymous, and dangerous aspect of homosexual encounters, 
the memorial site in Frankfurt is oriented towards inclusiveness and a celebration of the 
                                                
9 Memorial plaques had been installed in Mauthausen concentration camp as early as 
1984, but the first actual monument not built on or near a concentration camp was 
Frankfurt’s Angel. 
10 “Sie lagen und liegen auch heute noch abseits und hätten das Mahnmal eher aus dem 
öffentlichen Blick gerückt als in das Leben eingebunden”. 
11 “In der schwul-lesbischen Szene ist er heute ein beliebter Treffpunkt und wird 
allgemein auch als »Dorfplatz« bezeichnet”. 
 
 148 
things yet to come.12 It is not only integrated in the landscape of the city, but also alive 
and welcoming with benches to meet and rest.  
That the memorial is integrated into the landscape and inclusive of both genders is 
also visible in the form of the monument, which deviates from the commonly used 
symbol of the pink triangle.13 As the name suggests, the statue of an angel dominates the 
center of the memorial square. Artist Rosemarie Trockel used the reproduction of a 19th 
century angel that was initially part of a series for the western entrance of the dome of 
Cologne but changed its meaning by cutting off the head and attaching it slightly 
misaligned. The breaking point is still visible as a scar on the neck of the angel. Various 
interpretations of this act include its violence, the remnant of a scar where the break can 
and will never heal and the misaligned head, which seems only ever so slightly out of 
place. It seems like a nod to Paul Klee’s painting Angelus Novus and the interpretations 
by Walter Benjamin about the angel of history that anxiously has his eyes wide open and 
wings spread,  
the angel’s face is turned to the past and where we perceive a chain of 
events, the angel sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would like to stay, 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise and entangled itself in his wings. The storm 
propels the angel forward, into the future to which the angel’s back is 
                                                
12 The only sign of it being a space of remembrance for male homosexuals, which the 
newly developed space carries, is the name it was given once the memorial had been put 
in place. Named after Klaus Mann the reference to male homosexuality subtly aligns the 
otherwise neutral space with gayness when it comes to sexual orientation.  
13 Of the 19 memorials for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust that exist worldwide 
at the writing of this dissertation, 14 make the pink triangle a central part of reference to 
the group of victims. Prominent examples are the San Francisco “Pink Triangle and 
Memorial Park” consisting of 15 triangular-shaped steles with pink inlays on top, and the 
Amsterdam “Homomonument” made up of three smaller pink triangles laid in the ground 
which form a bigger triangle in its entirety.  
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turned while the pile of wreckage grows skyward. This storm is what we 
call progress.14 (Benjamin and Raulet 182) 
Rosemarie Trockel’s angel is a memorial for past suffering and persecution in the 
present, with injuries of its own where the storm and wreckage of the past have wounded 
it, yet it is still standing and reminding the viewer that there is a future ahead. Embedded 
in the surroundings of inclusiveness and intentional redevelopment of its location, 
Trockel’s memorial suggests an unusual approach to the culture of Holocaust memorials. 
Without drawing on the symbols of the oppressors, i.e. pink triangle, sites of terror; 
without focusing exclusively on the suffering of the victims the artist created a design 
mindful of the persecution while demonstrating that memory is kept alive by those who 
keep on living.  
In the figure of the angel, Rosemarie Trockel additionally accomplishes 
navigating the male versus female homosexual persecution debate successfully. Because 
the angel is neither male nor female, nor visible as a symbol of solely male homosexual 
persecution, the viewer has the choice of how to perceive the statue. In the accompanying 
book available about the history of the monument in Frankfurt, Jean-Christophe Ammann 
reflects that the angel “isn’t only male/female, it is also subject and object. As it focuses 
desire on [the angel] it also embodies a form of enlightenment. Enlightenment about 
‘being different’ likewise constitutes the character of the angel” and adds that in its 
                                                
14 “Er hat das Antlitz der Vergangenheit zugewendet. Wo eine Kette von Begebenheiten 
vor uns erscheint, da sieht er eine einzige Katastrophe, die unablässig Trümmer auf 
Trümmer häuft und sie ihm vor die Füße schleudert. Er möchte wohl verweilen, die 
Toten wecken und das Zerschlagene zusammenfügen. Aber ein Sturm weht vom 
Paradiese her, der sich in seinen Flügeln verfangen hat [und so stark ist, daß der Engel sie 
nicht mehr schließen kann]. Dieser Sturm treibt ihn unaufhaltsam in die Zukunft, der er 
den Rücken kehrt, während der Trümmerhaufen vor ihm zum Himmel wächst. Das, was 
wir den Fortschritt nennen, ist dieser Sturm”. 
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androgynous form it comes closer to our actual human experience of being and the 
enlightenment perception of ‘being different’ (IMH).15  
Lesbians are also explicitly mentioned in the inscription on the pedestal the angel 
is mounted on, without differentiating as much as emphasizing the similarities of being 
humans capable of love: 
Homosexual men and women were persecuted and murdered. The crimes 
were denied, the dead concealed. The survivors were disdained and 
condemned. We bear witness to this with the knowledge that men who 
love men and women who love women can always be persecuted again.16 
(IMH)  
Like the statue itself, which integrates past and present, suffering and hope, the 
words on the pedestal echo recognition of suffering without creating a hierarchy. Men 
and women were persecuted and murdered; survivors – regardless of their gender – were 
disdained and condemned. Here, lesbian persecution is not subordinate or a post-scriptum 
to gay persecution. It is acknowledged as equal to the suffering of gay men for the events 
of the past and observed as a possibility for the future. With an emphasis on love rather 
than sexual behavior the inscription breaks free of the Nazi definition and role 
expectations for gender-appropriate behavior. Instead of focusing on procreation, the 
sexual act, dominant men and subordinate females, women loving women (or men loving 
men) centers on cherishing another person without being subjected to a state-agenda.  
                                                
15 “Er ist nicht nur männlich/weiblich, er ist auch Subjekt und Objekt. So wie er 
Begehren auf sich fokussiert, verkörpert er auch eine Form der Erkenntnis. Die 
Erkenntnis des »Andersseins« konstituiert gleichsam das Wesen des Engels”. 
16 “Homosexuelle Männer und Frauen wurden im Nationalsozialismus verfolgt und 
ermordet. Die Verbrechen wurden verleugnet und die getöteten verschwiegen. Die 
Überlebenden verachtet und verurteilt. Daran erinnern wir in dem Bewusstsein, dass 





5.3 Berlin’s ‘Homomonument’ 
Within walking distance from the Brandenburg Gate, concealed in a secluded spot 
of the Tiergarten Park and diagonally across from the ‘Memorial to the Murdered Jews of 
Europe’ is the ‘Memorial to Homosexuals Persecuted under Nazism.’ The central 
location of the monument in close proximity to the Reichstag unites multiple important 
factors. It is a reminder of the power exercised by the Nazi state and its officials in 
persecuting homosexuals, it points to the failure of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
keep §175 in an unrevised form until 1969, and yet at the same time it stands as tangible 
evidence for the recognition of homosexuals as another victim group.17 During the 83rd 
session of the German Bundestag in 2003 minster of state for culture and media Dr. 
                                                
17 In 1969 the age of consent for legal homosexual acts between men was set at 18 years, 
only after the reunification of East and West Germany §175 was debated to be abolished 
and in 1994 it disappeared as a punishable offense from the penal code. 
Figure 5.2: Frankfurter Angel. Memorial in Frankfurt, Germany. 
IHM e.V. “Frankfurter Engel – Mahnmal Homosexuellenverfolgung.” Frankfurter Engel. 
Web. 15. Feb. 2015. 
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Christina Weiss delivered a keen speech about the importance of the monument and its 
location: 
It is due time that homosexuals are remembered in the center of the 
German capital. Here, where the perpetrators did their deed, Heinrich 
Himmler ordered the installment of the headquarters for the fight against 
homosexuality and abortion in 1936. This is where roundups, arrests and 
denunciations took place. Those who criticize a memorial lane is created 
in the German capital with the memorials to the murdered Jews of Europe 
as well as the Sinti and Roma misjudge the dimension in which especially 
minorities were subjected to the systematic crimes of the National 
Socialists. It will not be concealed that the terror against the homosexuals 
was also terror against our culture. We want to remember this group of 
victims because it cannot be kept secret what price those had to pay who 
disclosed their sexual orientation. Despite all awareness raising is the 
place that persecuted and murdered homosexuals take up in our collective 
memory not very stable.18 (Weiss)  
Sidestepping for a moment the issue of whether and how lesbian persecution is integrated 
in the Berlin memorial that Weiss advocated for, I want to draw attention to her thought-
provoking statement about viewing terror against homosexuality as terror against the 
German culture. While it is arguably a sensitive matter to frame her argument in the 
context of terror against the German culture, given that she has previously contrasted it 
with the murdered Jews of the Holocaust, I argue that her framework of reference is the 
                                                
18 “Es ist überfällig, dass in der Mitte der deutschen Hauptstadt auch der ermordeten 
Homosexuellen gedacht wird. Hier, wo die Täter ihr Handwerk versahen, ließ Heinrich 
Himmler 1936 eine Reichszentrale zur Bekämpfung der Homosexualität und der 
Abtreibung einrichten, hier gab es Razzien und Verhaftungen, nicht zu vergessen 
Denunziationen in großem Stil. Wer kritisiert, in der deutschen Hauptstadt entstehe mit 
dem Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas und dem Denkmal für die ermordeten 
Sinti und Roma eine Gedenkmeile, der verkennt, in welchem Ausmaß gerade die 
Minderheiten von den systematischen Verbrechen der Nationalsozialisten betroffen 
waren. Es soll nicht verschwiegen sein, dass der Terror gegenüber den Homosexuellen 
auch ein Terror gegenüber unserer Kultur war. Wir wollen und wir werden dieser 
Opfergruppe gedenken, weil nicht verschwiegen werden darf, welchen Preis zu zahlen 
hatte, wer seine sexuelle Orientierung offenbarte. Trotz aller Aufklärungsarbeit in 
unseren Gedenkstätten ist der Platz, den die verfolgten und ermordeten Homosexuellen 




understanding in German collective memory of Holocaust victimhood. Her statement 
thus needs to be understood as an appeal to the consciousness of those who see the work 
of remembrance as done, who do not want more money or resources poured into projects 
dedicated to creating spaces of memory. 
Apart from the political importance of the location in the vicinity of the historical 
sites of persecution is also the proximity to the memorial to the murdered Jews. It seems 
like a demonstration of similarity, intended to express that there is no hierarchy in 
suffering. That there is such an intention – and that it can be taken even further from the 
location of the memorial to its design – becomes clear in the analysis of its form. One last 
interesting aspect about the location of the memorial in the Tiergarten Park is its relative 
disconnectedness from any historical meeting places of homosexuals before or after the 
Weimar Republic. Unlike the sites in Cologne and Frankfurt, where a relation to past or 
present homosexual subculture scenes exists, the location in Berlin evokes the negative 
image of anonymous, homosexual sex between men in dark corners of a park after dark. 
Such anonymity was mirrored in placing the unmarked cube a distance away from the 
two commemorative plaques that explain the purpose and history of the memorial to the 
viewer.   
At first sight the black, unmarked cube seems like an oversized imitation of the 
concrete blocks that make up the memorial for the murdered Jews only steps away hidden 
from view behind the vegetation of the Tiergarten. Artists Michael Elmgreen and Ingar 
Dragset, winners of the call for proposals, deliberately ‘borrowed’ the plain design of the 
cube from the black steles of the Holocaust memorial for the murdered Jews of Europe. 
They picked up on the design of the holocaust memorial but supplemented it with an 
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additional element: “In a small window a kissing-scene can be seen. The memorial is 
supposed to honor the victims of National Socialism while setting ‘a permanent symbol 
against intolerance, hostility and ostracism of gays and lesbians’” (“Denkmal für die 
Verfolgten Homosexuellen”).19 The cube is thus infused with meaning from the memorial 
to the Jews, representing violence, suffering and killing. At the same time, however, it 
beckons to be perceived as the anonymous block it was designed to be, allowing only a 
voyeuristic view inside like that of a Peeping Tom. The video screen behind the glass, 
originally installed to show an endless-loop of two men kissing, is the only hint as to 
what the monument is to memorialize. Lesbians did not show up in the original concept 
of the design and only after public protest and debate – as has been summarized in the 
introduction – did the artists and the endowment foundation agree to change the video 
every two years and include kissing women in the installation as well. In its design the 
                                                
19 “Die Künstler haben dabei die Formensprache des Holocaustdenkmals aufgegriffen 
und durch ein zusätzliches Element ergänzt: In einer Fensteröffnung ist ein Film mit einer 
Kuss-Szene zu betrachten. Das Denkmal soll die homosexuellen Opfer des 
Nationalsozialismus ehren und zugleich ‘ein beständiges Zeichen gegen Intoleranz, 
Feindseligkeit und Ausgrenzung gegenüber Schwulen und Lesben setzen’”. 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  ‘Homomonument’. Monument for the Homosexual Victims of the 
Holocaust. Tiergartent Park, Berlin.  




memorial is an ambiguous structure of angular masculine massiveness and nondescript 
monstrosity, making it the symbol of ‘machismo’ the artists were striving for. Lesbian 
women, though explicitly included in the call for proposals and apparently meant to be 
integrated in the memorial, cannot be found in the design of the memorial and were not 
planned as part of the original video installation either. On the contrary, in an open letter 
denying the accusations of EMMA editor Alice Schwarzer to have constructed a 
monument solely for the gay victims of the National Socialists they claim lesbians will 
find themselves in their interpretation (cf. Denkmal Verfolgten Homosexuellen). Law 
professor Monika Frommel disagrees with the idea of lesbian persecution from the start, 
saying that “to be ignored like lesbian women were by the Nazis may hurt but isn’t a 
tragedy – and certainly no persecution. The monument should only be dedicated to gay 
men” (Denkmal Verfolgten Homosexuellen).20 
In the inscription on the two commemorative plaques lesbians are mentioned but 
their suffering and possible persecution is diminished for the benefit of homosexual men: 
“The Nazis smashed the living environments of gays and lesbians. Female homosexuality 
was not prosecuted under criminal law except in annexed Austria. Lesbians were not seen 
as a threat to the Nazis. If lesbian women did get into trouble with the regime they, too, 
were subject to repressions. Gays and lesbians were intimidated and lived in constant 
necessity of deception” (Berlin).21 It stands to reason to wonder what the difference is 
                                                
20 “Ignoriert zu werden, wie die lesbischen Frauen durch die Nationalsozialisten, mag 
kränkend sein, ist aber keine Tragödie – und erst recht keine Verfolgung. Das Mahnmal 
sollte nur den schwulen Männern gewidmet sein.” 
 
21 “Die Nationalsozialisten haben die Lebenswelten von Schwulen und Lesben 
zerschlagen. Weibliche Homosexualität wurde – außer im annektierten Österreich – nicht 
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between the written word and the moving picture. Do pictures say more than a thousand 
words? Berlin is, admittedly, the only memorial with a continuous moving picture 
installation as part of its memorial for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust. Cologne 
and Frankfurt, the other two memorials analyzed in this dissertation, included lesbian 
women with little or no opposition from political or private parties as part of their 
commemorative plaques. None of them garnered the kind of public attention in 1994 and 
1995, respectively, that gripped the lesbian and gay movement in 2008 for the unveiling 
of the monument in Berlin. Comparing the original proposal by the Bundestag from 2003 
and the final inscription of the memorial in 2008, however, it becomes clear that 
recognition of lesbian persecution suffered a blow. While the last words of the inscription 
imply the memorial to be “a permanent symbol against intolerance, animosity and 
ostracism against gays and lesbians” (emphasis added), the reality of the protests 
surrounding the memorial itself and the previous negating sentences about lesbian 
persecution in particular show how deeply rooted the idea still is that only gay men were 
persecuted by the Nazis. To be sure, one cannot compare the suffering of gays with that 
of lesbians, but as with any other victim group one cannot and should not create a 
hierarchy of suffering. The Berlin memorial, with its exclusiveness to the memory of gay 
men while only laterally acknowledging the situation of lesbians during National 
Socialism created a stir, I contend, because of the inconsistencies from the conception of 
the idea to the actual realization of the memorial. The definition of persecution – what 
counts, what does not count, what may be counted under certain circumstances – would 
                                                                                                                                            
strafrechtlich verfolgt. Sie galt den Nationalsozialisten als weniger bedrohlich. Gerieten 
lesbische Frauen dennoch in Konflikt mit dem Regime, waren auch sie Repressionen 
ausgesetzt. Schwule und Lesben lebten im Nationalsozialismus eingeschüchtert und unter 
stetem Zwang zur Tarnung”. 
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have to be evaluated again to make a valid argument for the exclusion of lesbians from a 
monument for the homosexual victims of the Holocaust. Monika Frommel’s earlier 
statement that to be ignored as lesbian is a tragedy but does not count as persecution 
negates the reality of what it means to be ignored and subsumed under the umbrella of 
‘women.’ It assumes that passing as a heterosexual woman was nothing more than an 
inconvenience for lesbian women, begging the question as to why gay men could not or 
would not have played the heterosexual husband just as well.22 With the threat of §175 
hanging over their heads gays should have been acutely aware that their lives were in 
danger and that male privilege was only part of the Nazi ideology for those who 
belonged. Monika Frommel shifts the blame from the perpetrators to the victims in 
denying lesbians recognition as having been persecuted by the Nazis. The inscription on 
the monument in Berlin carved in stone the representation of lesbians as tragic but 
negligible casualties of the extermination policies of the National Socialists. 
In sharp contrast to the monuments realized in Cologne and Frankfurt, where 
lesbian persecution is recognized in writing in both inscriptions without any negation or 
limitation, Berlin recognizes and minimizes lesbian persecution at the same time. The 
fact that lesbian women were persecuted under Nazism should be enough to count them 
as victims of the Holocaust even if the exact nature of their suffering cannot be estimated. 
While the memorial in Frankfurt is also inclusive of male and female homosexual victims 
in location and design of the memorial, in Cologne only the inscription can be fully 
                                                
22 Frommel’s argument can also easily be turned against homosexual men, questioning 
why they did not simply pass as heterosexual men in a heterosexual marriage and played 
their role as heterosexuals males. Why did they not dress differently, act differently, and 
simply be different to pass as heterosexuals?  
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counted as a positive affirmation of lesbian persecution. The use of the pink triangle as a 
marker of homosexual concentration camp prisoners and the location at a former cruising 
spot for gay men limits the lesbian association with the memorial to its plaque, which 
nevertheless explicitly differentiates between the victims that were silenced and those 
that were killed.  
I argue that Cologne’s differentiation between ‘silenced’ and ‘killed’ is a good 
indicator of how to understand persecution of gays and lesbians. Silencing and killing 
both lead to a – metaphorical and real – hole in the fabric of memory, (her-/his-)stories 
that cannot be told. Persecution is the disruption that creates these holes, intended to kill 
and destroy a group of people and their memory. Thus, the unveiling of the memorials 
that happened quietly in Cologne and Frankfurt because the differences in the victims’ 
persecution were acknowledged, drew protests in Berlin due to the attempt of creating 
another hierarchy of suffering.  
In comparison with the written and filmic analysis, memorials are different due to 
the unique needs they serve. Their function as public places of remembrance, celebration, 
or mourning means political and social agendas are involved and shape how they are 
perceived. Likewise, processes to be set in motion in the viewer differ from the effect a 
book or a film are intended to have. A work of art does not need to acquiring meaning or 
justification for its existence through political or private intervention. Where art – in 
writing, cinematography, or sculpture – is free to express an individual’s interpretation of 
events, memorials need to live up to the expectation of representing a historical ‘truth.’ 
Art is therefore free to cater to an audience receptive to the interpretation of the author, 
whereas memorials are intended to reflect a more broadly accepted view. The limitations 
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imposed on memorials is not applicable for literary representations, thus making the texts 
analyzed in this study examples of a different kind of historical authenticity or truth. 
Where memorials cannot transgress the boundaries set by their status as reflections of 
history, art opens up a space of interpretation virtually free of these limitations. For the 
representation of lesbian persecution I would thus contend that the public memorials 
previously described enhance the gap of visibility between lesbian and gay victims of the 
Holocaust.   
 
 160 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
The emphasis of this dissertation has been to explore lesbian persecution during 
the Holocaust as it is represented in various forms of narratives. I have argued that 
lesbian persecution disappears at the intersection of persecution related to other 
personality traits, such as political ideology, religious belief, or class. Sexual identity is 
essentially overlaid by the category of ‘woman’, a categorization that made females 
vulnerable to victimization based on the National Socialists beliefs about gender roles. In 
addition to that, ‘woman’ in narratives with lesbian love stories set during the Holocaust 
is further subsumed under the classification of ‘Jewish woman.’ As my analysis has 
shown, religious persecution and discrimination based on sexual identity are thus 
conflated to overshadow each other: a reading as either Jewish or lesbian suffering is 
rejected in favor of the novelty of a lesbian love story.  Persecution of the Jewish partner 
is utilized and skewed to represent persecution against a lesbian couple. 
Debates about the meaning and scale of persecution are at the heart of arguments 
about exclusion and inclusion of lesbians as victims of National Socialist politics. The 
analysis of representations of lesbian persecution completed in this dissertation brought 
to light several difficulties connected to finding and recognizing representation of lesbian 
persecution during the Holocaust today. The first and basic problem was finding a shared 
definition for what counts as and constitutes persecution versus discrimination. As my 
analysis has shown, it is in the absence of one final and definite classification that lesbian 
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persecution and suffering are debated. Secondly, it was problematic to settle on whom to 
identify as lesbian and conversely distinguish where lesbian persecution was taking place 
in those narratives, which were not biographical. As I pointed out in my analysis of 
Verbotene Verhältnisse, one kiss, touch or sexual intimate act with a woman does not 
make one a lesbian. Delineating ‘lesbian’ as a sexual identity, however, and in the 
absence of personal statements to prove otherwise, the distinguishing sign of visibility for 
the analysis was physical contact between women. The third difficulty presented itself in 
the analysis of the current dialogue regarding the representation of lesbian persecution 
and its recognition in varying factions. Originating in the discourse of individual and 
collective memory of the Holocaust, lesbian persecution is ignored, moderated, or denied, 
to name but a few opinions. The participant’s views and understandings of lesbian life 
during the Holocaust are influenced depending on the collective memory they share. As a 
non-heteronormative sexual identity, lesbians are still not readily accepted in all cultures 
and societies. Thus they do not only vanish by being incorporated into other victim 
groups but also by not being recognized as lesbians, they furthermore remain invisible 
under the sign ‘woman.’ 
This brings me to the challenge of how lesbian women were represented during 
the Holocaust, how they saw themselves and how they were persecuted. In my analysis of 
biographical narratives it became clear that the National Socialist feminist ideology 
played a big part in how the women acted and reacted to their surroundings. Dressing 
‘feminine’ to fit in versus daring to stand out and risk being charged by the police as 
‘asocial’ and receiving a ticket to Ravensbrück; staying away from clubs and old friends 
for fear of being picked up or taking the chance of a fictitious marriage; the permutations 
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of possibilities are endless but the common denominator was fear. This fear is expressed 
across the board and though the women act it out differently they are all driven by the 
motivation to stay alive and – in some cases – keep those they hide alive. The persecution 
they are subjected to is expressed mostly in chauvinist behavior. Hilde Radusch, who 
loses her job after she refuses to send her girlfriend to her boss, or ‘Johnny’, who is fired 
after she reprimands her superior for groping her, are examples for this. In both instances 
neither woman behaved in the subordinate manner prescribed by the Nazis and expected 
by men in higher positions. The expected availability and subordination of women is, for 
the most part, not applicable to the lesbians in Days of Masquerade and Verbotene 
Verhältnisse. In the experience of being different and within the process of identity 
formation they have to define boundaries against those who ask “Aren’t you ashamed of 
this?” (Schoppmann, Days of Masquerade 118). It comes across as a progression that 
leaves them less vulnerable in the end. The persecution they are subjected to by the Nazis 
is compartmentalized as something that cannot be changed but has to be endured. Much 
like the taunting, ridicule and self-doubts of the previous coming-of-age and coming out 
process, the interviewed lesbian women state matter-of-factly what happened and how 
they reacted. They describe the fear and the psychological damage they still suffer.  
The movies Aimée & Jaguar and Novembermond, though both superficially about 
relationships between women, show persecutions of Jewish women, not lesbian women. 
Felice and November are Jewish and persecuted as Jews, and their lesbian identity – if it 
exists at all – is invisible and can only be inferred from the sexual acts that are shown. In 
the analysis of Aimée & Jaguar I claim that the lesbian love-story is only a means to an 
end to show the persecution of Felice, the Jew. I argue that the ‘love’ between Felice and 
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Lilly cannot and would not work if Felice were a German. The tension of the movie is 
accomplished through the power differential in the relationship between Lilly and Felice. 
The persecution that is shown, however, is always persecution against Felice as a Jew but 
never against Lilly or Lilly and Felice. Thus the aspect of lesbian persecution is irrelevant 
and invisible, it disappears behind the imminent danger Felice is in as a Jew and the 
persecution she endures as a Jew. Her death is not the death of a lesbian but the death of a 
Jewish woman who lived with and had sexual relationships with other women. 
Novembermond operates on a similar assumption of lesbian persecution, although here 
the lesbian undertones are subtler. An argument, which I believe to be central in 
understanding the representation of November as Jewish persecution and not lesbian 
persecution, is the tattoo of the word ‘Jew’ she is given during the stay at the brothel. 
Everything that marked her as Jewish is taken away from her character as soon as she is 
on the run and when she is hiding with Férial. She is still branded as a Jew, though, by 
the tattoo and it is included in various shots when her fear from detection becomes 
visible. Thus both movies, while telling the stories about two women in a relationship and 
possibly even being in love, are not about lesbian persecution but about the persecution 
of Jewish women who may have been lesbians.  
The findings from my analysis have to be revisited in order to further understand 
the implications of the way lesbian persecution and its representation influences the 
perception of lesbian life – and lesbians as victims – during the Holocaust. Few 
historians, among them Claudia Schoppmann and Ilse Kokula on whose works I have 
relied extensively, have undertaken the task of researching lesbian life and lesbian 
persecution during the Holocaust. Literary analysis of Holocaust memoirs mentioning 
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lesbians has thus far been limited to memoirs of female concentration camp survivors. In 
these memoirs lesbian behavior is described negatively, the fellow inmates see lesbian 
sexual acts between women as a power relationship. Kerstin Meier published an essay in 
1999 focusing on Ravensbrück and Auschwitz concentration camp. More scholarly 
research centering on the thousands of unpublished memoirs by female survivors of the 
Holocaust could shed more light on lesbian life. The attempts by Yad Vashem, the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum and other museums and archives to collect and 
translate survivor accounts indicate that there is material to work with. 
The limitation of this dissertation to include only publications dealing with 
Germany and Austria is a starting point for further research. A focus on fiction narratives 
or pulp fiction may add different conclusions, although I will make an educated guess at 
this point and conjecture that Jewishness and lesbianism will go hand-in-hand there as 
well. Another especially fruitful comparative analysis approach I see is the study of 
Holocaust memorials for homosexual victims. Presenting at once the perception of 
lesbian persecution as well as the representation of it in the design of the memorial site, it 
would be interesting to explore how the Holocaust is viewed and commemorated in 
countries other than Germany. One problem I see important to address in the future is the 
question of lesbians as German perpetrators. For this to be possible, though, it would be 
necessary to identify lesbian German perpetrators first, the chances of which seem 
relatively slim at the present moment, in part because women as perpetrators do not fit 
the image of women as the innocent nurturers during the third Reich, in part because the 
denominator ‘lesbian’ fades in the background behind the label of Germaneness.  
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Finally, there will have to be a shift in the understanding of lesbian identity as its 
own category within the box labeled ‘homosexuality’ before lesbian persecution will be 
recognized as such. Lesbian persecution as it was represented in the texts I analyzed did 
not represent persecution against lesbians but women persecuted as something else who 
also happened to be lesbians. As long as homosexuality is the main category and mainly 
equated with ‘gay men’, lesbians will be implicitly included and excluded at the same 
time. I propose that a change from thinking about the ‘lesbian victims of the Holocaust’ 
to ‘the lesbian women among the victims of National Socialism’ may be a first step in the 
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